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In this thesis, I use an experimental model to investigate the role of social pressures
in stimulating language divergence.
Research into the evolution of cooperation has emphasised the usefulness of in-
group markers for swiftly identifying outsiders, who pose a threat to cooperative
networks. Mechanisms for avoiding cheats and freeriders, which tend to rely on
reputation, or on (explicit and implicit) contracts between individuals, are consid-
erably less effective against short-term visitors. Outsiders, moreover, may behave
according to different social norms, which may adversely affect cooperative interac-
tions with them. There are many sources of markers by which insiders and outsiders
can be distinguished, but language is a particularly impressive one.
If human beings exploit linguistic variation for this purpose, we might expect
the exploitation to have an influence on the cultural evolution of language, and
to be involved in language divergence, since it introduces a selective pressure, by
which linguistic variants are selected on the basis of their social significance. How-
ever, there is also a neutral, mechanistic model of dialect formation that relies on
unconscious accommodation between interlocutors, coupled with variation in the
frequency of interaction, to account for divergence. In studies of real-world com-
munities, these factors are difficult to tease apart.
The model described in this thesis put real speakers in the artificial environment
of a computer game. A game consisted of a series of rounds in which players were
paired up with each other in a pseudo-random order. During a round, pairs of
players exchanged typed messages in a highly restricted artificial “alien language”.
Each player began the game with a certain number of points, distributed between
various resources, and the purpose of sending messages was to negotiate to exchange
these resources. Any points given away were worth double to the receiver, so, by
exchanging resources, players could accumulate points for their team. However, the
pairings were anonymous: until the end of a round, players were not told who they
had been paired with.
This basic paradigm allowed the investigation of the major factors influencing
language divergence, as well as the small-scale individual strategies that contribute
to it. Two major factors were manipulated: frequency of interaction and competi-
tiveness. In one condition, all players in a game were working together; in another
iii
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condition, players were put into teams, such that giving away resources to team-
mates was advantageous, but giving them to opponents was not. This put a pressure
on players to use variation in the alien language to mark identity. A combination
of this pressure and a minimum level of interaction between teammates was found
to be sufficient for the alien language to diverge into “dialects”. Neither factor was
sufficient on its own.
The results of these experiments suggest that a pressure for the socially based
selection of linguistic variants can lead to divergence in a very short time, given
sufficient levels of interaction between members of a group.
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Two facts about language are undeniable. The first is familiar to most people from
everyday experience: it is that language communicates not only propositions, but
also social information about the speaker. The second fact requires some knowledge
of history, though it is enough to be dimly aware that French, Italian, and Spanish
all used to be called Latin. What can be inferred from this is that languages change,
and not only that—that one language can diverge into multiple accents and dialects
and, ultimately, new languages. Such data provoke a hypothesis: perhaps the two
facts are related. Indeed, they must be. If there were no such things as accents and
dialects, then language could not communicate social information in the way that
it does. Perhaps, though, the causality also runs in the opposite direction: does
the need for social marking lead languages to diverge into new dialects (or at least
hasten their divergence)? This is the question this thesis addresses.
1.1 Why suicide bombers shouldn’t have Yorkshire
accents
Whenever we speak, we give away all sorts of social information about ourselves:
where we are from; what kind of school we went to (or go to); what kind of job we
do; even what we like to do in our free time (see Section 9.2.3). We tend to forget,
since we take it for granted, that this is somewhat curious. There are in fact two
parts to the question of why it is the case: the first is the question of why speech
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varies according to such factors; the second is why listeners are so good at learning
to interpret the variation—what is the use of doing so?
It is this second question that looks most in need of an answer. The fact that
speech patterns vary at all looks as if it can be explained in terms of random drift,
and the fact that people from the same community sound like each other may be
explicable in terms of variation in the frequency with which people talk to each other
(although see Section 1.2 below). But this does not explain why we pay so much
attention to the variation. Not only do we notice it, but we attach importance to
it. Enough importance, in fact, that parents pay large sums of money to send their
children to schools where they will learn not to talk like them. Enough importance
that people take time out of their day to write to the BBC to complain about
Americanisms, or about Radio 4 announcers sounding Jamaican (Kirby: 1 April
2006). Enough importance that, after the 7/7 London suicide bombings, when a
video of one of the bombers was shown on Al-Jazeera, the Times reported:
Shehzad Tanweer, 22, a university dropout from Beeston, Leeds, is
shown speaking with a Yorkshire accent, wearing a Muslim headscarf
and jabbing his finger at the camera. (Fresco et al.: July 6 2006)
It is fascinating that a respected British national newspaper should find it worthy
of mention, in the first paragraphs of an article, that a young man from near Leeds
spoke with a Yorkshire accent. There may even be a clue here as to why accents
matter to us; and there may be a further clue in the limits that exist on our ability
to distinguish them. We are rather good at telling if another person is not from the
same place, or the same social group, as we are, but we tend not to be very good
at distinguishing between all the different “not-one-of-us” accents, except where
this happens to be especially relevant to us. A native of Edinburgh, for instance,
is likely to be rather good at identifying Glaswegians by the way they speak (and
distinguishing them from people from Stirling, or Perth); and, in principle, this
should not be a very hard task, as there are relatively significant differences to
pick up on. In spite of this, however, visitors from outside Scotland tend to find
it rather hard to make the distinction. It is not, therefore, that human beings are
extremely well attuned to all linguistic variation; it is rather that we are very good
at learning the (often subtle) distinctions that are relevant to us. This suggests that
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the ability is, primarily, about identifying outsiders to one’s own group and, perhaps
secondarily, about distinguishing between outsiders we encounter frequently. The
very point of the ability, it would seem, is that it allows us to tell if someone is
part of our group or not. This is why it shocked people that a Muslim terrorist had
a Yorkshire accent instead of a Middle-Eastern one; and this is why some British
people worry about Americanisms on Radio 4: because they feel Radio 4 belongs
to them, and putting on the speech patterns of another group feels like disloyalty.
We are still in the realm of proximate explanations, however—why, after all, do
we care about whether or not someone is part of our group? The best ultimate
explanation for such behaviour has to do with cooperation, and the mechanisms
that support it, which depend on an ability to distinguish between individuals who
have a local reputation to consider and outsiders who do not. This will be discussed
in detail in Chapter 2.
1.2 The drive to sound different
If this is the explanation for why we pay such attention, and attach such value, to
linguistic variation, does it also play a role in explaining how the socially structured
variation comes about in the first place? It was suggested above that socially struc-
tured variation might be explicable simply in terms of random drift and variation in
the frequency with which speakers interact, given that people come to speak most
like the people they talk to the most. This is the the view of Trudgill (2004, 2008a),
and, as the most parsimonious explanation, it should be our null hypothesis. On the
other hand, Atkinson et al. (2008: 588) found evidence for “rapid bursts of change
associated with the emergence of new languages.” This suggests that there may be
something more going on, at least some of the time: that, as was suggested in the
first paragraph of this introduction, the need for social marking may drive people
to sound different—or rather, to sound less like some people and more like others.
It should not be understood from this that people set about trying to create new
dialects. Atkinson et al. (2008) begin their article with Noah Webster’s assertion
that:
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as an independent nation, our honor requires us to have a system of our
own, in language as well as in government. (Webster 1789: 20)
This is misleading. As will be discussed more in Section 9.2.1, it seems highly
unlikely that this kind of explicit planning is how new dialects usually come about,
or even that this is how American English came about (certain spelling conventions
excepted). If identity plays a role in language divergence, then it is rather more
likely to play a role in the everyday interactions of individuals and the choices they
make, whether they are aware of it or not, in how to use language. It is here,
in these small-scale strategies, that “social selection” can be said to play a role:
the (conscious or unconscious) selection of linguistic forms for social reasons. The
opposition between this social-selection model and the interaction-frequency model
in explaining language divergence will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3, and is
the focus of the central question of this thesis.
1.3 An underused methodology
The question will be addressed by means of experimental simulation. This is a
methodology that has a relatively long history, and which has been employed with
some success more recently to investigate the origins and evolution of language
(Galantucci 2005; Kirby et al. 2008; Scott-Phillips et al. 2009). It has not been
much used to research change in modern language, however. There are likely to
be two main reasons for this. First, evolutionary linguists have no real-life data
to work with that can shed a direct light on language origins; they are forced to
take more indirect routes and create data through simulation. Historical linguists,
by contrast, have centuries of recorded language to work with, eked out by recon-
structions of proto-forms from periods before literacy. Given this, simulated data is
less necessary, although computational and mathematical simulations have begun
to show their worth (Nettle and Dunbar 1997; Nettle 1999; Livingstone and Fyfe
1999; Livingstone 2002; Oudeyer 2005; de Oliveira et al. 2008; Baxter et al. 2009;
Kirby to appear).
Chapters 5 to 9 will present a series of such experiments designed to address
the central question of this thesis: the role of social factors in language divergence.
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This paradigm involved having participants learn an “alien language” of twenty
made-up words and use it to play a game in which they negotiated with each
other, anonymously, to exchange resources. In one condition, players were divided
into teams, and the game was set up such that it was advantageous to give away
resources to teammates, but not to opponents. Frequency of interaction was also
manipulated. This allowed two main questions to be investigated: first, were players
able to come up with sociolinguistic markers in a made-up language they had only
just learnt, and without the means to discuss their strategies explicitly; and, if
so, under what conditions? Second, did this behaviour lead the alien language to
diverge significantly? The strategies that players used, their patterns of gift giving,
and the relationship between their score in the game and other factors were all also
investigated.
1.4 Other questions
Questions have a habit of inviting their friends. The use of the word “selection” in
the title of this thesis raises questions about cultural evolution: do the commonal-
ities between language change and biological evolution, new-dialect formation and
speciation, imply they are fundamentally examples of the same process? This will
be addressed in Chapter 4. Questions more directly concerned with biological evo-
lution will be discussed in Chapter 10, along with some suggestions of how they
might be answered: are human beings innately biased to pay special attention to
linguistic cues (as opposed to other cultural and biological cues, such as race)?
Has a pressure for social marking led to selection for variability in language? How
should we explain children’s impressive ability to learn several languages at once?
This chapter will finish with a tentative sketch of the evolutionary path envisaged.




The problem of cooperation
Cooperation is enormously important. It is easy to suppose, and it frequently is
supposed, that cooperating is something human beings do, but which is otherwise
rare. This reflects a serious misunderstanding: cooperation is everywhere. It has
played a fundamental part in the history of life, and at all levels of life (Dawkins
1989: 37–45; Axelrod and Hamilton 1984). Maynard Smith and Szathmáry (1995: 4)
note that the most important feature common to their major transitions in evolution
“is that entities that were capable of independent replication before the transition
can replicate only as part of a larger whole after it.” Not only our societies, but also
our bodies, our cells, and the very DNA that codes for the proteins of which our cells
are made are testament to the power of cooperation. Yet explaining cooperation in
evolutionary terms is problematic. As Maynard Smith and Szathmáry (1995: 4) put
it: “why does not selection between entities at the lower level disrupt integration
at the higher one?”
2.1 Defining cooperation
Before going further, it would be useful to be clear what is meant by cooperation,
and related terms like “altruism”. Such terms are not always used as clearly and
as consistently as they might—particularly outside biology—and this has led to
confusion. West et al. (2007) provide a good summary of the confusion and clarify
key terms, in general following established practice in biology, although also making
recommendations of their own, and this thesis will follow them in their use of terms.
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Along with Hamilton (1964) in his classification of social behaviours, they define
cooperation as follows:
a behaviour which provides a benefit to another individual (recipient),
and is selected for because of its beneficial effect on the recipient. (416)
Several points about this definition should be borne in mind:
• Benefit is to be understood as an absolute, not a relative, fitness benefit. The
important question is whether recipients produce more offspring than they
would in the absence of the cooperative behaviour. Even if some individual
recipient benefits relatively more than other recipients from the behaviour, in
other words, it still counts as cooperative for all beneficiaries.
• The fitness benefits to the recipient must be direct. A fitness benefit is direct
when it increases the number of offspring that a given organism produces,
and which survive into adulthood; it is indirect when it increases the number
of surviving offspring produced by individuals carrying the same cooperative
allele. If behaviour were called cooperative on the basis of only an indirect
benefit to the recipient, then selfish behaviour would be included, since it
indirectly benefits close relatives of the actor (stealing from one’s siblings
would be cooperative, because the effect on one’s own reproductive success
would indirectly benefit the same siblings!). Indirect fitness is important to
accounts of cooperation, but chiefly in explanations of apparently altruistic
behaviour (see Section 2.2.1), where the indirect benefit to the actor—not the
recipient—plays a key role.
• The fitness benefit in question is to be understood not as the short-term
benefit of a particular cooperative act, but in terms of average lifetime payoffs;
behaviour may thus be cooperative even if, on a particular occasion, it happens
to “misfire”. For example, feeding your children is a cooperative act, even if,
on one occasion, they are unlucky enough to get food poisoning.
• The costliness of a behaviour should be understood in the same terms: be-
haviour is costly or harmful to the extent that the average lifetime payoff from
it is negative.
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• Cooperative behaviour should be selected for. Parasites benefit from various
behaviours of their hosts, but this does not mean that these behaviours are
cooperative.
Finally, it will be noticed that no reference is made to the actor’s payoff under
this definition. Altruistic behaviour, which can be defined as behaviour costly to the
actor and beneficial to the recipient, is, therefore, a subset of cooperative behaviour.
West et al. (2007: 418) suggest “mutual benefit” as a term to describe cooperative
behaviour that is directly beneficial to both parties.1
Non-cooperative social behaviour can be distinguished along the same lines: self-
ish behaviour is behaviour beneficial to the actor and costly to recipients (i.e. has
an average negative fitness payoff for other individuals); behaviour that is costly to
both the actor and the recipient is termed “spiteful” (ibid.). This is summarised





+ Mutual benefit Selfishness
− Altruism Spite
Table 2.1: Summary of social behaviour types (cf. Hamilton 1964; West et al. 2007:
418)
1This should be distinguished from “mutualism”, which—while it is often used in this sense—
is also frequently used to refer to interspecific cooperation. See West et al. (2007: 418) for a
discussion. Clutton-Brook (2009), by contrast, uses it in to refer to instances where actors benefit
by being a part of a benefiting group.
2If the minus signs are taken to represent an indirect benefit instead of a direct cost, then the
left half of the table remains the same, since it is indirect benefit that explains altruism. For
both cells in the right half of the table, however, the meaning of “recipient” changes: this indirect
recipient must now be a relative of the actor. The top right cell would thus still represent selfish
behaviour, but the bottom right would now, like the bottom left, represent altruism, the difference
being that there is some other, direct, recipient—a relative of both—not included in the table.
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2.2 Explaining cooperation
Explaining cooperative behaviour has long been an intriguing problem for evolu-
tionary thinkers, including Darwin (1879/2004: 119–72). It should not be assumed,
however, that it poses a problem for evolutionary theory in particular. Social con-
tract theory, in which the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century philosophers Thomas
Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau stand out as the best known
figures, is an early-modern response to very much the same question, which has
engaged philosophers in all eras. It is this:
Under what conditions will cooperation emerge in a world of egoists
without central authority? . . . in situations where each individual has
an incentive to be selfish, how can cooperation ever develop? (Axelrod
1984/1990: 3)
Nor is the problem a mainly hypothetical one, or one that concerns only hu-
man behaviour (as noted at the start of this chapter, cooperation is to be found
throughout nature). In spite of Axelrod’s vivid choice of words, the problem does
not lie in an irreconcilable mismatch between an evolutionary world of selfishness
and some creationist world of altruism. It is clear that cooperation can arise from
selfishness; the problem of explaining cooperative behaviour in evolutionary terms
is in pinning down precisely how it contributes to the actor’s fitness. A first distinc-
tion to be made is between direct and indirect benefits3 (see Section 2.1, page 8,
for a definition of these terms, and Section 2.2.1 for more discussion), although,
of course, both kinds of benefit may be involved in a given case. If it is direct
(i.e. if the behaviour is mutually beneficial), then either a group of actors draw a
shared benefit from some cooperative enterprise, or an actor is compensated for a
particular cooperative act by cooperative acts from other individuals. The problem
becomes one of explaining how such a system is enforced. If the benefit is indirect
(and the behaviour is thus altruistic), then the problem lies in uncovering the level
of kinship necessary for such behaviour to be adaptive, and the means by which the
actor establishes this.
3Actors and recipients differ in this respect. It will be recalled that cooperative behaviour is
defined as behaviour that directly benefits some recipient. The benefit to the actor need not be
direct.
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Section 2.2.1 will discuss indirect fitness benefits and kin recognition in more
detail, while Section 2.2.2 will discuss enforcement in mutually beneficial behaviour.
2.2.1 Indirect benefits and altruistic behaviour
Altruism is cooperative behaviour in which there is no direct benefit to the actor. In
view of this, it should be noted that some behaviour that appears altruistic is in fact
mutually beneficial. The term “altruism” has even been applied in the literature
to such behaviour. For example, behaviour has been termed “weakly altruistic”
where it is costly to the actor relative to the individuals it interacts with in its
group (see Wilson 1975, 1977; cf. the use in Boyd et al. 2003 of the term “altruistic
punishment”, which may or may not be strictly altruistic). As West et al. (2007:
420–1) show, however, such behaviour can in fact increase the individuals’ direct
fitness. Similarly, the term “reciprocal altruism” (introduced by Trivers 1971) is
often used for situations where a cooperative act is rewarded by another cooperative
act that benefits the first actor. This reward, however, means that the behaviour is
not in fact altruistic in a useful sense of the term, and is instead mutually beneficial.
Several writers (e.g. Hamilton 1996; West et al. 2007) prefer alternative terms like
“reciprocity” for this reason.
True altruistic behaviour that does not involve an indirect fitness benefit for the
actor (i.e. does not on average provide a direct fitness benefit to other bearers of
the gene) should not be expected to evolve by natural selection. This is as much
as saying that for behaviour to evolve by natural selection, it must be selected
for. A classic example of altruistic behaviour, clearly explicable by indirect fitness
benefits, is of a parent aiding its young. This is simply a particularly salient case
of kin selection; any altruistic behaviour can be explained in this way provided the
average indirect benefit outweighs the cost of the behaviour. Formally, we should
expect genes for any behaviour to increase in frequency whenever rB > C, where
r is the genetic relationship between the actor and recipient, B is the benefit to
the recipient of the behaviour, and C is the cost to the actor. This is known as
Hamilton’s Rule (Hamilton 1964).
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It is important to note that this does not mean every altruistic act must be
beneficial to the actor; such behaviour can be expected to operate on a rule-of-
thumb basis (cf. Hutchinson and Gigerenzer 2005), provided that the average net
payoff is positive. This allows a certain amount of abuse, as can be seen in the
behaviour of cuckoos, who lay their eggs in the nests of other bird species. It is
not the case that the mother birds targeted by cuckoos have no mechanisms for
identifying their own young; they do not, for example, try to feed rocks. Rather,
it is these very identification mechanisms that cuckoos exploit—in this case, the
genetic instruction to treat as kin “any small bird sitting in the nest that you built”
(Dawkins 1989: 102; cf. Komdeur et al. 2008: 181; see Komdeur and Hatchwell 1999
for a review of kin-recognition mechanisms in birds).
2.2.1.1 Mechanisms of kin recognition
There are several possible kinds of kin-recognition mechanism (see Hepper 1991,
2008 for a review).4 One solution might be provided by a “green beard”, where a
gene, or group of linked genes, produces three things: a recognisable phenotypic
effect; recognition of this trait in others; and preferential behaviour towards indi-
viduals exhibiting the trait. The idea was first put forward by Hamilton (1964), and
given a name by Dawkins (1989: 89). Though theoretically possible, such effects
have generally been assumed to be rather unlikely to arise. As Dawkins puts it:
Green beardness is just as likely to be linked to a tendency to develop
ingrowing toenails or any other trait, and a fondness for green beards
is just as likely to go with an inability to smell freesias. It is not very
probable that one and the same gene would produce both the right label
and the right sort of altruism. (ibid.)
In spite of this, Keller and Ross (1998) provide evidence for one—now frequently
cited—case in ants, and there are other cases to be found in microbes, where the
link between genotype and phenotype is relatively simple (West and Gardner 2010).
4Kin-recognition aids the evolution of altruism by helping propagate the genes that underlie
it. It might be objected that “trait-recognition” could do the job just as well, if not better, since
altruistic behaviour may be more unambiguously identifiable than kinship. This is misleading, for
if the altruistic behaviour identified in such a case were based on different genes, then there would
be no indirect benefit to the actor, and there would still be pressure for kin-recognition. If there
were instead a direct benefit to the actor in rewarding such behaviour, then this would be a case
of mutual benefit, not altruism.
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More broadly, however, various more general heuristics can be expected to be em-
ployed for recognising kin (Dawkins 1989: 99–107), including physical resemblance
and childhood relationships. Shepher (1971) found, for example, no cases of mar-
riage or heterosexual activity between individuals raised in the same peer group on
a kibbutz, the implication being that the instinct for incest avoidance was operating
with a kin-recognition heuristic based on upbringing patterns. There is also evi-
dence that grandparents make quite subtle adjustments in behaviour on the basis
of the likelihood of kinship; Laham et al. (2005) found, for example, that grand-
children tend to have closer relationships with maternal grandparents than with
paternal ones, while Michalski and Shackelford (2005) found that this had an effect
on grandparents’ actual investment of time and money. Other behaviour may serve
to reinforce assumptions of kinship; Daly and Wilson (1982) found that newborn
babies are alleged to resemble their fathers far more often than their mothers.
On the other hand, kin-recognition mechanisms may work well enough on a much
more general level: in populations with sufficiently low levels of migration, or limited
dispersal (such groups are called “low-viscosity” groups), levels of kinship between
all members are likely to be sufficiently high for altruistic behaviour to be directed
indiscriminately towards other members of the group (Dawkins 1989: 100), although
there is simulation evidence to suggest that the increased competition between kin
can cancel this effect out (Wilson et al. 1992; Taylor 1992a,b). It is also worth
noting that, as behaviour towards adoptees, pets, or other organisms in loco infan-
tis shows, human beings can easily develop feelings of kinship towards unrelated
individuals, even when the lack of kinship is obvious to all involved. Explanations
for non-kin adoption have made reference to the heuristic nature of kin-recognition
(Dawkins 1989: 101), evolutionary lag (where adoption is no longer adaptive for
the adopters, but once was, owing to the low-viscosity of the group; see Barash
1982: 327), or mutual benefit (where the adopted child provides some direct benefit
to the adopters; see Lindgren and Pegalis 1989). We should of course be careful
of simply assuming that relationships between adopted children and their parents
are necessarily exactly like those between parents and genetic offspring, whether
for better or worse. It is at least the case that some adoptive parents lack a sense
of entitlement to their children, for which they may compensate; however, Miall
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(1987) explains this with reference not to the parents’ own views, but to societal
stigma aimed primarily at infertile couples and couples who choose to be childless.
She found that attitudes towards adoption are influenced positively by familiarity
with families that have adopted children.
In all the enforcement mechanisms described above, there remains a potential to
cheat the system: outsiders can become attached to low-viscosity groups, pose as
kin, or even pose as offspring. Even a green beard is not foolproof—if a phenotypic
trait can evolve that is genetically linked to cooperative behaviour, then it can
presumably evolve without that link too. Of course, simply not being kin need
not matter; a population of individuals behaving altruistically to one another is
barely distinguishable from a population of indirectly reciprocal cooperators (that
is, individuals who cooperate with others on the basis that the others are also
generally inclined to cooperate), and if the kin-cheat returns favours, then it causes
relatively little harm to the cooperative system. But the cheat who poses as kin
and also gives little in return for favours can also do very well indeed. In this case
some form of enforcement may become necessary, of the kind described in the next
section.
2.2.2 Enforcement in mutually beneficial behaviour
Mutually beneficial behaviour is cooperative behaviour where both the actor and
the recipient benefit directly. As benefit is to be understood as a lifetime fitness
benefit (see Section 2.1), the benefit to the recipient may consist in being the recip-
ient of such behaviour at a later date. Alternatively, two or more individuals might
work together to achieve some goal from which they all benefit, or one individual
might exchange skills or goods with another. All this counts as mutually benefi-
cial behaviour, and the three examples just given are hardly exhaustive. In some
cases, enforcement is integral to the activity: to have a favour returned is to be
rewarded for doing the favour. Nor does the relationship between one favour and
another need to be explicit—an individual is rewarded for a propensity for doing
favours by living in a population of similarly inclined individuals. There are other
kinds of enforcement, however, which may be more negative, and several—often
overlapping—terms are used in the literature. They fall into two broad categories:
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• Positive enforcement. Several terms are used:
– Reward: Cooperative behaviour is directly rewarded, either by the re-
cipient of the behaviour or a third party.
– Reciprocity: This, first described in evolutionary terms by Trivers (1971)
as “reciprocal altruism”, can be summed up as “I’ll scratch your back
if you scratch mine”. It involves a direct reward, as the individuals in-
volved reward each other for cooperative behaviour. Where an individual
behaves cooperatively on the assumption that the behaviour will be re-
ciprocated at a later date, Gintis (2000) calls this “weak reciprocity” (cf.
“Strong reciprocity”, described below).
– Indirect (reputation based) reciprocity: An individual is made the recip-
ient of cooperative behaviour on the basis of their reputation as a co-
operative individual—meaning that members of a group are constantly
reassessed (Alexander 1987; for formal models of this see: Nowak and
Sigmund 1998a,b; Panchanathan and Boyd 2003).
– Strong reciprocity: This term was introduced by Gintis (2000) to describe
individuals who are “predisposed to cooperate with others and punish
non-cooperators, even when this behavior cannot be justified in terms
of self-interest, extended kinship or reciprocal altruism” (169). In other
words, there is a direct fitness benefit, but not one that relies on the
cooperative behaviour being directly rewarded, or on the expectation of
direct reciprocation. A strong reciprocator benefits by being a member
of a group that is made more successful by the behaviour in question.
The explanation, in spite of Gintis’s claim, thus relies ultimately on self-
interest (cf. West et al. 2007: 426, who argue that such claims confuse
proximate and ultimate explanation).
• Negative enforcement. Again, several terms are used:
– Policing: Behaviour in a group is monitored and uncooperative be-
haviour is punished (see below).
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– Punishment/sanction:5 Uncooperative behaviour (such as failing to re-
turn a favour) is directly punished, either by a directly involved individ-
ual, or by some third party. Punishment involves incurring some sort
of cost to the malefactor, and may consist solely in spreading word that
the individual is uncooperative. Such reputation-based punishment re-
quires a sophisticated communication system, but, once such a system
is in place, it is comparatively cheap (Dunbar 1996).
The role of culture in all these kinds of enforcement may, of course, be significant
(Richerson et al. 2003; Henrich et al. 2010). It is not the case, of course, that
such mechanisms are foolproof. They can all be circumvented. The next section
discusses this.
2.3 The problem of freeriders
The terms “free(-)rider”, “free(-)loader”, and “cheat(er)” are all used more or less
interchangeably in the literature to refer to individuals who exploit cooperative
systems so that they can enjoy the benefits undeservedly (Boehm 1997, for example,
uses all three with no obvious distinction between them). The most commonly used
of the three terms is “freerider” and so will be the one employed here, particularly
as the compound term “freerider problem” is well established.
In the case of altruistic behaviour, as discussed in Section 2.2.1, a freerider is
an individual who poses as more closely related to an altruistic actor than is the
case. In the case of mutually beneficial behaviour, a freerider is one who fails
to return favours, defaults on deals, contributes less to but enjoys more of the
fruits of teamwork, and so on. Such behaviour can be punished, as described in
Section 2.2.2. However, such punishment can be avoided by cheats who do not stay
around long enough to receive it. Reputation-based punishment (a relatively cheap
form of punishment, at least for humans) is useless against an individual who moves
faster than the speed of gossip. Therefore, a mobile individual who travels from
community to community, exploiting each in turn, can be particularly dangerous
5These terms both occur in the literature, but there is no obvious attempt to distinguish them
(cf. Fehr and Rockenbach 2003; Fehr and Fischbacher 2004; Houser et al. 2008)
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(Enquist and Leimar 1993). Such individuals can also exploit altruistic behaviour
in groups with limited dispersal (see Section 2.2.1).
Learning, through reputation and observation, to avoid cooperating with specific
individuals is a useful strategy, but this will do nothing to protect against exploita-
tion by individuals you happen not to have met or heard of yet (and, even if you
have been warned of a particular cheat, this does not mean you will recognise them
when you meet them). In the face of a serious threat from outsiders, two approaches
remain: decreasing one’s investment in cooperation and compensating by increasing
the number of interactions, or limiting the recipients of one’s cooperative behaviour
to individuals who are likely to form part of the same cooperative network—that
is, treating newcomers with suspicion. This may involve refusing to cooperate with
any newcomer, which is suitable for extreme situations, but which seriously limits
the potential for mutually beneficial interaction. Not all newcomers, after all, are
equally likely to defect. Newcomers from nearby are more vulnerable to gossip,
for example; an individual from the next village has more of a local reputation to
maintain than someone from another country. Among neighbouring communities
there will also be distinctions: members of hostile communities are more likely to
defect than members of friendly ones. This means that mechanisms which allow
information to be inferred about an unfamiliar individual’s origins are valuable and
aid cooperation. Inferring such information is not trivial; that it might seem so
chiefly reflects the numerous mechanisms we have evolved (or invented) for ingroup
recognition.
2.4 Identifying oneself and others
Information about an individual’s group membership can be stored in a variety of
places. Section 2.2.1 gave some examples of heuristics that might be relied on to
identify kin, mainly based not on identifying features of the individual in question,
but on the “normally . . . reliable correlation between genetic relatedness and the
spatial/temporal component of association” (Halpin 1991: 222; see also Komdeur
et al. 2008). Such heuristics are reliable in relatively low-viscosity groups, but
can obviously become very unreliable if non-kin are regularly present. In these
cases, it may become necessary to rely on associating specific cues with individuals.
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Beecher (1982) coined the term “signature system” for cues that exhibit greater
inter-individual than intra-individual variation, and are thus suitable for identifying
individuals.
Above the level of the individual, such labels can become associated with groups—
what Halpin (1991) calls “group cues”. He notes that these tend to be either
individually-distinctive cues of the sort mentioned above, or a combination of such
cues. They also tend to be environmentally acquired rather than genetically de-
termined (223). That last fact means that such cues can be used for groups not
defined by genetic relatedness. Cues of this sort need not necessarily even be exhib-
ited on the organism in question, as demonstrated by animals that scent-mark. To
take a very specifically human example: governments (and other institutions) often
store quite extensive information about people, and issue passports for the explicit
purpose of identifying people’s membership of particular communities. Such doc-
uments, of course, may or may not be carried by the person referred to in them,
but technology—such as photography and fingerprinting—has long been employed
to strengthen the links between the document and the individual referred to in it.
A government database can be seen as an externalised version of what human be-
ings, and other animals, possess without the intervention of technology: (mentally)
stored information about other individuals. Such information can, when transmit-
ted through communication systems, behave somewhat like other affiliation cues
stored in the environment, although access to them (as in the case of government
databases) is restricted by the possessors of the information. The sort of informa-
tion stored mentally might range from a list of individuals in one’s own social group
to detailed information about the social relationships between these individuals
(and oneself) and individuals in other groups, as well as the relationship between
social groups themselves. It has been argued convincingly that the relatively large
size of anthropoid primate brains is best explained by the cognitive demands of
the relatively complex social structures of these primates, based on networks of
non-reproductive pairbonds (Byrne and Whiten 1988; Dunbar 1998; Dunbar and
Shultz 2007; cf. Herrmann et al. 2007). There is, moreover, good evidence of the
importance to hunter gatherers of both regional and long-range social ties, which
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Whallon (2006: 261) refers to as a “‘safety net’ . . . in times of local resource scarcity
or failure”.
The amount of information that can be stored mentally is clearly limited by the
memory capacity of the individual, but can be supplemented and extended (at least
in human beings) by such external devices as address books and social-networking
websites, at which point the distinction between environment and individual is again
blurred (cf. Clark and Chalmers 1998). Stored information, however, will always
be somewhat wanting: first, storage capacities put a limit not only on how much
information can be stored, but also on speed of retrieval, even when cognition is
supplemented by technology. Second, such information as can be stored must be
gathered from the environment in the first place. Third, information previously
gathered from the environment is inherently more likely to be out of date than in-
formation currently in the environment. Fourth, stored information is of much less
use with new acquaintances. Therefore, while it is reasonable for extensive and de-
tailed information (gathered over long time periods and frequently updated) about
an inner-circle of contacts to be stored in memory, this needs to be supplemented
by heuristics and mechanisms for interpreting cues directly from the environment
or the individual in question.
2.4.1 Markers
This brings us to the case where individuals carry information about their affiliations
on their person. To the extent that these are on display, they can be termed
markers.6 Such social markers can be useful both to their bearers and to others.
To its bearer, a marker is useful if it signals membership or non-membership of
groups in such a way as to maximise the fitness benefit for that user. In many cases
this may involve appearing to belong to the same group as other individuals in an
6This term is chosen for its relative transparency, and because it is already used in this sense
in the literature (e.g. Boyd and Richerson 1987; Nettle and Dunbar 1997; McElreath et al. 2003).
However, it should be noted that a distinction is normally drawn in sociolinguistics between
markers, stereotypes and indicators. With regard to linguistic variation, indicators are below the
level of conscious awareness, but correlate with social (though not stylistic) factors; stereotypes
correlate with social factors, but are above the level of conscious awareness, and attract positive
or negative evaluation; markers may or may not be above the level of conscious awareness, and
correlate with social and stylistic factors, but tend not to attract evaluation. For simplicity’s sake,
such distinctions will be ignored in this chapter.
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interaction, or at least the majority of them; it may be more beneficial, however,
to appear to be of the same group as the most influential minority, or at least
of a group favourable to them. In other cases it may be equally, or even more,
important to signal one’s lack of connection to a particular group. It would seem,
therefore, that there would be pressure for individuals to develop chameleon-like
markers that are able to change to suit circumstances. There are two pressures in
the opposite direction, however: first, to be perceived as too fluid in one’s affiliations
is quite dangerous, as it identifies an individual as considerably less trustworthy (it
is possible to be considered too charming). It will almost always be preferable to
be considered an honest member of the wrong group than a false member of the
right group. Second, there is pressure on observers to attach more weight to more
reliable markers; this means that the most trusted markers are likely to be those
that are inherently hard to fake, or change.
2.4.2 Criteria for good markers
To individuals other than the bearer, then, a social marker is useful to the extent
that it provides accurate information about the bearer’s identity and affiliations. In
order to be accurate, it must fulfil several criteria. Here a distinction must be drawn
between variables and variants: a variable is a trait that can vary (e.g. hair colour),
and a variant is a particular instance of that variability (e.g. red hair).7 The ideal
marker is one where a given variant is costly to obtain and to imitate (an imitation
being a trait designed, whether by natural selection or cognitive means, to resemble
a trait exhibited by another individual).8 This recalls theories of honest signalling
in biology, such as Zahavi’s Handicap Principle (Zahavi 1975, 1977; Zahavi and
Zahavi 1997). Costly signalling has also been put forward as an explanation for
7Boyd and Richerson (1985: 33) contrast cultural variants further with “cultural repertoires”,
which consist of the information an individual inherits culturally—a particular collection, in other
words, of cultural variants.
8The term “imitation” can be used in two ways. First, it is a name for a process by which
something is copied; second, it is a name for the product of that process. In the second sense in
particular, the term tends to imply some lack of authenticity. This is at the root of the implied
distinction here between the costliness of obtaining a trait and the costliness of imitating it, which
are not necessarily the same thing. In fact, there are two ways in which imitating a trait might
differ from obtaining it. Either the imitation resembles the actual trait only at a certain level of
detail, but not at other levels (consider, for example, a tattooed freckle); or it has a different level
of permanence (hair dye lasts less long than natural hair colour, and is not inherited genetically).
The second is in fact a special case of the first.
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“strongly reciprocal” cooperative behaviour (Gintis et al. 2001; see Section 2.2.2,
page 15, of this thesis) and—most relevant to the current discussion—for certain
religious behaviours and rituals as costly markers of affiliation and commitment to
a religious group (Irons 2001; Sosis 2003; Ruffle and Sosis 2007).
There are two pressures in the other direction. First, the ideal marker must
not be too costly to obtain or possess; the cost should not outweigh the benefits
of bearing it. Second, the ideal trait must be obtainable by any genuine member
of the relevant group. To act as a social marker, a trait should also be suitably
salient—as a variable, it should be suitably easy to observe, and a given variant
should be suitably distinct from others—a marker is no good if it can only be seen
in restricted circumstances, unless those circumstances coincide with the relevant
contexts (in which case, the marker is sufficiently salient for those contexts). Finally,
as group dynamics are prone to shift, a variable trait should be flexible enough to
accommodate this, at least across generations, but ideally within a single lifetime
as well. It will be noticed that there is a tension here: on the one hand, a marker
should not be so flexible that its bearer can adjust it too easily and use it to deceive
(i.e. its variants must be sufficiently costly to obtain and hard to imitate); on the
other hand, if it is too inflexible, it can be made unreliable by changes in group
dynamics.
Any trait that varies across human populations may be a candidate for use as
a social marker. The variation in such traits may be more or less genetically de-
termined: variation in eye colour, for example, is mainly determined genetically;
variation in clothing, on the other hand, is dependent mainly on culture and local
environment (climate, availability of materials etc.), although this is not to say that
there is no genetic component in shaping individual and cultural tastes. There is
much interaction between all these influences, and modern technology even allows
cultural manipulation of eye colour. Nevertheless, a continuum can be said to exist
between those traits in which variation is chiefly genetic in origin and those traits in
which variation is chiefly cultural in origin, and the position of a trait on this contin-
uum influences how well it fulfils the criteria of costliness, imitability, and flexibility
across generations. The more that variation in a trait is genetically determined, the
more costly the trait will be to obtain (one must be born to the right parents to
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possess it). This kind of trait, however, tends to be very inflexible. Traits in which
variation is chiefly cultural tend to be more flexible, at least across generations, but
tend to be less costly to obtain and easier to imitate. The flexibility of a marker
within an individual’s lifetime is influenced by the trait’s position on a different
continuum: relative permanence. For example, tattoos and many other forms of
body modification can be said to have a high degree of permanence (and thus be
less flexible), while clothing has considerably less. Neither continuum is especially
relevant to the salience of a marker, which depends on a wide range of factors: a
large tattoo on one’s chest is a very salient marker when one’s chest is on display,
for example, but not at all if it is covered.
There are, then, very many possible sources of markers, and their suitability
varies considerably. If it were the case that all Scottish people had red hair, that
no English people had red hair, and that hair dye were hard to come by, then red
hair might be a useful marker of Scottishness. Nevertheless, such a situation would
make it almost impossible for people without red hair to be considered fully Scottish.
Of course, there do exist human communities that actively exclude people on the
basis of such genetic traits, but this goes beyond what is necessary for protecting
one’s community from freeriders, and can make it hard for a group to increase
its membership, where group augmentation may be beneficial for all members (cf.
Kokko et al. 2001). One might replace red hair in the example with a much more
flexible, similarly salient, cultural trait like the wearing of kilts. This could be a
good marker, but only if kilts were very hard to make or obtain for non-Scots. To
return to the real world: it may indeed be reasonable to assume that a person
with red hair and a kilt has some strong connection with Scotland, but if any
importance hung from the identification, most observers would be inclined to seek
some better marker, and most would be especially interested in the speaker’s accent.
Among all the possible human traits in which variation could be exploited as a
marker of identity, linguistic variation seems an especially good source (cf. Nettle
and Dunbar 1997: 98). A person’s accent is a salient trait in social situations. It
is flexible across generations (infants learn whatever speech patterns occur around
them) and even within a single lifetime (Harrington 2006). Yet in spite of this
flexibility, learning new speech patterns takes a considerable time, and considerable
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exposure to the target; this appears, moreover, to be generally easier—for reasons
that are still debated—for children than for adults (see e.g. Penfield and Roberts
1959; Lenneberg 1967; Newport et al. 2001; Abrahamsson and Hyltenstam 2008).
Moreover, duality of patterning 9 means that language has an enormous potential for
semantically meaningless variation, which—for speakers familiar with the code—is
not detrimental to communicative function.
2.4.2.1 Broader explanations for cultural markers
This chapter has focused on the development of cultural markers that allow indi-
viduals to identify themselves as belonging to a particular social group, and it has
explained this in terms of a need to distinguish between insiders and outsiders to
one’s group as a means of avoiding freeriders. There are, however, other reasons for
non-functional cultural variation between groups. In a classic study of vocal learn-
ing in birds, Nottebohm (1972) gives population identity (alongside kin recognition)
as a proximate explanation for geographically defined songbird dialects. The ulti-
mate explanation is that “Panmixia between neighbouring populations hinders the
development of local adaptations” (123). Boyd and Richerson (1987) give a similar
explanation for ethnic markers in human beings: that they allow individuals to
identify suitable models for social learning, and thus allow more accurate cultural
adaptation to variable environments. McElreath et al. (2003) make a similar argu-
ment and, indeed, argue that this explanation is preferable to the cooperation-based
explanation, which (with reference to Nettle and Dunbar 1997) they do not find to
be cogent. Their arguments for the latter point, however, are rather briefly stated,
and are far from convincing; indeed, it seems they have misunderstood the position
they are opposing. There are two arguments. The first is that:
Altruism can evolve only if some cue allows altruists to interact with
each other preferentially so that they receive a disproportionate share
of the benefits of altruism. One such cue is kinship . . . and another is
previous behavior. (122)
9See Hockett (1960). This refers to the fact that language consists of two layers: a meaning-
less layer of sound units—phonemes—which is associated, arbitrarily, with a layer of meaningful
units—morphemes, words, and syntactic patterns.
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This is an argument against group markers as an explanation for the evolution of
altruistic behaviour. It is indeed correct that the existence of such markers cannot
explain why people are cooperative or, more specifically, altruistic. This, however,
is a straw man. The word “cue” is also used misleadingly, which conflates two very
different things. Kinship and previous behaviour clearly are cues to cooperation:
once an individual has been identified as kin, or as reliable, then this is a cue
to act cooperatively towards them. Cultural markers are also often referred to
as cues, but they are cues to something different. McElreath et al. seem to be
suggesting that they are a poor substitute for kinship and previous behaviour. This
is missing the point. As argued above, it is not trivial to identify new individuals
either as kin or as reliable cooperators, and this is precisely why social markers are
useful. They are cues to kinship or potential reliability (on the basis of belonging
to the same group). They are not, in other words, an alternative explanation for
cooperation, but a means of reinforcing exactly those cues that McElreath et al.
mention. Their second argument relates to green beards (122–3). Again, they are
right that this is unlikely to work as an explanation for altruistic behaviour (see
Section 2.2.1.1). However, given that the issue in question concerns cultural markers
and that green beards are by definition genetic, McElreath et al.’s argument in this
regard is strikingly beside the point.
McElreath et al.’s own argument is that “markers function to allow individuals to
interact with others who share their social norms” (123), which they support with
a mathematical model. This is convincing, and entirely reasonable. It is, however,
far less different from Nettle and Dunbar’s (1997) own view than they seem to be
claiming. Both are arguing that markers allow the identification of conspecifics
as members or non-members of one’s own group, since it is beneficial to interact
differently with the former than with the latter. McElreath et al. see the benefit
as being about identifying other individuals likely to share one’s own social norms,
which allows one to maximise the payoff from the interaction. This, however, is
still about cooperation, and it still assumes that the most beneficial cooperative
interactions are likely to be with members of one’s own group. The difference be-
tween the positions is that Nettle and Dunbar focus on avoiding outsiders who will
exploit the interaction—the existence of whom, McElreath et al., for some reason,
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see as an argument against Nettle and Dunbar’s position (128)—while McElreath
et al. focus on avoiding outsiders who will misunderstand the norms governing the
interaction. Not only is the difference small, but the two positions are eminently
compatible. Indeed, as McElreath et al. note themselves (128), the social norms
involved may well be moral norms concerned with preventing exploitation. In any
case, it would be misleading to assume that the only purpose for cultural markers of
group identity is to identify potential freeriders and cheats, and it would be entirely
wrong to explain human cooperative behaviour simply on the basis of ethnic mark-
ers. McElreath et al. are right about the importance of markers to the maintenance
of groups based on shared social norms, but are misleading in their suggestion that
this is opposed to explanations that make reference to cooperation.
2.4.3 Social selection
A social marker, as noted on page 19, is useful to its bearer to the extent that it max-
imises fitness benefits to that bearer. This means being associated with the right
groups and not with the wrong groups. We should thus expect variants of traits
to be selected (whether consciously or unconsciously) on the basis of their social
significance, which is not, it should be noted, inherent to the variant itself—at least
in language—but comes about through association with individuals and groups of
individuals. This process can be termed social selection (cf. Croft 2000: 32; Nettle
1999), although other terms are in use, such as Boyd and Richerson’s (1985: 132–
71) more general (i.e. not specifically social) “biased transmission”. They make
a distinction between “direct bias”, whereby an individual directly evaluates the
worth of a particular cultural variant,10 “indirect bias”, whereby the worth of a
variant is based not on an evaluation of the variant itself, but on its selection by
another successful individual, and “frequency-dependent bias”, where the worth of
a variant is determined based on the number of other individuals exhibiting it (135).
It should also be noted that, in addition to such cultural selection of a variant by
10On some functional basis, for example. Although this does not necessarily mean that the
cultural variant in question is actually valuable. The proximate explanation for why many animals
gather shiny things is that they are innately biased to be attracted to them. There is an ultimate,
adaptive, explanation underlying this, but that does not necessarily mean that every shiny thing
must be of functional use to the animal that picks it up.
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an individual, a cultural variant may spread because it gives its bearers a repro-
ductive advantage, and via this route gain a frequency-dependent advantage over
other cultural variants (cf. Boyd and Richerson 1985: 227–40; Boyd and Richerson
1987; Soltis et al. 1995 on the related notion of cultural group selection). Of course,
genetic evolution and cultural evolution should be expected to interact significantly.
Individuals may, for example, select cultural variants because of the fitness advan-
tage they confer. On the other hand, a cultural variant (e.g. contraception) may
benefit from cultural selection, but lower the reproductive fitness of the individuals
selecting it (for a discussion of gene-culture coevolution, see Laland 2002, 2008).
The extent to which a trait can be directly selected by the bearer will also vary
considerably, as discussed in Section 2.4.2. In any case, if a trait is selected for on
social grounds, whatever the nature of the selection, this should affect its distribu-
tion. If this occurs in language (and, as noted at the end of Section 2.4.2, language
seems to be an especially good source of social markers), then we should expect it
to play a role in language change. Chapter 3 will discuss this in more detail.
Chapter 3
Change and variation in language
Chapter 2 discussed the evolution of cooperation and argued that the use of social
markers aids cooperative interaction, by allowing members of a group to quickly
identify outsiders who may exploit the cooperative behaviour of group members,
or, more broadly, whose social behaviour may be governed by different cultural
norms. It was also argued that language—for reasons given in Section 2.4.2—is a
particularly good source of such social markers. Given this, we might expect social
factors to play an important role in language change, in particular in encouraging
divergence into dialects. This is somewhat more controversial in linguistics than
might be expected, however, and Section 3.3 will discuss the controversy. First,
though, Section 3.1 will look at what precisely is meant by change and variation in
language, and the relationship between them.
3.1 The meaning of variation and change in language
For social markers to exist, there must be variation—in language this means more
than one way of saying the same thing. Since linguistic signs are arbitrary, there is
in principle an infinite number of ways of saying the same thing. In practice this
is limited by the number of acoustically distinct sounds producible by the human
vocal tract (far from all of which are available for use in any given linguistic variety);
however, there remains an enormous potential for variation in language, and this
variation is the raw fuel of socially driven change; it is, indeed, a prerequisite of it.
The process by which variation arises in language, however, is also usually called
change. Obviously different things are meant by the word “change” in both cases.
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To be clearer about what is involved, it is worth probing the relationship between
change and variation a little more deeply.
That change and variation in a communication system should be closely related is
not quite a logical necessity. One can imagine a system in which variation remained
entirely stable across time, or a population of robots whose identical communication
modules all changed in unison. But in a culturally acquired system of the kind that
we have, the two are inherently associated. What, however, is the relationship? It
seems on first sight that they can be understood, respectively, as diachronic and
synchronic reflexes of each other (cf. Milroy and Milroy 1985: 344). Understood this
way, change is just diachronic variation. This seems to make some sort of intuitive
sense, but it will not quite do. We would, presumably, also want to use the word
to refer to the appearance of a new variant in some context, or its spread through
a population. Here we do not seem to quite mean “diachronic variation” so much
as the process that brings that variation about.
When we say that new variation has arisen, we also need to be clear with respect
to what: one speaker or a population of speakers? On top of that, we must account
not only for the appearance and spread of new variants, but also for the loss of old
one, and shifts in their usage: the pejoration of “silly” and the lamentable loss of
“neorxnawang” are evidently signs of change. Nor, finally, can we restrict ourselves
to talking of changes in production, as some writers (e.g. Janda and Joseph 2003)
appear to want to do. Underlying production is linguistic knowledge in the heads
of speakers and, in being clear about what change and variation are, we need to
be clear about how they relate to both production and competence. Sections 3.1.1
and 3.1.2 will attempt to define variation and change in a useful way for the purposes
of this thesis.
3.1.1 Variation
First, variation should be distinguished from variability (cf. Section 2.4.2). A lin-
guistic variable is any linguistic item that can vary, and a variant is a particular
case of that variation. The level or domain in which a variable is to be found is
dependent on context and does not form part of the definition. For example, one
might treat the concept of [meat] as a variable with, as its variants, words for meat
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in various languages, whether represented orthographically or phonemically: meat,
mso, cig ; /mit/, /"mjaso/, /kig/. Alternatively, one of these words, say the free
morpheme {meat}, might be considered a variable with such phonetic variants as
[mit], [miP], [mIit], [m@IP].
There will usually be a context or set against which this is to be considered, and
that depends on the particular research question. A researcher may be interested in
all the words for [meat] in the world’s languages, but may just as well be interested
in the phonetic realisations of the word (or one of its phonemic segments) in a
particular monolingual corpus, or even a single conversation. These are all cases
of variation in production. A speaker may equally well be interested in looking
at variation in the competence of a particular speaker, or in the grammars of a
particular population.
This leads us to a definition of variation:
The existence of more than one variant for a given variable.
It will be noticed that no distinction is drawn between synchrony and diachrony.
For sets of utterances at least, this is partly because a principled distinction is rather
hard to maintain. Research on dialogue has consistently shown that speakers align
to each other over the course of a conversation (Bock 1986; Branigan et al. 2000;
Pickering and Garrod 2004, 2006; Pardo 2006); is a corpus drawn from a single
conversation thus diachronic? Then what is left that can be considered synchronic?
How short, in other words, must a time-window be to be considered synchronic, and
how long before it becomes diachronic? There seems less of a problem in the case
of competence: it is easier to imagine a snapshot of the linguistic variants stored
in a set of speakers’ brains at a particular moment than a split-second snapshot of
those speakers’ utterances. This is because the brain is a physical space, in which
we imagine information to be in some sense all present at the same time. Spoken
discourse, on the other hand, consists very obviously of sounds spread across time,
and is thus inherently diachronic (as is signed discourse).1 We must be cautious:
this view of brains may simply reflect greater näıvety about the nature of mental
representations. Moreover, the means currently available for investigating mental
1Written texts are a little different, but, like spoken texts, are accessed diachronically.
30 Chapter 3. Change and variation in language
representations of linguistic knowledge do not allow us to simply take such a snap-
shot in the way we might like. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable for the time being
to refer to synchronic and diachronic variation with respect to linguistic compe-
tence. With respect to production, it seems we are obliged either to talk simply
of variation, specifying the set of utterances involved, or to distinguish synchronic
from diachronic variation, specifying the length of the relevant time-windows.
3.1.2 Change
Variation was defined above (page 29), relatively straightforwardly, as “the existence
of more than one variant for a given variable”. Change is more troublesome. For
example, it has been taken for granted so far that language change is an indisputable
fact. Ritt (2004: 11), however, seems to express doubt about this very thing:
Of course, it deserves to be stressed right at the outset that the very
claim that languages actually “change” is not really self evident. “Lan-
guage change” is no “fact”, but a theoretical construct because processes
of “language change” are not observable as such. That language change
is nevertheless treated as if it were a “fact” reflects, basically, a com-
plex but plausible interpretation of observable variation among linguistic
texts from different historical periods.
The point, which has been raised in other places (see e.g. Andersen 1989: 12–13;
Janda and Joseph 2003: 13), is that change and diachronic variation are not quite
the same thing after all (or, if diachronic variation is to be called change, then it
is only one of several things referred to by that name). Indeed, Janda and Joseph
(2003: 13) advocate a three-way distinction between “diachronic correspondence”,
“innovation”, and “change”. The first refers to a comparison of two linguistic
states, separated by time; the second to an event initiated by a particular speaker
at a particular time; and the third to a process “requiring adoption, over time,
by all—or at least much—of a group.” Change in this paradigm, in other words,
is specifically change on the level of a population of speakers, or grammars; it
is a change in the distribution of variants, and is kept distinct from change in a
particular speaker’s grammar, which, if it fits into this framework at all, must come
under innovation (although the definition seems to refer specifically to production).
These distinctions are vital ones to make, and this narrow use of the term “change”
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at least accords well with what most people, particularly non-linguists, first think of
when they hear the term “language change”—given an understanding of the term
“language” as something like the combined linguistic knowledge of a statistical
clustering of speakers (see Section 3.2).
However, this division still has the potential to mislead, partly because “change”
is still a very broad term in common usage—an innovation is clearly a kind of
change, in the normal sense of the word, for example—and the word is hardly used
more precisely even in the field. Indeed, Croft (2000) quite reasonably interprets
Joseph’s (1992: 127) claim that “language change always takes place in the present,
i.e. it always occurs in some speaker’s (or group of speakers’) present” as meaning
that “only innovation is a language change” (Croft 2000: 5), a claim that not only
employs the term “change” differently from Janda and Joseph (2003), but implies
that the latter’s usage is unhelpful. Croft cites Milroy (1992) and Labov (1982)
as holding the opposite view: that a change is not a change until it has been
propagated. Similarly, Andersen (2006: 67) asserts that, “Traditionally linguists
conflate the notions of innovation and change and name different types of change
by the kinds of initial innovation that gave rise to them.”
A desire that the word be used in the narrow sense that Janda and Joseph
want thus seems a little quixotic. The best response, it would appear, is to allow
“change” to be used in a somewhat more overarching sense (see below), and to
make distinctions elsewhere. One distinction in particular is worth being clear
about. This is between what Croft (2000) prefers to call innovation and propagation
(terms that have the advantage of already being in common usage in linguistics,
and of being relatively straightforwardly applicable to complex systems other than
language). The first he uses to refer to the “creation of a novel variant” (238) and
the second to refer to diffusion of a variant (in the case of language, this usually
means from speaker to speaker, but should also be taken to include diffusion between
stylistic contexts; see Kroch 1978; Moore 2004).2
2Croft specifically defines propagation as “the increase in frequency of a lingueme [i.e. a variant]
in a language by selection.” (241) This definition seems to exclude the spread of variants by drift,
but this is more a reflection of Croft’s views of how propagation tends to occur than a part of the
definition; elsewhere he allows drift as a “relatively minor propagation mechanism” (62).
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Croft does not, of course, claim to introduce the distinction, which has a long
history in linguistics; Weinreich et al. (1968), for example, use the terms “actuation”
and ”diffusion” (to which Croft also refers, as alternatives) in a very similar way.
“Innovation” is perhaps preferable in its transparency to “actuation” (although the
term “actuation problem” is now well established), but there seems little to choose
between propagation and diffusion. In any case, the distinction is a very useful one,
which will be maintained here (see also Section 3.1.2.2). Any instance of change
must involve at least one of the two.
But this still leaves open the question of what is meant by change. A common-
sense understanding is that if there is a difference between the state of an object
at two different points in time (i.e. diachronic variation, or “diachronic correspon-
dence”, to employ Janda and Joseph’s usefully more specific term), then we can
infer that change has occurred. For example, if a house has a blue front door on
1 January 1989 and a red front door on 31 December 1990, then we can say that
the colour of the door has changed at some point during 1989 or 1990. We can
also say that the door has changed, that the house has changed and that the world
has changed. Of course, even if the door is blue at the end of 1990, there might
still have been a change—the door might have been painted red and then repainted
blue. In any case, the key issue, as Ritt (2004: 11; quoted above, page 30) implies,
is that in this example we have inferred the change rather than observed it—the
existence of the two states separated by some period of time is not itself a change.
“Change” is rather a term we apply to whatever activity led from one state to
the other: in this case, it is something that starts when the old coat of paint is
removed (if it is removed) and ends when the new coat has dried, and the desire to
be more precise about what exactly it is that counts as change is akin to the desire
to be precise about when a collection of grains of sand becomes a pile. Ritt’s point
should not be taken too far, however: it would be excessively pedantic to seriously
deny that change occurs simply because it is inferred rather than directly observed.
The explanandum, strictly speaking, is the fact that there is diachronic variation
in language. Theories of change attempt to explain how and why a move from one
state to another occurred; this is as much an explanation of language change as of
linguistic variation in time.
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Language change, then, can be defined as:
The process of moving from one linguistic state to another.
The next sections will expand on this. Sections 3.1.2.1 to 3.1.2.3 will elaborate on
important distinctions; Section 3.1.2.4 will provide a broad taxonomy of language
change.
3.1.2.1 Change and diachronic variation
Based on the above discussion, it seems we can say that the practical difference
between diachronic variation (or diachronic correspondence) and change is primarily
one of emphasis. The former term emphasises the difference between mental states,
or utterances, or populations of speakers, at different points in time, while the
latter emphasises the movement from one to another. The real difficulty is in
clearly specifying what has changed: moving from one state to another of what?
Some answers are straightforward. With regard to individual competence, we can
say that a speaker’s grammar has changed, or that their brain has changed. If a
new word has been learnt, we can say that a lexicon has changed. With regard
to a population of grammars, we are interested in a change in distribution: the
proportion of grammars that have a particular pattern of variants.
We must be specific about what constitutes a population, of course. If we com-
pare the same people in 1970 and 2000, then this is straightforward (even if the
practicalities of finding them are not); if we compare speakers in 1623 and 1923,3
however, then we must be clear about how we are selecting the two sets of speakers.
Perversely, for there to be change, something must remain constant. For English
speakers in one century to be compared with English speakers in another, and for
us to able to say that English has changed between the two centuries, there must be
something constant that we call English (which is precisely why Janda and Joseph
2003 use the term “diachronic correspondence”). This is not the place for an ex-
amination of the Ship of Theseus paradox—lt is enough for present purposes to be
aware of the issues—but there is one further point worth making. Some differences
3It will be objected that in both cases we are actually comparing linguistic output rather
than grammars. The point is that even with contemporaries, grammars can only be inferred
from output. We are simply more limited with historical speakers in our methods for inferring
grammars.
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between a corpus from 1623 and 1923 may be significant, but others may simply
reflect the variation that is to be expected between two corpora and which is not
statistically significant. Here there appears to be a distinction in intuition: where
the difference between two things separated by time is statistically insignificant, it
seems clearer to talk of diachronic variation; where the difference is significant, one
feels more justified in talking of change.
3.1.2.2 Innovation and propagation
Innovation and propagation were defined above (page 31), and the difference be-
tween them can be stated clearly: propagation occurs between speakers, and can be
defined as the transmission of information from one grammar into another (which
occurs via production). Innovation, on the other hand, can only occur in a single
speaker, not in a population.4 There is, granted, one terminological issue here,
which can be summed up in this question: can innovation in a grammar be dis-
tinguished from grammar-level change (as distinct from change in production)? If
not, then innovation refers both to a change in a grammar that has its origins in
that grammar and to the result of an instance of propagation. If the two can be
distinguished, then innovation is a subset of grammar-level change, and refers only
to such changes as originate in the grammar.5 Since such a distinction—between
innovation and grammar-level change—is likely to be useful, it will be maintained
in this thesis.
3.1.2.3 Production and competence
A further distinction, which has a very long history in linguistics, is that be-
tween competence and production: between the linguistic information in a speaker’s
head—their grammar and lexicon—and the utterances the speaker produces.6 In
4Of course, we tend not to be aware of innovations until they have already spread to many
grammars. Therefore we might talk of an innovation “in a dialect of English”; this is because we
do not know the particular source of the innovation (and there may be several), but also because
the innovations that tend to matter to us are the ones that propagate (cf. Milroy and Milroy 1985:
348).
5Such changes can, of course, come about as a result of propagation, where imitation is less
than perfect.
6This is not quite the same as Chomsky’s (1986) distinction between I-Language and E-
Language. The former is equivalent to competence, but the latter is essentially a term for ev-
erything else that might be referred to as language, and which Chomsky does not find to be a
coherent concept.
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the context of change, however, they are not as easy to distinguish as might be
expected, since what is called change in production tends to be simply a reflection
of a change in the grammar or lexicon. Now, inasmuch as two instances of linguistic
production from one speaker, separated by time, can differ, it does not seem unrea-
sonable to speak—at that level of analysis—of change in that speaker’s production,
just as we talk of a change in the colour of a door, when we know that, really, the
change is in the particular chemical composition in the coating on the door, and the
colour difference we perceive is a product of that. There can, however, be change
in a grammar that is not reflected in production, simply because the relevant dis-
course context does not arise that would allow the change to be revealed. At least
we can assume such changes are possible; they are, by definition, unobservable by
the methods currently at our disposal.
Innovation in production can also occur that does not reflect any change in the
grammar; a slip of the tongue is a familiar example. Can we speak, however, of
propagation in production? First, it should be noted that linguistic production is
the only means by which propagation occurs. In a simplified example, a speaker
says something (the form of which, slips of the tongue aside, is constrained by their
grammar); another speaker hears this and, perceiving something novel (whether
consciously or unconsciously), makes some change to their grammar.7 In this case,
if the hearer then reproduces the novel variant, this simply reflects propagation
between grammars, not production.
So can propagation occur in production, but not between grammars? We might
consider the case where a speaker produces a variant that is not encoded in their
grammar (presumably as a production error), and this variant enters the grammar
of another individual. Here there is at least propagation from production to gram-
mar, not from grammar to grammar via production. How about propagation to
production? This could occur if a speaker were to imitate something that another
7This is, of course, greatly simplified and, to an extent, theory-dependent. In a more exemplar-
theoretic account, every variant heard would be stored mentally—counting, trivially, as a change—
and, eventually, changes in the proportion of variants might lead to a more significant shift in the
grammar. In any account, we should certainly not expect every novel variant to induce a significant
change in the hearer’s grammar; there must be something more involved, be it frequency, prestige,
or some other biasing factor.
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speaker said, but without storing it in their grammar.8 If this is an imitation of a
production error, then we have propagation from production to production, via the
speakers’ brains, but plausibly not via their grammars.
3.1.2.4 Kinds of change
A movement from one linguistic state to another can take four forms.9 It might
involve:
(a) the introduction of new items (e.g. a new word for something, or a new speaker);
(b) the removal of items (e.g. the loss of a past-tense form, or the death of a
speaker);
(c) the replacement of one item with another (i.e. the simultaneous occurrence of a
and b);
(d) the reorganisation of items, where an already-existing item takes on some new
role, or the relationship between items changes (e.g. euphemism, where a pho-
netic string expands in scope to refer to a new referent).
While these four categories are most obviously applicable to innovation, where
the “item” is some linguistic variant, they also apply to propagation. Change at
the population level can also be discussed in the same terms—the unit in this case
would most often be the grammar, or speaker.
3.2 Convergence and divergence
Language change invariably leads speakers to become less or more like each other.10
In terms of the kinds of change discussed in Section 3.1.2.4, this is a reorganisation
8Again, this understanding depends somewhat on our understanding of what constitutes a
grammar. In an exemplar-based model, then speakers might store everything they hear, albeit in
some cases fleetingly, in their grammar.
9Andersen (2006: 67) defines innovation in much this way (though in broader terms), as “(a)
the introduction by a speaker . . . of a new variant, or (b) the modification of an existing variation”,
yet mysteriously neglects the removal of variants (unless this is considered to be included under
“modification”).
10In fact, it should be noted that the degree of difference between two speakers may well depend
on the context in which they are speaking. Intra-speaker variation, whether defined in terms of
dialect or style (a distinction Moore 2004 is in favour of abandoning) is ubiquitous, and has been
long recognised (e.g. Trudgill 1974; Kroch 1978). A particular case of this—alignment between
two speakers in dialogue—will be discussed in more detail in Section 3.3.1.2. An extreme (though
also unexceptional) case of such variation is multilingualism, and the evolutionary context to this
will be discussed in Section 10.3.
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change (type d) on the level of a population; on the level of the speakers’ grammars,
on the other hand, other kinds of change are involved.
When speakers become more like each other, this is called convergence, and it
represents a reduction in variation; the opposite—when speakers becomes less like
each other—is divergence, which represents an increase in variation. Neither pro-
cess, nor the relationship between them, is quite as simple as it may seem (cf. Giles
et al. 1991). Consider the relationship between Latin and the modern Romance
languages: these languages are quite reasonably perceived as having come about
through a process of divergence. Nevertheless, on the level of individual speakers
and groups of speakers, there must have been convergence involved as well. If the
history of Romance speakers from the fall of the Western Roman Empire to now
could be described entirely in terms of divergence, then we would expect there to be
an extravagant multitude of Romance idiolects, not the relatively manageable col-
lection of languages and dialects that we in fact see. Divergence leads to a spreading
out across linguistic space, and convergence to a coming together at some point on
it; a combination of the two leads to statistical clusters in the space, and it is these,
on the whole, that get called languages and dialects (see Croft 2000, 13–20, for a
related discussion in evolutionary terms).11
The development of Latin (or, more accurately, Proto-Romance) into the modern
Romance languages, in other words, was the divergence of one statistical cluster into
several. The actual movement in linguistic space, however, was done by individual
speakers (replaced periodically through birth and death), and this involved both
divergence and convergence. The relationship between Ancient Greek and Modern
Greek, by comparison, is of a different kind. Here, several clusters converged into
one, and this must have involved convergence between individual speakers. Strictly
speaking, koineisation of this sort need not involve divergence between speakers, al-
though in practice one can assume that at least some divergence between individual
speakers will inevitably occur.
11The distinction between the two is famously fuzzy, and may involve political factors. Of two
clusters of similar density, for example, one may be treated as representing one language, while
another may be treated—for political reasons—as representing two or more.
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Convergence is mainly driven by the propagation of variants between speakers.12
Divergence between members of a speech community, on the other hand, must
involve either innovation by members of the community or the arrival of new variants
from outside it. In any case, something new must be introduced. However, as
noted above, if divergence is to mean divergence into dialects and not idiolects,
there must be convergence involved, and thus propagation within the community.
This propagation must in some way be biased; if it were not, then variants would
propagate equally between all members of the community, and speakers would end
up neither closer to each other nor further apart. The simplest such bias is based on
frequency of interaction, which may simply be the result of geographical distance
between speakers (including the presence of natural barriers that hinder travel).
On the other hand, there may be some other bias involved: variants may be more
likely to propagate between some speakers than others, and the reasons for this are
likely to be social, involving such specific factors as prestige and identity.
3.3 Social factors in language change
It is well recognised in linguistics, and has been for a very long time, that language
is affected by social factors. The field of sociolinguistics, after all, is primarily con-
cerned with the association between social variables and linguistic ones. Although
the field had its origins in work on dialectology that began in the nineteenth cen-
tury, modern sociolinguistics owes a considerable amount to the pioneering work
of William Labov, and one of his earliest articles, his 1963 study of sound change
in Martha’s Vineyard, is still cited both as a foundational paper for the field (see
e.g. Meyerhoff 2006; Pope et al. 2007)13 and in support of the claim that social
factors play a significant role in language change and divergence (e.g. Nettle and
Dunbar 1997: 93). This study showed that the use of certain phonetic variants
12It may also involve homoplasy, and in some cases this is quite likely. As historical linguists have
been very well aware for a long time, intervocalic voicing need reflect neither common ancestry
nor borrowing.
13As Meyerhoff (2006: 20) points out, this study was almost, but not quite, the first study to find
evidence for the involvement of social, as distinct from geographical, factors in language variation.
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by inhabitants of Martha’s Vineyard correlated significantly with attitudes to out-
siders, especially the rich visitors who would spend their summers on the island.14
Fishermen selected centralised variants of the (ay) and the (aw) diphthongs, ap-
parently unconsciously, which were associated more with traditional island speech
patterns than with the outsiders. In Labov’s words: “the meaning of centralization
. . . is positive orientation towards Martha’s Vineyard” (306; italics original). Blake
and Josey (2003) carried out a follow-up study on the island forty years on, which
suggested that, at least with regard to the (ay) variable—the focus of their study—
the situation was no longer as Labov had found it. In contrast, work by Pope et al.
(2007), which was a closer replication of the original study, found similar results to
Labov, especially for the (aw) variable, although they also found that change had
slowed for the (ay) variable.
Labov’s study is a classic work that has had a huge impact on the field, and which
seems to provide clear evidence for social selection at work in language change.
However, a fact often forgotten or ignored is that Labov himself is cautious of how
broadly it can be applied:
The Martha’s Vineyard study . . . is frequently cited as a demonstration
of the importance of the concept of local identity in the motivation of
linguistic change. However, we do not often find correlations between
degrees of local identification and the progress of sound change. (Labov
2001: 191)
He states, moreover, that:
It does not seem likely that the linkage between linguistic and social
structure involves the association of forms and frequencies with par-
ticular groups and calculations of the consequences of adopting their
speech forms . . . [T]he simpler and more mechanical view [is] that so-
cial structure affects linguistic output through changes in the frequency
of interaction. (ibid., 506)
14Hostility towards holiday-home owners, who are often able to buy locals out of the housing
market, and who tend not to contribute to the economy throughout the year, is not restricted to
Martha’s Vineyard. In Wales in the late twentieth century, holiday homes were burnt down by a
group called Meibion Glyndŵr, and legislation has since been passed in Gwynedd to control the
number of holiday homes. There is similar hostility in other parts of the UK, and in Europe more
widely. The stereotypical holiday-home owner—an outsider who enjoys the best of an area, but
gives little in return—is a classic freerider.
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Labov refers to the primary importance of frequency of interaction as the “prin-
ciple of density” (ibid., 19–20), according to which most cases of the propagation
of linguistic variants are explicable in simple, mechanistic terms.
3.3.1 Trudgill and new-dialect formation
Peter Trudgill, another highly significant figure in the development of sociolinguis-
tics, is of the same view, and he applies it to his explanation of the emergence of
new dialects in colonial contexts (see e.g. Trudgill 1986, 2004, 2008a). His claim
is that the emergence of new colonial dialects is the result of mixing, mediated
by accommodation in face-to-face interaction. The emergence of new dialects is
thus, in line with Labov, “inevitable” (Trudgill 2004) and mechanistic, mediated
by accommodation to one’s interlocutor—which Trudgill views as an unconscious,
automatic process—and thus ultimately by the frequency of interaction between
interlocutors. Although Trudgill admits that identity plays a role in some sociolin-
guistic situations (2008a: 243), he claims it plays no role in the formation of new
colonial dialects—indeed, that it is simply “not . . . powerful enough” to explain the
new dialects, but, rather is “parasitic upon accommodation, and is chronologically
subsequent to it” (ibid., 251–2).
This stance has much to recommend it: if accommodation occurs automatically
in ordinary discourse (though see Section 3.3.1.2), then an explanation that can
account for language change in terms of it, without invoking identity or speakers’
attitudes in general, is clearly a more parsimonious one, and there is broad support
in the field for privileging more mechanistic accounts. Croft (2000: 78) makes a
similar, though not identical, point when he states that “a good methodological
strategy would be to seek nonintentional mechanisms first, and only turn to inten-
tional mechanisms if those fail”. As Mufwene (2006; 2008) points out, moreover,
Trudgill’s account is also compatible with research into the development of creole
languages. Both he and Trudgill make reference to the uniformitarian principle
(Mufwene 2008: 254–5; Trudgill 2008a: 250–1): if identity cannot be invoked in
some cases of creole-formation and colonial dialect mixing, then there is no reason
to invoke it in other cases.
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This all seems compelling, but Trudgill’s claims have nonetheless been challenged.
His deterministic account of the emergence of New Zealand English (Trudgill 2004;
see also Gordon et al. 2004) prompted Baxter et al. (2009) to present a mathematical
model contradicting it. His 2008a paper attracted six responses in the same journal
issue (Mufwene 2008; Tuten 2008; Schneider 2008; Coupland 2008; Bauer 2008;
Holmes and Kerswill 2008), along with a rejoinder by Trudgill himself (2008b).
That the issue should attract such a significant response should not be surprising.
It certainly has great bearing on the central question of this thesis, which is why
it will be discussed in some detail here. While it is obviously a question of great
importance to the study of change and variation in language, it is also relevant
to the psycholinguistic study of dialogue (whence the concepts of accommodation
and alignment; see Section 3.3.1.2). Since it is relevant, moreover, to models of
cultural evolution and language as an example of a complex system, it is of interest
to biologists, physicists and mathematicians (see e.g. Atkinson et al. 2008; Baxter
et al. 2009). With regard to Trudgill’s own field: as Coupland (2008: 267) notes,
there has been a tendency in sociolinguistics for identity to be the “first explanatory
resource”, and, even among critics of his 2008a paper, Trudgill finds much support
in his rejection of this knee-jerk tendency (e.g. Mufwene 2008; Tuten 2008; Schneider
2008; Coupland 2008); the same point has also been made elsewhere (e.g. Meyerhoff
1998). Mufwene (2008: 257) and Holmes and Kerswill (2008: 275) also side with
Trudgill in recognising the implausibility of “guided” evolution in this context—
of speakers early in the process of new-dialect formation explicitly setting out to
create a new speech community, or deliberately developing new vowel qualities,
which Trudgill (2004: 157) rightly calls “ludicrous”.15 But this is something of a
straw man, and hard not to concede: no one would seriously argue that linguistic
divergence and dialect formation are generally best explained by such conscious
and deliberate activity. Similarly, Coupland (2008) agrees with Trudgill in his
rejection of people of disparate origins coming together in some sort of identity
pact. This is also rather a straw-man argument, however. Trudgill (2008a: 252)
cites Keller’s (1994: 100) maxim of, “Talk like the others talk”, as an expression of
15Although there are certainly several historical cases (such as in America and the Balkans) of
members of speech communities explicitly seeking to promote linguistic variants associated with
their community in contrast to another. See Section 9.2.1.
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the basic drive to accommodate. Keller’s focus in his book, however, is on the large-
scale unintended consequences of small-scale intentional actions—which he calls
“epiphenomena”, or “phenomena of the third kind”—making reference, in the title
of the book, to Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” in economics. The role of identity in
such a large-scale phenomenon as dialect formation should not, therefore, be lightly
dismissed on the grounds that large-scale intentional coordination by speakers is
implausible.
3.3.1.1 Claims and criticisms
Before looking at the criticisms of Trudgill’s thesis, it would be as well to look at
what precisely he is saying. He is really making three arguments:
1. That automatic, unconscious accommodation is sufficient to explain the emer-
gence of new dialects, and identity need not be invoked;
2. That national identity cannot be invoked before the 16th century, so should
not be invoked later either;
3. That identity is not a powerful enough factor to explain the emergence of new
dialects.
The third of these is particularly poorly motivated, and Trudgill’s argument
does not go far beyond the statement that “identity factors cannot lead to the
development of new linguistic features” (2004: 157; 2008a: 251). Be that as it may,
this is not the point, as he admits:
This is, of course, not necessarily the same thing as saying that once
new linguistic features have developed they cannot become emblematic.
(Trudgill 2008a: 251, emphasis original; cf. Trudgill 2004: 157)
He is right to call the idea that speakers are deliberately creating new dialects
from scratch ludicrous (Trudgill 2004: 157), but that is not what is being claimed.
The role identity is assumed to play is not in innovation, but in propagation16 (cf.
Baxter et al. 2009: 269). Trudgill may mean that identity is not powerful enough
on its own to lead to change, but must work together with accommodation, or
16Although that is not to exclude it as a possible source of innovation. An attempt to imitate
a particular accent for social reason might “overshoot” and lead to the creation of a new variant.
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some similar process. If so, what is the alternative that he objects to? Surely no
one seriously proposes that identity leads to language change unmediated by any
other process. The real question is whether social factors can play a significant
role at all and influence how accommodation occurs. This brings us to his first two
arguments, which are more clearly based on empirical foundations than his third.
These are the main focus of criticism in responses to his 2008 paper, of which there
are essentially four:
1. That his conception of identity is too narrowly focused on large-scale national
identity (Tuten 2008; Schneider 2008; Coupland 2008; Holmes and Kerswill
2008).
2. That his invocation of the uniformitarian principle puts the cart before the
horse in seeking to explain general processes with reference to poorly under-
stood historical case studies (Schneider 2008; Holmes and Kerswill 2008)
3. That accommodation cannot lead directly to language mixture (Bauer 2008).
4. That the processes Trudgill invokes rely themselves on social factors (Schnei-
der 2008; Coupland 2008; Holmes and Kerswill 2008).
Not all these criticisms are overwhelming. Bauer argues, for example, that ac-
commodation “cannot lead directly to a mixed dialect . . . because different speakers
will accommodate to different degrees, and, in any case, will accommodate to the
interlocutor of the moment” (272). This is true, and the possibility of variation in
levels of accommodation is a highly important one, that will be discussed in more
detail below. His point about accommodation in the moment is less convincing,
however, even given that he is certainly right that this will occur and will not—on
its own—lead to dialect mixing. Of course accommodation cannot lead directly to
dialect mixing; of course there must be some influence on the speaker’s grammar. It
seems clear, however, that such an influence is assumed in Trudgill’s model; indeed,
he makes explicit reference elsewhere to usage-based models, in which frequency
plays an important role in grammar change (Trudgill 2004: 150–1)17, a fact not
missed—perhaps unsurprisingly, given the authorship—by Baxter, Blythe, Croft
and McKane (2009).
17See Pierrehumbert (2001); Bybee (2006, 2007); Bod et al. (2003) for a review of such ap-
proaches.
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The criticism of Trudgill’s appeal to uniformitarianism is more interesting. The
point of the uniformitarian principle is that, in seeking to explain historical events—
for which we may lack data—we are best served by relying on processes with which
we are familiar through observing recent events, for which we have more data. It
is thus an application of Occam’s razor: we explain the unknown as far as possible
with reference to those entities we already know to exist. Trudgill’s argument,
however, is that there are examples to be found of new colonial dialects developing
before the 16th century, the main period of European colonial expansion, and that
there is no evidence that national colonial identity factors played a role in these
cases. Nor should we even expect them to have done so. Since we do not invoke
national identity in our explanations of these cases, he argues, we should not do
so in other cases. Schneider (2008) is right to find this an odd application of the
uniformitarian principle, but it is odd only because we generally know less about
more distant historical events. However, if Trudgill is right that we know enough
to rule out national identity in the older cases, then it is indeed more parsimonious
to assume that it is unnecessary for explaining the later cases, assuming the newer
and older cases are indeed comparable in relevant details. And the rejection of
national identity as a significant factor in the pre-16th-century cases does indeed
seem reasonable; the genesis of nationalism is, after all, usually located in the late
eighteenth century, around the time of the French and American revolutions.
Much hangs on the word national, however, and this is the clearest criticism.
There is, in short, more to identity than this; indeed, to quote Coupland (2008: 269):
“identity is often less coherent, less rationalized, more elusive, more negotiated, and
more emergent than this.” It is not as if, prior to the development of nationalism,
identity was not an important factor in human social psychology. It is simply that
the association of an individual with a nation-state, rather than a city or other
smaller-scale entity, developed at this point. Nor will it do to protest that Trudgill
is really talking only about national identity, even if this is all he refers to directly.
He is clear in his reference to the automaticity of accommodation, and he is clear
in his claim that this (mediated by frequency of interaction) is sufficient to explain
colonial dialect formation, that he is rejecting all forms of identity, and indeed social
factors more generally. Given this, his argument concerning pre-16th-century cases
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seems rather redundant. It is presumably intended to provide empirical support for
the parsimony-based claim. But, as noted, it does not go far enough. It suggests
only that new dialects can form without large-scale national identities, which is
to ignore the possibility of other sorts of identity factors (cf. Holmes and Kerswill
2008). As Tuten (2008: 259) states:
newly arrived inhabitants often faced common human and natural threa-
ts [that] could well . . . favor the development of a “frontier” identity
in opposition to local “others” . . . as well as to distant “others” who
remained in home communities.
The emphasis on some sort of explicit, coherent large-scale identity is simply
misleading (again it seems that Keller 1994 is being ignored; see page 42). It is
enough that the new arrivals identify more, on an individual level, with other new
arrivals—or with some of them—than with people they left behind, and this is
precisely what one would expect, particularly in the kind of frontier zones Tuten
refers to. They may still identify as nationals of their native lands, but that does
not mean that they identify as much with the people they left behind as with people
they now mix with. To put it another way, a bias does not have to be huge to have
a significant effect over time (cf. Kalish et al. 2007). Similarly, Holmes and Kerswill
(2008: 276) point out, with reference to Trudgill (2004), that:
Rather than searching for evidence of the development of a “New Zea-
land” identity at the early stages of dialect mixing, we should be looking
for evidence on what it would mean to sound (locally) acceptable within
any particular new, socially diverse community.
So this argument is not overwhelming. Trudgill’s best argument was always
about parsimony—that identity is simply unnecessary to explanations of dialect-
formation. It is self-evidently more parsimonious to explain any phenomenon in
terms of automatic, universal mechanisms. There is a false dichotomy here, how-
ever. Trudgill (2008a: 252) makes reference to the biological, adaptive, basis of
accommodation as evidence for its being a powerful, automatic, universal tendency.
This seems to imply that social factors have no such biological basis (Holmes and
Kerswill 2008 explicitly make the same distinction: 275). Yet, as I hope to have
shown in Chapter 2, there is good reason to suppose that the drive to mark one’s
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membership or non-membership of a particular social group also has an adaptive,
biological basis.
3.3.1.2 Accommodation and alignment
There is another false dichotomy in the implication that explanations based on ac-
commodation and frequency of interaction exclude social factors. There are two
ways for this to be false: social factors may be involved, but relatively unimpor-
tantly, or they may be integral to the process. As an example of the first case, let
us assume a neutral model, as Trudgill does, in which dialect-formation is simply
the result of accommodation to all interlocutors and variation in the frequency of
interaction. As Schneider (2008: 264) suggests, this variation in the frequency of
interaction is likely to be affected by social factors: the groups to which individuals
belong, and which shape the frequency with which they interact, are formed on the
basis of social factors related to identity. In other words, we interact more with
those we identify with more strongly. But the influence of social factors on accom-
modation here is indirect and relatively uninteresting. The more interesting second
case is where social factors exercise a direct influence. There are various ways in
which this might plausibly work: for example, speakers might accommodate more
to people they are keener to associate with; or they might accommodate more to all
interlocutors in certain socially marked situations (where, for example, nervousness
or uncertainty plays a role).
Indeed, it has long been recognised in Speech Accommodation Theory (SAT)
and its broader successor, Communication Accommodation Theory (CAT), that
speakers both converge and diverge (Scotton 1985 makes a distinction between
accommodation and “disaccommodation”), depending on attitudes. Bourhis and
Giles (1977) and Bourhis et al. (1979), for example, are classic experiments that
demonstrate accent divergence. As Giles et al. (1991: 11) note, moreover, “basic
convergent-divergent shifts are . . . not as descriptively simple as they might at
first appear.” Various sub-categorisations can be made, depending on the social
relationships between the individuals involved, the relative degree to which they
converge or diverge, and variation in the linguistic dimensions on which this occurs.
It has also long been known that convergence may be to a perceived, rather than
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an actual target (e.g. Cohen and Cooper 1986; Giles and Wiemann 1987), or may
converge on a related—and easier, or more acceptable—target, rather than the
patterns of their interlocutor (Seltig 1985).
In other words, linguistic accommodation has, throughout its theoretical his-
tory, been assumed to be influenced by identity and social relationships between
the speakers involved (cf. Coupland and Jaworski 1997; Coupland 2008; Meyerhoff
1998). As Coupland (2008: 269) states:
When Trudgill writes that “accommodation is not only a subconscious
but also a deeply automatic process,” he is challenging the fundamental
claims of the model.
All the same, there is not complete agreement on this, and Tuten (2008: 260),
for example, agrees with Trudgill that accommodation is “largely automatic and
mechanistic”. He makes reference to Pickering and Garrod’s (2004) Interactive
Alignment Model, and notes that Trudgill (2008a) does not make reference to this
himself. This is indeed surprising, for it is an important assumption of this model
that the process is largely automatic. It is, moreover, not generally assumed to
occur as a means of signalling identity, but “as a mechanism to promote mutual
understanding between interlocutors” (Pickering and Garrod 2004: 188). Since
it is concerned with establishing common ground in interactions, and is achieved
through priming (Bock 1986; Branigan et al. 2000), interactive alignment differs
from accommodation in certain respects: the model does not easily include the
possibility of alignment to an imagined target, for example. There is, however, an
important qualification to be made about its automaticity. Pickering and Garrod
(2004) argue, with reference to Bargh (1989) that alignment most likely occurs at
a “postconscious” level. Crucially, this allows the possibility of its being influenced
by external factors:
In general, we expect that rate of alignment may be affected by social
factors even when the interlocutors are unaware that they are aligning.
(Pickering and Garrod 2004: 214)
There is evidence, for example, that a desire to affiliate with the interlocutor
can enhance behavioural mimicry (Lakin and Chartrand 2003; Lakin et al. 2008),
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while Branigan et al. (2007) show that alignment can be affected by the prior
conversational role of participants.
There is nothing, therefore, about models of accommodation and interactive
alignment that specifically excludes the role of social factors. Again we return
to Trudgill’s best argument: these models provide a framework that allows the
exclusion of external factors. So if dialect formation can be accounted for with-
out reference to such factors, then it is self-evidently more parsimonious to do so.
Trudgill (along with Labov, Meyerhoff, and others) is right that this should be our
default assumption; even if identity is involved somewhere along the line, it may
form an unnecessary part of our explanation. What remain are, first, the smaller-
scale empirical questions of whether identity is relevant to particular cases of dialect
formation and, second, the broader question of what the typical pattern is—what
a generalised model should include. Baxter et al.’s (2009) mathematical model, as
it happens, suggests that identity is in fact a necessary element in accounting for
the particular case of New Zealand English.
3.4 Conclusion
Interactive alignment and, more broadly, communicative accommodation are mod-
els that allow a mechanistic explanation of convergence and divergence in language.
At the level of interaction between individual speakers, and in combination with
usage-based theories that allow language change to occur in adult speakers, based
at least partly on token frequency (Miller 1994; Croft 2000; Pierrehumbert 2001;
Bod et al. 2003; Bybee 2006, 2007), these frameworks allow the propagation of vari-
ants to be modelled theoretically, and can account—to an extent—for differential
propagation through variation in the frequency of interaction. However, they do
not exclude the possibility of social factors influencing propagation, and we might
expect these, on the basis of the discussion in Chapter 2, to play a role especially in
cases where identity is of particular importance and has some relevance to survival
and economic success. Chapters 5 to 9 of this thesis will present an experimental
model investigating this very question. In the meantime, there is a second, more
theoretical, question that arises from the discussion of language change in this chap-
ter. While this is less essential to the main argument of this thesis, it is important
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to the understanding of how social factors might influence language change: if there
is socially biased selection of variants, is this selection in a Darwinian sense? Chap-
ter 4 will attempt to give some answer to this question.

Chapter 4
Linguistic variants in cultural-evolutionary models
4.1 Language as an adaptive system
Chapter 2 was about the mechanisms that support cooperation. It was argued that
such mechanisms are supported by markers of identity and social affiliation, which
help create a safe environment for cooperative exchange. The implication is that
human beings are biased, as a result of biological evolution, to use such markers to
guide their social behaviour. It may also be that human beings have evolved a bias
towards relying on linguistic markers in particular, though this cannot be assumed
to be the case—such a specific bias may be inherited culturally, not biologically
(Section 10.1 will discuss this further). As was argued in Section 2.4.2, language
is an inherently good source of reliable markers. It is worth noting that this is to
a great extent the result of language being culturally transmitted: members of the
same group talk in a similar way because they acquire linguistic variants from other
members. This thesis is about modelling that process experimentally, and Chap-
ters 5 to 9 will describe the model. Chapter 3 discussed the theoretical background
from a relatively traditional historical-linguistic and sociolinguistic standpoint. The
present chapter will also be concerned with a theoretical question, and one that has
demanded attention ever since the word “selection” was introduced in Section 2.4.3;
this word implies an evolutionary process—one, moreover, that is relevant to ex-
plaining the nature of language. This is not, however, quite the same as the process
that made our brains language-ready.
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Indeed, the science of evolutionary linguistics has two foci. The first concerns
the processes of biological evolution that led to human beings becoming a linguistic
species, and the influence of evolved systems on the structure of modern language
(e.g. Pinker and Bloom 1990; Deacon 1997; Hauser et al. 2002). The second treats
language itself as a “complex adaptive system” (Gell-Mann 1992; Morowitz and
Singer 1994; Steels 2000). The two approaches are not in the least contradictory—
though there is certainly room for debate regarding their relative importance as
explanations for particular features of language—and they cannot be treated as
entirely separate. The constraints and biases to which language adapts are to a
great extent the product of human biological evolution. Moreover, it is far from
clear that the route that took us from our non-linguistic ancestors to our current
linguistic state can be understood entirely through biological evolution; cultural
evolution may well play a vital explanatory role not only in how and why language
changes, but also in how human beings came to have such a thing as language, at
least in the form that we do (Brighton, Kirby and Smith 2005; Kirby et al. 2007).
The distinction implies a shift of perspective: on the one hand, human beings adapt
to their environment and language is shaped to their needs; on the other, language
itself adapts to the environment of human brains and social structures. Indeed,
some cultural-evolutionary accounts (e.g. Croft 2000) make relatively little reference
to human beings as active agents. Others are more careful to keep speakers in the
picture; Keller (1994), for example, views language change as a “phenomenon of the
third kind”—a large-scale unintended consequence of small-scale human intentions.
Similarly, some make the link between cultural and genetic evolution very explicit,
and argue that they are two examples of the same process (e.g. Lass 1997; Croft
2000; Ritt 2004; Mesoudi et al. 2004), while others are rather wary of the notion of
uniting cultural and biological evolution as a single process.1
This is not only a concern of modern evolutionary linguists. The divide between
those who focus on human evolution and those who focus on language evolution
has its roots in a rather older divide in historical linguistics, between those who
1See, for example: Sperber (2000); Brighton, Smith and Kirby (2005); Andersen (2006); Ingold
(2007). Barkow (2006) and O’Brien (2006) make reference to a very broad hostility in the social
sciences generally towards perceived incursions from biology and other sciences, although this
certainly does not lie at the root of many criticisms of the “same process” view.
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seek to explain change with reference to speakers and those who seek “some of
the ultimate explanations for change in languages as systems” (Milroy and Milroy
1985: 345). Indeed, the view that language behaves rather like a biological entity
is usually dated to at least the nineteenth century, and William Jones’s recognition
of the relatedness of certain languages that would come to be known as Indo-
European—and the consequent hypothesis of their common origin—dates to the
eighteenth. There are even examples of similar conclusions as early as the sixteenth
(Lass 1997: 108). The direction of influence tended at this point in history to be
from linguistics to biology, rather than the other way round; recognition of the
organisation of languages into family trees, and the acceptance of language change
and divergence, upon which this depends, was famously commented on by Darwin
(1879/2004: 465f ). That a coherent theory of linguistic common origins should have
preceded the biological one is presumably due to the rate of change and divergence
in language being so much greater than in biology, making such conclusions more
readily apparent. There has long been influence in the other direction, however, and
it is thus interesting that, by the twentieth century, the application of biological
metaphors to language had nonetheless become “One of the most controversial
issues in current historical linguistics (if not all linguistics)”; evolution had, indeed,
become “a ‘dirty word’ in modern linguistic theory” (McMahon 1994: 314). Fitch
(2007: 665) attributes this, at least partly, to the quasi-mystical ideas entertained
by some nineteenth-century linguistics, like Jacob Grimm’s Sprachgeist. McMahon
(1994) attributes it instead to the careless borrowing of concepts from other fields
by individuals who did not fully understand what they were borrowing (although
the two phenomena may not be entirely distinct).
Andersen (2006: 60), on the other hand, argues that the adoption of biological
metaphors in linguistics is simply part of a series of attempts by linguists “to le-
gitimize their endeavors by borrowing concepts, principles, or methods from other
sciences, natural or formal.” He goes on to argue that:
Against such attempts to make linguistics ‘more scientific’ by borrowing
from the ‘real’ sciences, it should be emphasized that there is only one
way the practitioners of a discipline can make it truly scientific, namely,
by developing a conceptual framework and methods of investigation that
are appropriate to their object of inquiry. This is, of course, precisely
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what scholars in the natural and formal sciences have done and continue
to do. (ibid.)
In his view, historical linguists have not in the main failed in this endeavour, and
what metaphors they have adopted from the natural sciences “have generally been
understood as the metaphors they are” (ibid.). He considers that modern evolution-
ary theory, on the other hand, is a poor fit to language change, and that many of
its proponents have lost sight of the metaphorical nature of its application. In this
last point, he would find some kind of agreement among these proponents: several
cultural-evolutionary theorists (e.g. Lass 1997; Croft 2000; Ritt 2004; Mesoudi et al.
2006) explicitly reject an understanding of evolutionary theory applied to culture
as “metaphorical”. In their view, researchers of cultural and biological evolution
are both studying the same fundamental process. Clearly there is some question as
to the level of detail at which this is true. At the finest-grained level, it is trivially
untrue (cf. Lass 1990: 96; Ritt 2004: 89–91)—languages are not made of DNA,
for example—while at the most coarse-grained level, it is trivially true: both are
complex systems that change. The question is whether there is a level of detail
between these extremes where it is interestingly true that the mechanisms are the
same, where recognition of the commonalities makes a useful contribution to our
greater understanding. As Jäger (2010: 193) puts it, “The proof of the pudding
is in the eating.” He can be said to fall in the category of those who would treat
language change and biological evolution as examples of the same process, but at a
rather more abstract level than, say, Croft (2000) and Ritt (2004). He promotes an
analysis based on George Price’s “General Theory of Selection” (Price 1970, 1972,
1995), by which the same simple equation—the Price equation—can be used to
model processes as diverse as biological evolution, trial-and-error learning, chemi-
cal recrystallisation, political change, and the selection of apples in the marketplace
(Price 1995; Jäger 2008).
At the other extreme from these theorists are those, like Andersen, who view
evolutionary theory as actually unhelpful to our understanding of language change.
Somewhere between these poles are those who consider it a useful metaphor or
analogy, in one way or another (e.g. Whinnom 1971; Mufwene 2001; see also Croft
2000: 10–13, for further discussion of this three-way distinction).
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There is a great deal that could be said about models of cultural evolution,
and there is not space here to say more than a small amount of it. Chapter 3
talked of the innovation and propagation of linguistic variants, and their differential
selection based on social factors, and Chapters 5 to 9 will present an analysis of
experimental data based on such variants. The rest of the current chapter, therefore,
will concentrate on evolutionary models of variant propagation. The question, which
has been a significant focus of recent debate (Jäger 2010: 193), is whether such
variants can be treated as “replicators” in the sense Dawkins (1989) uses the term.
Is language, to use another of his terms, memetic?
4.2 Memetic models of language
A meme is a cultural replicator that can be the basis of evolutionary processes:
Examples of memes are tunes, ideas, catch-phrases, clothes fashions,
ways of making pots or of building arches. Just as genes propagate
themselves in the gene pool by leaping from body to body via sperms or
eggs, so memes propagate themselves in the meme pool by leaping from
brain to brain via a process which, in the broad sense, can be called
imitation. (ibid.: 192)
For the idea of memes to be able to offer anything interesting to the study of
culture, it is important that they be replicators in an evolutionary sense; as Sper-
ber (2000: 163) notes, the Oxford English Dictionary’s definition of a meme as
“an element of culture that may be considered to be passed on by non-genetic
means” divests the idea of any usefulness. Indeed, the term “replicator”, as Dawkins
(1982/1999: 83) defines it, is extremely broad: “anything in the universe of which
copies are made. Examples are a DNA molecule, and a sheet of paper that is
xeroxed.” Only a certain kind of replicator can be made the focus of evolution,
however: “active germ-line replicators” (84)—that is, replicators that have some
influence over their probability of being copied (are active) and are potentially the
ancestor of an indefinitely long chain of descendants (a germ line). Only these can
be the focus of natural selection and have long-term evolutionary impact (ibid.).
The qualities need for such a replicator to be successful are longevity, fecundity and
fidelity. It seems clear that such replicators could exist in a form other than DNA,
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and even Sperber (2000: 163)—who is deeply critical of meme theory—acknowledges
that “there are clear cases of actual memes”, giving chain letters as an example.
Dawkins introduced the idea primarily as a thought experiment, but it has found
enthusiastic support among such figures as Daniel Dennett (e.g. 1990; 1993; 1996)
and Susan Blackmore (e.g. 2000; 2003). Others (like Sperber) remain more critical.
It is intriguing, however, that it has not found greater support in linguistics; linguists
are very used to breaking language up into discrete units, and there is no doubt, first
that these units can be copied faithfully, and second that small modifications over
time lead to large changes. The fact that the idea has not stimulated greater interest
in linguistics may partly reflect a general opposition in the social sciences towards
perceived incursions from biology (cf. Barkow 2006; O’Brien 2006; see also page 53).
Ritt (2004: 119f ), one linguist who is attracted to the idea, attributes it more
positively to the “very long tradition of historical language studies as an academic
discipline, and the progress they have made without employing an evolutionary
paradigm” (cf. Andersen 2006). His view, however, is that an evolutionary paradigm
has something important to offer the study of language change.
4.2.1 Ritt and neural assemblies
For Ritt, evolution is not an analogy in language change; language change is an evo-
lutionary process, and a memetic one at that. Based on Dawkins (1989, 1982/1999)
he gives four criteria for identifying replicators (122–3):
1. Minimal stability, or longevity.
2. Minimal copying fidelity.2
3. Minimal fecundity.
4. An effect on its own chance of being replicated or copied well.
This leads him to his own definition of a meme:
A ‘meme’ represents an assembly of nodes in a network of neurally
implemented constituents, which has (a) a definite internal structure, (b)
a definable position within a larger network configuration, (c) qualifies
as a replicator in Dawkins’ sense. (Ritt 2004: 169)
2For evolution to occur, of course, there is also a maximum level of permissible copying fidelity;
mutation must be possible (Ritt 2004: 123).
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In language the neural structure of a phoneme would be a prototypical example,
and he gives others. There is a problem with this, however, and it lies in the
difference between how genes replicate and how memes replicate . Gene replication
is a far more direct process; unless there is a fault in copying, gene replication
leads to a new copy that is identical to the original, and which codes for proteins
in the same way as the original. In language (or culture generally), however, a
particular neural pattern in one brain is not directly copied into another brain;
instead, it is inferred and reconstructed. Importantly, it is not obviously the case
that the reconstructed neural pattern must be identical to the original; it has no
a priori need to be, provided both produce the same output. Ritt is aware of this
problem and considers it a serious one (2004: 90, 104–8 etc.). Yet he does not give
a very clear answer to it, partly because we simply do not know enough about the
neural underpinnings of stored linguistic information. The problem of differences
between genetic and memetic replication is a challenge for any memetic model (cf.
Sperber 2000; Brighton, Smith and Kirby 2005: 221–2), but Ritt’s desire to locate
the replicating unit in neural assemblies is particularly troublesome in this respect.
The problem is not even quite as empirical as it might appear on first sight. The
important question is not whether or not linguistic units are in fact consistently
represented by identical neural configurations; it is more useful to ask whether it
is necessary that they be so represented. Ritt argues convincingly that language
evolution can be understood in terms of discrete units; he argues, indeed, that
to linguists this is “almost old hat” (203)—traditional linguistic theory has long
divided language up into such units as phonemes, morphemes, lexemes, and so
on. This would seem to fulfil his first criterion for identifying replicators (minimal
stability).3 Ritt further argues convincingly that these units are copied with a
very high degree of fidelity. This again, is not a new claim in linguistics: language
learning is clearly a faithful enough process that children are able to talk easily with
their grandparents (and easily understand the recorded output of several generations
beyond that), in all but exceptional circumstances; and it is far from clear to what
extent those differences that exist between generations can be explained by copying
error. As Ritt notes, many linguistic units remain unchanged over thousands of
3Whether or not these categories are in fact suitable will be discussed in more detail in Sec-
tion 4.2.3.
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years (133). Linguistic transmission thus seems very clearly to be a faithful enough
process for the second criterion (minimal fidelity) to be fulfilled. The third criterion
(minimal fecundity) is also no problem; no one denies that linguistic variants are
transmitted between brains. The fourth criterion (that the replicators have some
effect on their own likelihood of being transmitted) is also fulfilled; phonemes that
are not sufficiently distinct from others in the same system, for example, are likely
to be harder to copy than others.
Ritt, therefore, has already made his key arguments for the existence of some
kind of linguistic unit that can be the focus of evolutionary processes, and none of
this is dependent on the unit being instantiated on the level of neural patterns. The
problem described above, of whether or not the copying process produces identical
neural configurations embodying these units, is a question about the nature, or
composition, of the units, not about their existence. If the units are thus already
accepted to exist, then the question is this: is it in principle possible that such
linguistic units as phonemes could be copied as faithfully as they are, yet have
different underlying neural representations? If it is impossible, then their very
existence shows that the units must therefore exist at the neural level, and that
it must be these neural configurations that are copied faithfully. If, on the other
hand, we accept the possibility that they could be underpinned by different neural
representations, yet have the same surface features as consistently as they obviously
do, then the copying fidelity cannot be a feature of the neural configuration, but
must reside at a different level. In which case the replicator itself must exist at a
different level. Should it then turn out, in fact, that the units are underpinned by
identical neural patterns, then this must be coincidental.
4.2.2 Croft and utterances
If the linguistic replicators do exist above the level of neural patterns, at what level
is this? Presumably it must either be at some relatively abstract level, or at the
acoustic level. This latter possibility recalls Croft’s (2000) view that the linguistic
replicator is the utterance, or, more specifically:
embodied linguistic structures, anything from a phoneme to a mor-
pheme to a word to a syntactic construction, and also their conventional
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semantic/discourse-functional (informational-structural) values . . . The
linguistic structures as embodied in utterances are not beads on a string
either. They exist in nested systems of more inclusive units (28)
That Croft should choose the utterance as the unit of selection seems to arise
from his commitment to treating language in terms of “real, existing entities” (2).
The same commitment plays a role in Ritt’s choice of neurally instantiated units,
and it is understandable. DNA is tangible; it can be looked at under a microscope.
If linguistic replicators can also be shown to exist in some physical form, then this
is reassuring. It is, however, rather odd that Croft should choose the utterance as
the home of his replicators rather than the brain (although the degree to which
he keeps this distinction clear is highly questionable; see below). He does not
raise the problem noted above of how neural patterns might be replicated, and he
acknowledges the attractiveness of the obvious analogy between the grammar as
the genotype and the utterance as phenotype—to which Ritt explicitly subscribes.
As Croft points out, while in biology the replicator (the genotype) produces the
interactor (the phenotype), the situation appears to be reversed in his conception
of language evolution (39), where the utterance-level units are the replicators, and
the grammar the interactor. The key to his choice seems to be that:
the replicator . . . should not be identified with the structure as an ab-
stract essence (type). The formal structure of e.g. the passive construc-
tion or its semantic/discourse function, or the phonetic expression of a
phoneme can change in replication. (28)
Ritt (2004: 158) considers that Croft’s utterance-based theory “is flawed in a
fundamental way.” He takes issue with Croft’s definition of an utterance as:
an actually occurring piece of language, completely specified at all lev-
els of structure, including its full contextual meaning on the particular
occasion of use (i.e. speaker’s meaning). (Croft 2000: 244)
Ritt is right to see this as a serious problem. Croft seems to want to have his cake
and eat it: his conception of an utterance includes not just acoustic (or, indeed,
signed or graphic) patterns, but mental states as well. Such units cannot be the
“spatiotemporally bounded individuals” (Croft 2000: 24) that he wants them to be.
It is easy to see why he would want his units to consist of more than acoustic or
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graphical patterns; if he does away with the mental components, then, as Ritt (2004:
159) points out, he has trouble keeping such forms as “son” and “sun” distinct, or in
establishing “that two allophonic realisations of any morpheme actually represent
variants of a single type” (ibid.). However, if linguistic replicators are to exist
on the level of the utterance, and not mentally, then all they can be is strings of
sounds—waveforms. The contextual meaning that Croft refers to must form part,
not of the units themselves, but of the framework for their replication. If Croft is
serious about having meaning form part of the replicator, then that replicator must
exist in the minds of the speaker and hearer, and the waveform (together with the
context that allows inference of meaning) is in fact the means by which replication
occurs (i.e. the interactor), not the replicator itself. It may be that this is what
Croft intends in his definition—the memory of an utterance, in other words, rather
than the utterance itself—in which case, his units exist, like Ritt’s, in people’s
heads. If so, where precisely should these mental replicators reside? As discussed
in Section 4.2.1, Ritt’s view that they must be instantiated as patterns of neurons,
while plausible, is problematic for reasons already given, and it would be better to
treat his replicators as informational units, perhaps instantiated on a more abstract
level, but still a mental one. If Croft is serious in what he wants “linguemes” to
consist of, then they too seem best understood as existing at this level, rather (in
this case) than in “actually occurring . . . language”, as he claims to want.
The key questions are as follows: first, do linguistic units in fact exist that can
be the focus of evolutionary processes? Second, if they do, do they exist outside
the heads of speakers or inside them? If the former, then they can consist only of
waveforms. If the latter, then they can consist of more than this, but the question
remains open as to what level they exist on. Ritt sees them as existing as neural
patterns, but if we cannot be certain that such neural patterns themselves are
reliably replicated, then it is in fact the information they instantiate that is the
replicator, since it is here that their reliability must reside. If we cannot accept
this, then the units must exist as neural patterns, and we are committed to either
assuming that the neural patterns can be replicated faithfully or to rejecting such
mental units altogether. The next section will discuss whether linguistic replicators
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can be said to exist at all, and whether the kinds of linguistic unit that Croft and
Ritt identify as candidates are really suitable.
4.2.3 Candidates for linguistic replicators
Both Croft and Ritt agree in identifying traditional linguistic units, like phonemes,
morphemes, rules and syntactic constructions4 as examples of linguistic replicators
(see e.g. Croft 2000: 33–7; Ritt 2004: 169–86). This is perhaps not surprising; it
is hard to see what other units would do—Ritt (2004: 133–5) argues convincingly
that smaller entities, such as distinctive features, are not sufficiently cultural (that
is, they are too grounded in basic human abilities) to count. He argues further that
sequences of phonemes below the morpheme level are not sufficiently stable; that
is, we should not expect them to be replicated or stored distinctly from higher-level
units. This argument seems to hold as far as most such sequences are concerned,
but does not succeed in excluding phonaesthemes. Of course, there is no princi-
pled reason why units between the phoneme- and the morpheme-level should not
also be considered to be linguistic replicators. Nevertheless, phonaesthemes seem
problematic; on the one hand, this most likely simply reflects their uncertain status
in mainstream linguistics (Bergen 2004); on the other hand, even if their exis-
tence is taken for granted, there is a problem with treating them as replicators—to
the extent that they are units with any psychological reality, they are likely to be
schematic units inferred by the speaker from statistical tendencies over distributions
of phoneme sequences.
This fact raises a rather bigger problem: to what extent is this different from
other, more canonical, linguistic units? Are phonemes, for example, any safer than
phonaesthemes? There is much evidence now that speakers retain a great deal of
phonetic tokens in memory, and that phonemes are categories with considerable
internal structure—schematic units based on clusters in phonetic distributions.5 As
Bybee (2007: 205) puts it:
4As the inventor of radical construction grammar, Croft understandably puts more emphasis
on constructions than on rules.
5Miller (1994) is a relatively early review of evidence; Pierrehumbert (2001) provides a more
recent summary. See also Wedel (2006) for a summary very relevant to the current question.
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Phonemes . . . are not units of lexical representation. Instead, phonemes
are abstract patterns that emerge in the phonological organization of the
lexicon.
Exemplar theory has also convincingly been applied to other levels of linguis-
tic structure (Bybee 2006; Bod and Cochran 2007). This model leaves a level of
uncertainty as to the status of the linguistic “units” as potential replicators. If it
is correct, then linguistic replication of phonemes and rules is not a matter of a
cognitive unit being copied, via an acoustic channel, from one brain to another.
Instead, a speaker uses a mental category, representing a structured collection of
memorised tokens, to produce an acoustic token, and this token is turned into a
mental representation by a listener, which forms part of a structured collection of
mental tokens in the listener’s brain, influencing the phonetic forms that a speaker
is likely to produce in future. There are three types of unit here: an acoustic token,
a mental token, and a mental category (the second of which has something in com-
mon with Ritt’s replicators). Indeed, there are at least two kinds of category: since
the mental tokens, which contain the phonetic detail, are supposed to be stored
in the lexicon (and lexical items are thus considered to be rather more phoneti-
cally specified than previously thought), the basic category derived from them is
on the lexical level, and any sound-unit level of category must be derived from this
level. Much the same, within generalised exemplar theory, is true of morphosyn-
tactic units. Where does that leave our replicators? This, perhaps, is why Croft,
a construction-grammarian, seeks refuge in the utterance. Within the confines of
this theory, it seems that the replicator, if there is one, would have to be the token,
not the category. It seems reasonable to say that phonetic tokens are copied. If
categories are derived from multiple tokens gathered from multiple interactions, on
the other hand, it is hard to see that there is anything like direct copying going on.
In any case, Croft’s lingueme, as discussed in Section 4.2.2, does not seem to keep
this distinction as clear as one might expect.
4.2.3.1 Background conditions
Even ignoring exemplar theory, the inferential means by which linguistic variants are
transmitted may be a problem. Sperber (2000), for example, argues forcefully that
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the means by which cultural units are transmitted changes the game. Linguistic
replicators are not imitated; instead, the instructions for producing linguistic forms
are inferred through observation of another speaker’s output (Brighton, Smith and
Kirby 2005 also stress the importance of this). More specifically, he argues that
this inference depends on information already present in the system:
Thus, the similarities between the grammar and lexicons internalized
by different members of the same linguistic community owe little to
copying and a lot to pre-existing linguistic, communicative, and concep-
tual evolved dispositions . . . For memetics to be a reasonable research
programme, it should be the case that copying, and differential success
in causing the multiplication of copies, overwhelmingly plays the major
role in shaping . . . the contents of culture. Evolved domain-specific psy-
chological dispositions . . . should be at most a relatively minor factor
that could be considered part of background conditions. (172)
Put this way, the argument is only partly convincing. Pre-existing evolved dis-
positions of this sort may be a good explanation for certain universal features of
human language (though see, for example: Keller 1994; Kirby et al. 2004; Brighton,
Kirby and Smith 2005), but they hardly explain the similarities to be found between
members of a linguistic community, as compared with a different linguistic commu-
nity. The fact that people from London are more like other Londoners than people
from Washington DC in their propensity to pronounce “butter” with a glottal stop
(or, for that matter, the fact that people from Caernarfon are now more likely to
speak Welsh than people from Carlisle) has nothing to do with pre-existing evolved
dispositions, except inasmuch as there is a disposition to acquire one’s grammar and
lexicon from other members of one’s own community. Moreover, while there are of
course pre-existing cognitive and physical constraints on linguistic replication, there
are physical and chemical constraints on genetic replication too. It is hard to see
how these should not be considered background conditions to the propagation of
linguistic variants. Nevertheless, the key question that Sperber raises is a signif-
icant one: are the inferential mechanisms by which a linguistic unit is replicated
sufficiently similar to the mechanisms by which DNA is replicated for both to be
seen as the same kind of replicator? Again, it must be stressed that much depends
on the level of detail. On a certain level of detail, the two processes are obviously
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different; on a very coarse-grained level, they are clearly similar. Sperber marks out
a middle ground with three minimal conditions for “true replication”. Specifically:
For B to be a replication of A,
1. B must be caused by A (together with background conditions).
2. B must be similar in relevant respects to A, and
3. The process that generates B must obtain the information that
makes B [relevantly] similar to A from A.
(Sperber 2000: 169)
It is not too hard to find a linguistic example that seems to work within this
model. Consider the following situation: an English speaker (A) produces the pho-
netic form [miP] which is heard by another English speaker (B) and internalised by
that speaker. Speaker A must have mental instructions to produce the form [miP];
this is a competence state (cf. Ritt 2004). If we take a relatively exemplar-theoretic
approach and assume that phonemes are not monolithic units, this competence
state must either be a mental token previously added to the lexicon (and cate-
gorised) after being acquired from another speaker, or a mental token derived in
some way—involving phonemic categorisation—from other tokens in the lexicon
(this token might have been created at a previous point in the past, or might be
created at the moment of speech).
In either case, speaker A has a mental linguistic token that has a causal rela-
tionship with the acoustic token produced; this mental token can be termed Am.
A’s acoustic token, Aa, is heard by B and transformed into a mental token Bm. It
seems clear that there is a strong causal relationship between Am and Aa, and that
there is also a strong causal relationship between Aa and Bm; the causal relation-
ship between Am and Bm is more indirect simply because of the acoustic stage,
but it is hard to feel that this is a significant barrier to saying that Am causes Bm,
together with background conditions—these being the cognitive and physiological
mechanisms that allow A to turn Am into acoustic patterns and allow B to hear and
interpret these patterns. Furthermore, inasmuch as Bm leads B to reliably produce
acoustic patterns relevantly similar to those that Am led A to produce, then Sper-
ber’s second criterion is also fulfilled. The third criterion is the most important,
and Sperber also expresses it as, “B must inherit from A the properties that make
it relevantly similar to A” (ibid.). This also seems to be fulfilled: the properties
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that make Bm relevantly similar to Am are the particular acoustic patterns it leads
a speaker to produce in a suitable context, and these must come from Am.
The crux of the argument lies in the two words “relevant” and “background”,
and it is important to note that Sperber seems to be focusing primarily on the
acquisition of a first language by an infant. Given that, his point is fair: in the
first stages of language acquisition, those cognitive and physiological mechanisms
described above as background conditions are in the process of being developed, and
the development of these probably should not be considered a matter of replication.
Sperber seems to be right about that. At least some of the competence states that
exploit these mechanisms, on the other hand, seem very reasonable candidates for
evolutionary replicators.
4.2.3.2 Phonetic tokens as a special case
Brighton, Smith and Kirby (2005) make a similar argument to Sperber’s:
DNA persists by a process of direct copying governed by a selective
mechanism that prunes lines of inheritance. Linguistic knowledge, on
the other hand, must persist through a repeated cycle of production and
induction. We can think of the task of the learner as akin to that of
the reverse engineer, trying to figure out what the blueprints are for a
device while only being able to look at its behaviour. In the system of
biological evolution there is no such reverse engineer—the blueprints are
passed on directly every generation. (221)
This is very close to Sperber’s argument, cited on page 63, but it is less committed
to the existence of evolved domain-specific mechanisms. Put simply, the copying of
linguistic variants is rather less than direct. This points at a difference, noted before,
between sound patterns and other linguistic structures. The model of transmission
given in Section 4.2.3.1 is really about the transmission of phonetic variants. It
does not work anywhere near so neatly for semantic and syntactic structures, or
for the phonemic categories built from these phonetic tokens.6 It was noted in
Section 4.2.2 that all that a spoken utterance consists of, apart from what is in the
heads of the speakers in the interaction, is a waveform. This is a fundamentally
6Note that this is true even given a less exemplar-theoretic approach. Any theory has to have
some way of building phonemes secondarily, through a process of categorisation, from phonetic
tokens.
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important fact, which makes phonetic variants different from semantic and syntactic
ones: phonetic variants physically exist outside speakers in a way that no other
linguistic variant does. The meaning of an utterance and the morphosyntactic
constructions that govern the arrangement of meaningful elements must both be
inferred—reverse engineered—and they are inferred from the phonetic string once
it has been internalised and become a mental token in the mind of the hearer.
This is not to say that the transmission of meaningless (i.e. phonetic) tokens
does not also involve reverse engineering. It must do, since a waveform is not
the same as the instructions for producing a waveform. And in infants who are
learning to speak, or adults learning non-native sounds, this reverse engineering is
not trivial. However, in the relatively narrow (yet overwhelmingly typical) case of
adults hearing new strings that follow familiar phonotactic patterns, there is a good
case to be made that this inference plays a relatively minor role—for its having been
relegated, in other words, to a background condition. Consider, for example, an
adult native English speaker (A) teaching another adult native English speaker (B)
the novel word [gl2bl
"
]. Assuming a relatively noise-free channel, we would expect
B to be able to repeat the word back with little trouble (by contrast, say, with
a resolutely foreign name like [ì1flr]). It seems reasonable to talk of a relatively
straightforward transmission of a competence state Am—via an acoustic pattern
Aa—to competence state Bm. Of course there are entire cognitive frameworks set
up, conditions that have to be in place, to make this transmission possible; of course
this is not quite direct copying; but there are conditions that have to be in place
for DNA replication too. This by itself cannot be a cogent objection.
There is, in fact, a way of imagining the replication of sound-patterns that makes
it look somewhat similar to the replication of DNA strands in an interesting way.
Consider how DNA replication takes place: a double helix splits in half and each half
is used, reliably, to reconstruct a new copy of the missing other half. This, of course,
relies on the appropriate mechanisms being in place for such reconstruction to be
possible. A phonetic token, similarly, can be seen as consisting of two halves—a
competence half and an acoustic half.7 The reconstructibility of one from the other,
7Granted, there is a difference here. Both halves of a DNA strand are of the same kind, while
the two halves of a phonetic string given here are not. This must simply be accepted; to insist
that biological and linguistic replicators must be identical in every way helps no one. The point is
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given the appropriate mechanisms, seems reliable in a way that the reconstructibility
of a strand of double helix is reliable.
So can phonetic tokens act as the linguistic replicators we want? Certainly they
seem more suitable than other candidates. A few points should be made clear.
First, these tokens must be phonetic strings, not individual phonemes. Phonologi-
cal knowledge must already be in place—must already be part of the background
conditions—for the above to work as described. Second, it must be mental tokens,
not acoustic tokens, that are the replicators. There are numerous differences be-
tween any two acoustic tokens, even produced by the same speaker, that are not
linguistically relevant. Furthermore, as Ritt (2004: 159) pointed out, there is no
way to distinguish “sun” from ”son” acoustically, except by inference from context.
Mentally, such tokens can be attached more clearly to semantic information, though,
as implied, this meaning does not form part of the replicator. Since de Saussure
(1916/1995), a linguistic sign has been seen as consisting of two parts, the signifier
and the signified. The phonetic replicators described above are signifiers in this
sense; they are not full signs (cf. Ritt 2004, 233, who also decouples the two halves
of the sign, and treats linguistic signs as “secondary replicator alliances”).
Where, then, does this leave meaning? For language to work, the phonetic to-
kens described above must be paired with meanings. The way in which meanings
are transmitted, however, is different from the way in which phonetic strings are
transmitted; the process is much more clearly, and importantly, inferential. While
the transmission of phonetic tokens (at least between adult native speakers of the
same language) may be reliable enough, owing to the nature of the transmission
channel—which can contain only phonetic strings—for these tokens to be good can-
didates for evolutionary replicators, the transmission of meanings is different and
relies much more on relatively uncertain reverse engineering. Indeed, the reliable
inference of meaning of a particular word or construction can easily depend on the
hearer being exposed several times to a variant. There is a similar problem with
syntactic constructions. In traditional linguistics, syntax has been treated rather
that, in order to replicate, DNA strands split and create two halves from what was a whole. This
is the means of its replication. The means by which a mentally stored phonetic string replicates
is by producing something new—an acoustic token.
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differently from morphology, with the emphasis being on rules. In usage-based mod-
els of language, such as Cognitive grammar and Construction grammar, however,
syntactic constructions are treated more like morphemes: phonetic strings with
attached meanings, or signifer-signified pairings. From this point of view, should
the phonetic half of these be treated differently from the word-level phonetic to-
kens described above? There is a difference. Syntactic constructions are templates,
derived, like meaning and phonological categories, by a process of inference from
utterances and with regard to the context in which they occur, and this is where a
crucial difference lies: phonetic tokens are independent of the discourse context in
a way that other linguistic variants are not.
4.3 Conclusion
It has been suggested in this chapter that there are, in general, problems with
treating linguistic variants as Darwinian replicators, but that word-level phonetic
tokens stand out as plausible candidates for such replicators, owing to the nature
of linguistic transmission. Even these, however, only qualify in a relatively con-
strained set of circumstances: the transmission of variants among adult speakers
with a high level of competence in the language in question (and given a relatively
exemplar-theoretic account of transmission); only here is there sufficient automatic-
ity in the replication for the inferential capacities involved to reliably be relegated
to background conditions. Constrained though it is, however, this context cannot
be considered rare. It is reasonable to expect that most linguistic interactions in
the world are between adults competent in the relevant language.
It should be noted that there remain important differences between language evo-
lution and biological evolution, even if phonetic tokens are treated as evolutionary
replicators. The rate of change in language, for example, is clearly greater than in
biology. Brighton, Smith and Kirby (2005: 221–2) make a further point:
there may be times where competition leads to the induction of totally
new rules in one step. Linguistic paradigms can change through a pro-
cess of “reanalysis”, the output of a number of different rules can lead to
the origins of a new rule that subsumes them all—indeed, this process
is fundamental to the evolution of increasingly general regularity in the
iterated learning models we have described.
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This is particularly true of grammatical structures in language; it is here that
this sort of reanalysis occurs, rather than directly on the phonetic tokens paired
with particular meanings—and this is a further reason to treat these as different.
Nevertheless, this does not mean that competition between phonetic forms too
cannot lead to the production of new variants, and this is clearly different from
biological evolution.
Much depends, however—as stated elsewhere in this chapter—on the level of
detail, and at a certain level of detail, it is not even clear that the difference between
phonetic and other variants matters. How important is it that there is a difference in
the directness of transmission, if there is transmission and it is faithful? On another
level of detail, we can, as Wedel (2006) does, model category shift in an individual
speaker’s brain as an evolutionary process. It seems there is something to be lost
here in the search for the “correct” linguistic replicators to match up with genes.
It does not seem true that language change can be reduced to competition between
exemplars in the head of a single speaker (and Wedel 2006 does not think it can),
or to differential propagation of variants between speakers.8 It seems clear that
selection can operate in both cases; it also seems clear that mutation can occur in
more than one place. Assimilation, for instance, must originate at least partly as a
result of gestural overlap in the mouth of a speaker (though Ohala 1990 argues for a
significant role for the hearer). Dissimilation, on the other hand, is almost certainly
better explained as hearer-based. Similarly, while grammaticalisation may originate
in an intentional metaphorical extension on the part of the speaker, in some cases
it will be entirely driven by processes taking place in the minds of hearers (Hoefler
and Smith 2009).
This should not discourage cultural-evolutionary approaches to language change.
As Boyd and Richerson (2000: 158) put it:
If the application of Darwinian thinking to understanding cultural chan-
ge depended on the existence of replicators, we would be in trouble.
Fortunately, culture need not be closely analogous to genes . . . All that is
really required is that culture constitutes a system maintaining heritable
variation.
8As argued above, if we want to take a variant-eye’s view to the latter process, we need to take
on board the distinction between phonetic tokens and meaningful variants.
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To ignore the similarities between language and biological organisms would be to
ignore important parallels that have been beckoning to scientists for at least two
centuries. The danger is in attempting to shoehorn language into a genetic boot
that does not fit it, particularly when there exist generalised frameworks such as the
Price Equation, which allow questions of what the “right” replicators in language
are to be sidestepped (Jäger 2010: 196).
Such frameworks, in making clear the commonalities between language and other
complex adaptive systems, are a very useful addition to the historical linguist’s
toolkit. The next chapter will discuss the importance and role of experimental
methodologies in this kit, and it will present the first of a series of experimental
simulations designed to get at the question of the role of social marking in language
divergence.
Chapter 5
Testing the hypothesis: a first experiment
This chapter, along with the following four chapters, will present a series of experi-
ments designed to investigate the roles of a pressure for social marking and frequency
of interaction in language divergence. Section 5.1 will briefly discuss methodology
in historical linguistics and will introduce the method—experimental simulation—
employed in this thesis. Section 5.2 will describe how the first experiment worked,
and Section 5.4 will present the results. Chapters 6 to 8 will describe experiments
that follow on from the one described in the current chapter and attempt to pick
out more finely the factors involved in new-dialect formation. Chapter 9 will then
summarise the results and discuss various issues relating to them. Chapter 10 will
discuss how the findings might fit into an account of the evolution of language, and
Chapter 11 will present overall conclusions.
5.1 Methods in historical linguistics
Historical linguistics is not a field commonly associated with experiments. This
is perhaps not surprising, given the time periods normally involved in language
change.1 To be sure, any item of real-life linguistic data, whether already recorded
in some medium or gathered fresh by the researcher, gives only a window onto
1This chapter—and, indeed, this thesis—will treat historical linguistics as the study of language
change. Although this is broadly true, not everyone who calls themselves a historical linguist is
interested in language change. Historical sociolinguists, for example, tend to be more interested in
particular synchronic time slices (see Milroy and Milroy 1985, 344–5, for further discussion of such
matters). A distinction is sometimes drawn between historical linguists, as scholars interested
mainly in change, and linguistic historians, who are more interested in describing the linguistic
situation at particular periods, or the history of a particular language. In practice, the first term
is often used for both.
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a synchronic time-slice of language; and at this level of data collection, historical
linguistics, sociolinguistics, and dialectology are hard to distinguish. If such data
are to shed much light on anything, there has to be an element of comparison, and
to the extent that variationist sociolinguistics and historical linguistics can be said
to differ in method, it is mainly in the role of time in the comparison (Milroy and
Milroy 1985: 344; see also Section 3.1.2 of this thesis). The items to be compared,
for example, may come from different points in the same speaker’s lifetime (e.g.
Harrington 2006), or from different speakers separated by time, or, as in apparent-
time studies, by age. Similarly, reconstruction relies on the comparison of variants
of one variable at a particular time.
This, at least, is the traditional approach, and it has been augmented in the last
few decades by the use of advanced statistics and phylogenetic methods, often bor-
rowed from other disciplines, in particular biology (see e.g. McMahon and McMahon
2005). These methods have made a significant contribution, but their contribution
is in the manipulation of data already gathered, rather than in expanding the means
by which it can be gathered in the first place. Most historical-linguistic data is still
gathered in the wild. There are, granted, several exceptions: the results of many
psycholinguistic experiments, for example, shed important light on historical linguis-
tic phenomena. Section 3.3.1.2 discussed accommodation and interactive alignment
in dialogue. Much research has shown how this mechanistic process occurs more or
less automatically in linguistic interactions, and contributes to communication. It
is also generally assumed to play an important role in the propagation of linguistic
variants, and thus in accent change and dialect formation (see e.g. Pardo 2006, and
also Chapter 3 of this thesis). There are also the kinds of experiment commonly
carried out in sociolinguistics, such as matched-guise tests, which provide informa-
tion on language attitudes. Laboratory phonology, moreover, allows the collection
of more detailed phonological data (or, more accurately, phonetic data that allows
the drawing of phonological conclusions).
In the examples given so far, the diachronic dimension is clearly present only
in the experiments on interactive alignment; in these, there is a clear change in
language use over the course of the experiment. Assuming that frequency affects
storage and categorisation, this can be expected to lead to, or affect the course of,
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grammatical change (Bod et al. 2003; Bybee 2006, 2007). In laboratory phonology
and most sociolinguistic experiments, by contrast, the emphasis is on obtaining a
clearer synchronic window. To model larger-scale, longer-term change, the most
obvious recourse has been computational simulation. The advantages of computa-
tional simulations are obvious. Wild data are messy, and the different constraints
and pressures operating on the individuals involved are not always clear, or even
discoverable, to the researcher. In experiments, these can be controlled to an extent
(at the expense of ecological realism), but not all unknown quantities can be elim-
inated. In the artificial environment of a computer simulation, on the other hand,
the agents and the pressures acting on them are entirely under the programmer’s
control (at least within the constraints of the computational medium). For the
historical sciences, computational simulations have an enormous further advantage:
time can be contracted and thousands of generations modelled, many times over,
in a matter of days. Such simulations have been widely used in evolutionary lin-
guistics (for a review, see Cangelosi and Parisi 2002; Kirby 2002)—understandably,
given the lack of available naturalistic data. They have not been neglected in his-
torical linguistics, however (e.g. Nettle and Dunbar 1997; Nettle 1999; Livingstone
and Fyfe 1999; Livingstone 2002; Oudeyer 2005; de Oliveira et al. 2008; Kirby to
appear). Nettle and Dunbar (1997) present a model that is particularly relevant
to the central question of this thesis. In this model, the existence of variability
in language,2 coupled with a bias towards cooperating with those who speak in a
similar way, leads both to a population that cannot be invaded by “cheats” and to
a high level of (geographically structured) linguistic diversity. Nettle (1999: 37–59)
describes a series of simulations that confirm these results, but suggest further that:
Geographical isolation and noise in learning are . . . not sufficient to
produce diversity in discrete variables unless the level of noise is set
extremely high . . . A very low level of inter-group contact, in the absence
of social selection, destroys local diversity . . . [S]ocial selection hugely
increases both the amount of diversity which evolves and its stability
against inter-group contact. (54)
2Although “language” in such simulations could be taken to stand for almost any sufficiently
complex culturally acquired system.
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On the other hand,, other computational simulations have cast doubt on the im-
portance of social selection in explaining linguistic diversity. Livingstone and Fyfe
(1999) and Livingstone (2002) describe simulations in which “child” agents learn
language from “adult” agents; group boundaries are not defined, but individuals
are more likely to interact the closer they are to each other spatially. Given ran-
dom noise in the learning data, a high level of geographically structured linguistic
diversity emerges, without the need for social selection.
The simplicity of computational agents and computational environments is a
curse and a blessing. While it certainly makes both more tractable, much depends
on the programmer’s assumptions about the right biases to build into the model.
The middle ground between simulations and studies of the real world, as implied
above, is the experiment, and experiments vary considerably in their similarity to
both. There is a kind of sociolinguistic study, for example, where participants
are recorded talking in different conditions (e.g. chatting naturally and reading
scripts) and the conditions compared. Here, the experimental manipulation is slight,
and the difference from naturalistic data collection minimal. At the other end
of the spectrum are studies that are best called experimental simulations.3 In
embodied-agent simulations, for example, artificial agents (i.e. robots) are put in
real environments (e.g. Vogt 2000; Quinn 2001). Alternatively, human agents can
be put in highly simulated environments. This may involve complete immersion
in a virtual reality (see Fox et al. 2009 for a review of this methodology in the
social sciences), but any task, such as a game, intended to model some real-life
situation achieves a similar effect. Studies of this sort have been employed with
some success over the last decade in investigations of the origin and evolution of
language (e.g. Galantucci 2005; Kirby et al. 2008; Scott-Phillips et al. 2009), but
somewhat less so in research into change in modern language. The rest of this
chapter will describe an experimental simulation, which was influenced in its design
particularly by computational simulations described by Nettle and Dunbar (1997)
and Nettle (1999) and by such experiments as Garrod and Doherty (1994)—which
showed how communities can converge on a communicative strategy through paired
3This term has a long history in various fields; see e.g. Lindeman (1942); Mendlowitz and
Leslie (1942); Waters and Glass (1970); Martindale (1973); Krackhardt and Stern (1988); Willis
and Long (2007); Mesoudi and O’Brien (2008).
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interactions. It was carried out in November and December 2007 and designed to
investigate the role of social marking in language divergence.4
5.2 Description of experiment
5.2.1 Overview
This experiment involved twenty participants, who were divided into five groups
of four. Each of these five groups played a computer game, for which they were
divided into two teams of two. The object of the game was for one’s own team to
score more points than the other team.
A game consisted of a series of fourteen timed rounds (see Figure 5.2), in each
of which every player was paired pseudo-randomly (see Section 5.2.3) with one of
the other players (their “partner” for that round). A round of the game involved
using an instant-messenger-style program to negotiate to exchange resources (i.e.
points, expressed as quantities of meat, grain, water, fruit, and fish). Players were
not, however, allowed to use any real language, but had to type messages in an
“alien language”, which consisted of nineteen randomly generated words (see Sec-
tion 5.2.6). After the negotiation stage of a round, players could choose to give
away some of their resources to their conversation partner. The game was set up in
such a way that it was advantageous to exchange resources with one’s own team-
mate, but not to give anything away to one’s opponents (see Section 5.2.5). As
noted above, the four players of each game were divided into two teams of two, and
players did not know for sure until the end of a round whether they were paired
with their teammate or an opponent. Throughout the game all the players worked
in separate booths and could not see each other. The only information they were
given about the identity of their teammates was that they would be paired with
4The computer program that participants of this experiment used was written using a combi-
nation of HTML, PHP, and MySQL. I was aided in the programming by Justin Quillinan. While
I designed the experiment, how the program should operate, and how the interface should look
(which included writing the HTML code), he wrote the PHP and MySQL code that allowed par-
ticipants on different computers to communicate with each other, and which stored the resulting
data. The scripts written to analyse this data (which were all written using Python and R) were
entirely my work. Details of the experiment described in the following sections, and the two ex-
periments described in the following chapters, have been published in Roberts (2008) and Roberts
(2010), and this thesis will draw on those publications, but will contain additional analysis and
go into greater detail.
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them for the first two rounds of the game. No such information was provided for the
other rounds. Only at the end of a round, after they had already chatted with the
other person, and after they had already decided whether or not to give anything
away to them, was it revealed who they had been paired with.
The uncertainty that this engendered put pressure on players to use variation in
the alien language to mark identity, since this was their only means (aside from
giving away resources) of interacting with anyone else in the game. At the start
of the game, every player learnt the same alien language, so variation between
players had to arise during the experiment, and could have only two sources: error
and deliberate innovation. As well as the greater control afforded by this fact,
there were two further advantages, from an experimental point of view, to using an
artificial language. First, because the players were not using their own languages,
but were using a language they had only learnt that day, the chance of error as a
source of variation was increased. In other words, the mutation rate was raised,
leading to considerably faster change than would normally be expected to occur (cf.
Kirby et al. 2008). Second, as can be seen from the list in Section 5.2.6, the words
available to players severely limited their opportunities for explicit strategising.
5.2.1.1 A typical round
In a typical round, players would usually begin by greeting each other. Typically,
one would then state what resources they wanted, perhaps adding what they were
prepared to give away, and asking what their partner wanted in return (e.g. “I need
lots of meat. Do you have meat? I give you fruit.”). The other would reply to
this and the conversation would develop along these lines. Once this chatting stage
had ended (it lasted 180 seconds), a player could choose to give away as many or
as few resources as they liked (up to the amount they had available), and what a
player did would depend on what was said during this exchange and on the player’s
estimate of the benefits of doing so. After this, they would be told the results of
the exchange: what they had given away, what they had received, and whether or
not they had been talking to a teammate.
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5.2.1.2 Research questions
Two main predictions were made:
1. That, in spite of the anonymity of the interaction, players would be able
to identify their teammates using linguistic cues—the only means at their
disposal.
2. That the use of the alien language as a source of group markers would lead
the language, identical for all players at the beginning of the game, to begin
to diverge into dialects.
There were also two secondary research questions: what strategies would the
players use to win the game, and to what extent would success at recognising
teammates and linguistic convergence between teammates correlate with score?
5.2.2 Participants
Twenty participants were recruited via a student employment website. The ad-
vertisement stated that the experiment “involved playing a game with three other
participants using an alien language”. It was specified that participants must have
a high level of English (so that they would be able to understand the instructions
without difficulty), and that none should have studied more than a semester of lin-
guistics. All but six of the twenty participants were native speakers of English, and
they came from a wide variety of academic backgrounds. They ranged in age from
18 to 42. Participants were assigned to games on the basis of availability and to
teams at random.5 Each participant was paid £8, and the members of the winning
team in every game were awarded £5 each.
5.2.3 Experimental procedure
The procedure can be summarised as follows:
1. Participants arrive, sign consent forms, and choose cubicles;
2. Participants read instructions;
3. Training period: participants have ten minutes to learn alien language:
5There was one exception to this: two players in one game turned out unexpectedly to know
each other. They were put, without their knowledge, on different teams
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(a) First five minutes: participants look at wordlists;
(b) Last five minutes: participants look at wordlists and cartoons;
4. Participants told about prize;
5. Participants play two practice rounds (with wordlists in front of them);
6. Participants play game proper (without wordlists);
7. Participants fill in feedback questionnaires;
8. Having been paid, participants leave.
Having read and signed consent forms, participants were seated in adjacent closed
cubicles, each containing a computer (see Figure 5.1 for a diagram of the setup).
They then read through instructions, presented to them on the screen; they were
given as much time as they wanted for this. Having finished reading the instruc-
tions, and having been given a chance to ask any questions they might have, every
player was given an identical list of English words with translations into the “alien
language”. They were given ten minutes to learn these alien words in any way they
liked that did not involve them speaking out loud. They were also permitted to
write on the wordlists, and were given pens for this purpose. For the last five min-
utes of this training session, they were also given access, on the screens in front of
them, to a series of cartoons of people using the alien language (see Appendix B).6
After this training, participants were told about the prize available for winning the
game (the advertisement had also mentioned a potential £5 “bonus” for success) and
that they would now play two practice rounds, whose score did not count towards
the game proper. For these two rounds, players were told they would be paired with
their teammates. The chatting stage in the practice rounds also lasted 30 seconds
longer than in the game proper, and players were allowed to keep their wordlists
to refer to. Apart from giving the players a chance to get used to the game, and
to improve their command of the alien language before the wordlists were taken
away, these practice rounds (together with the training session described above)
were intended to go some way to simulating childhood. The game proper, where
players could not refer to their wordlists, but were told again that they would be
6They were not shown these for the whole ten minutes because pilots had suggested that—while
the cartoons helped participants learn the language, or at least feel more comfortable with using
it—being presented with the cartoons from the start distracted them from learning the words.
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Figure 5.1: Diagram of experiment setup
paired with their teammates for the first two rounds, can be seen as simulating
adolescence and adulthood. Section 5.6 will discuss the potential shortcomings in
this approach, particularly the high level of contact between teammates early on in
the game.
After the practice rounds, the players were given a minute to relax and have a last
look over their wordlists. These were then taken away, and players began the full
game, which lasted for 14 rounds (players were not told how many rounds to expect.
See Section 5.2.4 for a detailed description of how the rounds were structured). As
noted above, players were told in advance that they would be paired with their
teammates for the first two rounds. In fact, they were paired with their teammates
for the first three rounds. This was designed to frustrate players’ likely expectations
that, after two rounds with teammates, the next partner would most likely be an
opponent (see Section 5.6 on the shortcomings of this). After this round, players
were paired with their teammates in four more rounds, and with their opponents in
seven (three rounds with one and four with the other). The order of these rounds
was randomised, but no player was paired with any other player for more than three
rounds in a row. This meant that, overall, players were paired an equal amount of
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time with both teams, but were paired with their teammate more than with any
other individual player.
At the end of the game, participants were given a feedback questionnaire to fill
in (see Appendix A).
5.2.4 Game structure
Figure 5.2: Diagram of game structure
Figure 5.2 is a diagram of the game structure. As noted above, a game consisted
of a series of fourteen timed rounds. Players began the game with seven points,
divided between five resources (see Section 5.2.5). Throughout a round, players
could see their available resources on the left of the screen, and these were updated
after the second stage if they gave anything away to, or received anything from,
their partner.
Each round consisted of three stages. The first (chat) stage lasted for 180 seconds
in the game proper and 210 seconds in the practice rounds (which otherwise did not
differ). This was the stage in which players negotiated, by typing messages in the
alien language, to exchange resources. They could do nothing to interact with their
partner during this round except type and receive messages. This interaction worked
using an instant-messenger-style program: either player could type a message at
any time and, once they pressed enter, this message would appear on both their
partner’s screen and their own. Turn taking was not otherwise constrained. See
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Figure 5.4(a) for a screenshot (larger screenshots can be found in Appendix A in
the instructions for participants).
This stage was followed by the exchange stage (see Figure 5.4(b)), which lasted
30 seconds. In this stage, players could no longer send messages, but they could
choose to give away resources to the other player. They were free to give as little or
as much as they wanted, provided they had enough to do so. To give away resources,
players clicked on a button marked “+” for the relevant resource as many times
as they needed to. If they wanted to change their mind, there was also a “−”
button (nothing was final until the 30 seconds were up). Any resource given away
was worth double to the receiver (cf. Nettle and Dunbar 1997), so, as the aim of
the game was for one’s own team to finish with more points than one’s opponents’
team, there was an incentive to give resources away to one’s teammate, but not to
opponents. In this stage, players were also asked, “Were you talking to someone on
your own team?” and could answer on a scale of 1 to 4, where 1 meant “Definitely
not” and 4 meant “Definitely”. They were told in the instructions that their answer
to this question did not affect the game itself.
This stage was followed by a 20-second feedback stage (see Figure 5.5(a)), in
which players were reminded what, if anything, they had given their partner, and
told what, if anything, their partner had given them. They were also told if their
partner had been on their team or not (but not any more specific information, such
as, “You were talking to player A”). After this stage, either a new round started,
or the game ended.
The final screen of the game showed, along with the player’s own resources on the
left of the screen (which had been visible throughout the game), the resources the
player’s team had managed to gather and the resources their opponents’ team had
managed to gather (see Figure 5.5(b)). It also gave the provisional score for each
team, which equalled the sum of the team’s shared resources, and the final score,
which equalled the provisional score minus a penalty. This penalty was equal to
the difference between the team’s highest scoring resource and their lowest scoring
resource. For example, if a team had amassed 100 points of meat, 80 points of
grain, 60 points of water, 40 points of fruit, and 20 points of fish, then their overall
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(a) CHAT Stage (in which players negotiate to
exchange resources)
(b) EXCHANGE Stage (in which players ex-
change resources)
Figure 5.3: Examples of CHAT and EXCHANGE stages
(a) FEEDBACK stage (in which players receive
feedback on exchange and interlocutor’s iden-
tity)
(b) Final screen (shows combined team scores
at end of game)
Figure 5.4: Examples of FEEDBACK stage and final screen
score would be 300−80 = 220 (since the difference between their score for meat and
their score for fish would be 80). Neglecting one resource could therefore be very
serious. Players were made aware of the penalty before the game started. Its main
purpose was to ensure that there was material for negotiation in the chat stage.
Otherwise, there would be no point in asking for more of any particular resource.
5.2.5 Resources and scoring
Players began the game with seven points each, divided between five resources:
meat, grain, water, fruit, and fish. Every player began the game with three points
in one resource, two points in one resource, one point each in two resources, and
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no points in the remaining resource. These quantities were allocated to specific
resources at random, with the constraints that no two players in the same game
had precisely the same distribution, and that the resource in which a given player
had no points would be the resource in which their teammate had three points
(therefore, no team in any game had fewer than two points between them in any
resource). As mentioned above, there was a penalty applied to teams’ scores at
the end of the game, which equalled the difference between the team’s highest-
scoring and lowest-scoring resources. The difference between resources had no more
significance than this, however, and points in one resource were worth inherently
no more or less than points in any other resource.
Throughout the game, players could see how many of a given resource they had
available, but not how many their team had as a whole. At no time did any player
see how many points any other player had, except at the end of the game, when
the final combined scores for both teams were revealed.
5.2.6 Alien language
Players were not allowed to use English, any other real language, or numerals in the
experiment. Instead they were given an “alien language” to learn, which consisted
of nineteen randomly generated words of either two or three CV syllables. The
alien words were generated anew for every game, and the length of the alien word
(i.e. whether it had two or three syllables) paired with a given meaning was varied
between games. The following is an example set, with English glosses:
hello – jezife want/need – hizu
goodbye – zemoze give – howapi
please – zoyi meat – bileja
thanks – saje grain – jata
yes – fayide water – tomuje
no/not – kiba fruit – yinu
and – rupo fish – sipuno
I – muba much/a lot of – woduko
you – bulifo question word – lani
have – mijeke
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The players were not given detailed instructions with regard to syntax, but,
as mentioned in Section 5.2.3, they were shown cartoons of characters using the
alien language (see Appendix B). All the sentences in these examples had an SVO
structure, and the “question word” preceded the subject. There was, however, some
variation introduced. First, three out of five sentences had overt subject pronouns,
while these were lacking from the remaining two; second, one of the five sentences
had a preverbal negative particle, while another had one post-verbally.
So that players would remain focused on the game and the screen in front of
them, and so that memory lapses (along with typing mistakes) would provide a
source for “natural” variation in the language, analogous to production errors in
real language, players were not able to refer to their wordlists during the game itself
and had to use the alien language from memory. Early pilots had suggested that
participants felt somewhat overwhelmed by the prospect of having to “get the alien
language right”, so participants were also told not to. . .
. . . worry at all about making mistakes in the language. The important
thing is to make yourself understood without using English (or any other
real language).
This was also intended to encourage players to communicate as naturally as
possible, and not to treat the task as a memory test.
5.3 Summary of terms
The design of this experiment is relatively complex, so this section will summarise
the terms used to describe it, along with some details of the experiment.
Alien language An artificial language that players had to use to communicate
with each other during the chat stage of a round. They were not permitted
to use any real language, or to use numerals.
Final score The provisional score minus the penalty for a given team at
the end of a game.
Game The experimental task, engaged in by a group of four players. First the
players would play a small number of practice rounds, and then the game
proper, which, in this experiment, lasted for 14 rounds.
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Game proper Those rounds of the game, following the practice rounds, for
which players could be rewarded depending on their success.
Gift Points given away by a particular player during the exchange stage of a
round.
Group The four players engaged in playing a given game. There were five
groups in all.
Opponent A member of the same group, but not the same team. Every player
had two opponents.
Participant An individual taking part in this experiment. There were 20 partici-
pants in all in this experiment.
Partner For the duration of every round, each player was paired with one of
the other players, who might or might not be on the same team. This was
their partner for that round.
Penalty The difference, at the end of the game, between the highest- and the
lowest-scoring resource for a given team. This was deducted from the
provisional score to give the final score.
Player A participant described with respect to a particular game. There were
four players in each game.
Practice round In this experiment there were two of these, and they were played
before the game proper began, to allow players to practise using the alien
language and playing the game. Scores from the practice round were not
carried over into the game proper.
Provisional score This was equal to the sum of all resources belonging to a
given team. The penalty was deducted from this to give the final score.
Resource Every player started the game with seven points, split among five re-
sources: meat, water, grain, fruit, and fish. No resource was worth inherently
any more than any other.
Round A subdivision of a game, consisting of three stages.
Stage A subdivision of a round. There are three stages in each round:
Chat stage In this stage, a player could interact with their partner for
the round by typing and receiving messages. They cannot, however, give
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any resources away. This stage lasted 180 seconds in this experiment
(or 210 seconds in the practice rounds).
Exchange stage In this stage, players could choose to give away some of
their resources to their partner. This stage lasted for 30 seconds in this
experiment.
Feedback stage In this stage, players were reminded what they had given
away in the exchange stage, told what they had received from their
partner, and told if their partner had been on their team or not. This
stage lasted 20 seconds in this experiment.
Proportional gift A gift expressed as the proportion of the giver’s resource
total at the time of giving.
Team In each game of this experiment, the four players were divided into two
teams of two. The object of the game was for one’s own team to score more
than the other team.
Teammate The other member of one’s own team. Every player had one team-
mate.
Variable set In the analysis of how the alien language was used (see Sec-
tion 5.4.2), a variable set is a set of words used in a particular game with a
particular meaning (e.g. all the words used by players of one game to refer to
“meat”).
5.4 Results
Table 5.1 summarises the results for this experiment. The second game was unfor-
tunately cut short by power failure in the middle of the ninth round. Data from
this game will be included in the following sections only where it is practical to do
so, and, in such cases, results excluding this data will also be given.
As noted in Section 5.2.1.2, there were two main dependent variables in this
experiment:
1. Players’ success in distinguishing between teammates and opponents.
2. The degree to which the alien language diverged.
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As will be discussed in more detail in Section 5.4.1, players did significantly better
than chance at identifying their teammates. As will be shown in Section 5.4.2,
players were also significantly closer to their teammates than to their opponents
in their use of the alien language, indicating that the language was beginning to
diverge into team “dialects”. Section 5.4.3 will look at how teams’ scores correlate
with other factors, and Section 5.5 will discuss the particular strategies the players
employed, and how these relate to divergence. In these sections, teams will be
referred to by a number and a letter; for example, “Team 3b” refers to Team b in
the third game.
Final Convergence % Correct Mean Strategies
scorea levelb recognitionsc giftd employede
Game 1
Team a 35 (47) 0.91 79.2 (24) 1.3 (1.8) DR, M
Team b 33 (46) 0.95 79.2 (24) 1.1 (1.5) DR
Game 2f
Team a 52 (61) 0.86 90.9 (23) 2.1 (4.1) DR, II
Team b 13 (17) 0.91 66.7 (24) 1.1 (1.3) DR
Game 3
Team a 41 (55) 0.90 75 (24) 1.5 (2.3) DR, M
Team b 28 (44) 0.88 66.7 (24) 1.1 (1.5) DR, M
Game 4
Team a 54 (67) 0.89 73.9 (23) 1.8 (2.7) DR, M
Team b 52 (82) 0.84 77.3 (22) 2.5 (4) DR, M, II, SH
Game 5
Team a 432 (463) 0.88 85.7 (21) 16 (31.8) DR, M, II, SH
Team b 28 (35) 0.94 75 (24) 0.8 (1.2) DR, M
Table 5.1: Summary of results from first experiment.
a Provisional score given in brackets;
b 1−mean distance between teammates (higher figure means greater convergence);
see Section 5.4.2;
c Excludes first two rounds and rounds where players made no response; number
of responses made given in brackets (out of a possible 24);
d Based on all rounds; mean gift to teammates only given in brackets;
e See Section 5.5.1. DR = Dialect Recognition; M = Mimicry; II = Intentional
Innovation; SH = Secret Handshake;
f This game cut short by power failure.
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5.4.1 Recognising teammates
In the feedback questionnaire, participants were asked if they had been able to
recognise their teammates and, if so, how. All but one said that they had, at least
some of the time; of these 19 participants, 18 reported basing these judgements on
linguistic cues. Both members of Team 4a reported that this became more difficult
towards the end of the game, however, as their opponents had started mimicking
their use of language (members of Team 4b confirmed their use of this tactic in
their own questionnaires). The one player who claimed some success in recognising
teammates, but did not mention linguistic cues, reported basing his judgements on
“response time7 and the items they have or don’t have”. Two other players made
reference to recognising teammates based on the resources they claimed to have, but
only in addition to linguistic cues. Section 5.5.1 will discuss in detail the linguistic
strategies that players employed.
Aside from the players’ own subjective impressions, there are two quantitative
measures of how well they did at recognising their teammates. The first measure
comes from their having been asked explicitly. In the second stage of each round
in the competitive condition, players were asked: “Were you talking to someone
on your own team?” and answered on a scale of 1 to 4, where 1 meant “Definitely
not” and 4 meant “Definitely”. The third column of Table 5.1 shows the percentage
of correct recognitions for each team, where an answer of 1 or 2 is taken to mean
“no”, and an answer of 3 or 4 is taken to mean “yes”. Responses from the first two
rounds, where players knew they were talking to their teammates, were ignored, as
were rounds where players neglected to respond (which make up 2.9% of potential
responses). As can be seen, players were more often right than wrong. Of the 216
judgements made, only 56 were incorrect, which is highly significant (p < 0.001,
based on a one-tailed binomial sign test). If the results from Game 2 are excluded,
the results are similarly significant (p < 0.001; S = 44 incorrect out of 186). Definite
guesses (i.e. a guess of 1 or 4) were, unsurprisingly, far more often right than wrong
(97 correct against 14 incorrect).
7He gave no further details about this. Response time may, of course, be regarded as a linguistic
variable, at least to an extent. It stands in contrast, however, to the much more unambiguously
linguistic markers that other players referred to, such as punctuation, spellings and greeting forms.
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One problem with this measure, of course, is that players sometimes neglected to
answer the question. As there were four players playing at any one time, and the
rounds were timed, they could not be made to answer the question without inter-
rupting the game. In this case, it is unimportant. First, what players in fact thought
in these rounds can be inferred with reasonable expectation of accuracy from their
giving behaviour on these rounds (see below). Second, as failures only constituted
2.9% of responses, the results remain significant however these are interpreted. An
interesting question remains, however: where players are asked explicitly what they
think, their responses will be one step removed from their actual impressions of who
they were talking to, which might be filtered through post hoc justifications, recon-
siderations, and the like. It is, moreover, possible that players might subconsciously
respond to something in an interlocutor’s use of language, but consciously come to a
different conclusion on more rational grounds. Of course, it might be possible to get
some interesting data on this through neuro-imaging.8 While this was not done, the
question is not raised for the sake of idle speculation. A second measure of players’
impressions is available, which can be compared with the explicit responses. This
is gift size, which, as noted above, could be used to infer what players thought in
those rounds where they failed to answer the question. Since any points given away
were worth double to the receiver, we should expect that gifts to teammates should
be larger than gifts to opponents. There is one caveat to this: given the pressure
to keep resources balanced, if players had rather too much of one resource, it might
seem a reasonable strategy to give much of it away to an opponent, particularly if
that opponent also claimed to be overburdened with that resource—a strategy that
will be referred to here as “malign generosity”. Indeed, two players claim to have
done this, but one of these mentioned it only as an occasional alternative to giving
nothing; the other eighteen players claimed to have tried to avoid giving anything
to opponents.
To test whether players treated all assumed opponents the same, gifts were com-
pared (as a proportion of the player’s resources at the time of donation) for those
rounds where they voted no: if players were talking to teammates, did they give
them more than they gave their opponents, despite explicitly guessing “opponent”
8Such methods are not unusual, for example, in studies of multilingual processing; de Bot
(2008) gives a relatively recent, though pessimistic, review.
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in both cases?9 The mean proportional gift to teammates on these rounds (0.02)
was in fact higher than the mean proportional gift to opponents (0.01), but a
Wilcoxon T test (where N1 = 35 and N2 = 98) showed that this was not significant
(T = 1923, p > .05). Players’ gifts in these games were thus in line with their ex-
plicit judgements of whether or not they were paired with teammates. Everything,
in other words, indicates that players of this game were able to use linguistic cues,
in a highly restricted artificial language they had only just learnt, and which was
initially identical for all of them, to recognise people they had barely met.
5.4.2 Divergence
The previous section described how players managed to recognise each other using
markers arising in the alien language. One of the main research questions behind
this experiment was whether this would cause the language to start diverging into
team “dialects”. For this to happen, variation must arise between players (it will
be recalled that all four players in a game learnt the same alien language). This
alone is not enough, however. The development of four idiolects would not be of the
greatest interest (see Section 3.2). Far more interesting if there were also structured
convergence: if players were closer to their teammates, in their use of the language,
than to their opponents.
That there was variation in the players’ use of the language is easy to observe, and
a large amount of it emerged during the game. If we consider only the four games
for which there is full data, there are 76 potential variables (19 initial words × 4);
alongside these, the players introduced 282 new variant forms. The vast majority
of this variation appears to have arisen accidentally, as a result of typing mistakes,
poor memory, and so on: most players denied making any deliberate changes (as
can be seen from the fifth column of Table 5.1, members of only three teams claimed
to have employed Intentional Innovation as a strategy; see Section 5.5.1). There
were, moreover, a few variables that did not produce any new variants. If these are
ignored (since the only variables that matter for the measurement of between-player
9The second game will be excluded from this analysis, as the data was too incomplete to be
helpful.
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variation are those with more than one variant), then there were 6.2 variants used
for every variable.
Given this variation, players could be compared based on the relative frequency
with which they used particular variants. To this end, every individual word-form
used in every one of the four completed games was extracted along with a frequency
count for each player (i.e. how many times each player used a given form) and sorted
into “variable sets”, according to which players could be compared. Variants were
assigned to these sets based on formal similarity (see, for example, the variants in
Table 5.2) and the context in which they were used, which allowed their intended
meaning to be inferred.
For instance, in a particular game, one player might use only the form hizu to
mean “want”, while another player might use hizu sometimes and (the innovative
form) hizo the rest of the time. These—along with any other forms used to mean
“want” in a given game—would constitute a variable set. On the basis of these
sets, pairs of players could be compared according to which variant they favoured.
This is analogous to variation in real language, where speakers vary in the phonetic
forms they use (e.g. the word “meat” might be pronounced variously as [mit], [miP],
[mIit], [m@IP] etc.). All variants were on the word level; variation in capitalisation
was included (gazo, GAZO, Gazo and gAzo, for example, would be treated as four
separate variants), but syntactic variants were not. There was a particular kind
of morphological variant, however, which was a special case. This is where the
repetition of individual letters was used to indicate number. For example, Team
5a used ttttt to mean “5 points of meat [i.e. tasobo]”. In such cases, ttt, ttttttt and
tttttttttttttt etc. were not all treated as separate variants, but as one. For each of
these variable sets, the raw frequency scores were converted to proportions. The
mean Euclidean distance between each pair of players was then calculated. Table 5.2
shows an example, taken from one game, of a variable set consisting of five variants.
The figure on the left of each cell is the raw frequency and the figure in brackets
is the proportion. The form rohapi was given to participants in the word list at
the start of the game, and glossed as “want/need”. The other variants can be
assumed to have arisen through error. Players 1 and 2, as can be seen, showed a
strong preference for the original variant. Players 2 and 3, however, both used the
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metathesised form ropahi almost as frequently. Other forms were also used once or
twice. Table 5.3 shows the mean distance (based on the proportions) between every
pair of players for this example set; the smallest distances are marked in bold.
Team 1 Team 2
Player 1 Player 2 Player 3 Player 4
rohapi 34 (.97) 27 (.93) 11 (.52) 10 (.48)
roahpi 1 (.03) 2 (.07) 0 (0) 0 (0)
ropahi 0 (0) 0 (0) 9 (.43) 9 (.43)
rophui 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (.05) 0 (0)
wohapi 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 2 (.09)
Table 5.2: Example variable set from first experiment
Team 1 Team 2
Player 1 Player 2 Player 3 Player 4
Player 1 0 .02 .192 .208
Player 2 .02 0 .192 .208
Player 3 .192 .192 0 .036
Player 4 .208 .208 .036 0
Table 5.3: Mean distances between players in example set
The second column of Table 5.1 shows the mean level of convergence for every
team (calculated as 1 minus the mean distance between teammates across variable
sets; a score of 1 would indicate complete convergence). In no game was there a
significant between-team difference in within-team convergence (based on a Monte
Carlo test). This fact should not be misinterpreted. It means only that all players
converged linguistically with their teammates to a similar level. It is important to
note that this is not a measure of between-team divergence: if all four players in a
game used the language in exactly the same way, both teams would show the same
level of convergence; on the other hand, two teams could show the same level of
convergence, yet diverge significantly from each other. To test whether teams had
diverged in any condition, the variable sets were scored: if, for a given variable set,
every player was closer to their teammate than to either of their opponents (which
is the case in the example set; see Tables 5.2 and 5.3), the set was awarded a score
of 1 (meaning that the teams had diverged with regard to this variable). If, on
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the other hand, this was true of neither team, the set was scored 0 (meaning that
there was no between-team divergence). If both members of one of the teams were
closer to each other than either was to their opponents, but this was not the case
for the other team, the set was scored 0.5. The scores for all variable sets in all
four complete games were then summed, to give an overall divergence score (in this
case 19). P values were calculated using the Monte Carlo method; that is, the data
was shuffled and rescored 10,000 times (see Appendix C for more details of this
approach), and the score was found to be highly significant (p < .001), indicating
a significant tendency towards socially, and geographically,10 structured divergence
in the alien language.
5.4.2.1 Syntactic variation
The measure described above involves only word-level variants, but can be seen as
including morphological, phonological, and phonetic variation, to the extent that
these levels of structure played a role (see Section 5.4.2 for an example of something
like reduplication; orthography acted as a proxy for sound). This leaves syntax. To
investigate syntactic variation, every utterance used in the game was extracted and
rewritten as parts of speech. For example, a sentence meaning, “I give you meat
fish water” would be represented as, “PRO VERB NOUN NOUN NOUN”.
Players were compared on three variables: position of pronouns, position of the
interrogative particle (glossed as “question word” in the wordlists), and position of
negative particles in sentences with verbs. There were three variants for the second
two variables: left, right and on both sides. The same variants were measured for
pronoun position, but this variable had an extra variant: sentences with a verb, but
no pronoun at all (as was noted in Section 5.2.6, this possibility was presented to the
players in training, as were both pre- and post-verbal negative markers). Figure 5.5
gives the frequency of the different sentence types. Players were compared for these
variables as they had been for word-level variants. In this case, however, there was
no significant divergence (p = .25).
10With frequency of interaction understood as a proxy for geographical distance.
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(a) Position of pronoun
(b) Position of negative marker
(c) Position of interrogative marker
Figure 5.5: Frequency of sentence types
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5.4.3 Comparison with score
In three out of the five games, the team that most often distinguished correctly
between teammates and opponents also won the game. In one of the two games in
which this was not the case, both teams did equally well at distinguishing, and their
scores were also extremely close, differing by only one point before the penalty was
applied, and by only two points afterwards. In the other of the two games, the team
with the best recognition rate actually scored 15 points more than their opponents
before the penalty was applied, but lost by two points after it had been. The
team producing the most definite guesses (1 or 4), which was also always the team
with the most correct definite guesses, attained the highest provisional score in
every game. While this all might suggest that recognition rate was quite a good
predictor of (pre-penalty) success, there was no significant correlation between team
recognition rate and provisional score (r(8) = −.465, p > .05). While recognition
rate is a good predictor of the winning team, absolute score is the result of several
other factors, which will be discussed in Section 5.5.
Similarly, there was no correlation between the level of within-team convergence
and score11 (r(8) = −.25, p > .05) and, as noted in Section 5.4.2, there was no signif-
icant difference between levels of within-team convergence in any game. On the face
of it, this contradicts expectations. It should not, however. For teammates to be
able to identify each other, an especially high level of convergence is not necessary;
nor is it necessary to be any more converged linguistically than one’s opponents.
As noted in Section 5.4.2, within-team convergence is not even a good predictor
of between-team divergence. For the purposes of recognising one’s teammate, one
suitably salient variant or shared signal is sufficient for recognition. As can be seen
from the fifth column of Table 5.1, the two highest-scoring teams (before penalty)
developed a very powerful code: a “Secret Handshake” (see Section 5.5.1). This
was the strategy that led them to be so successful.12
11Either provisional or final; the coefficient given is for provisional score, as this is likely to be
the most meaningful measure for these purposes.
12At least in the case of Team 5a. Team 4b developed their Secret Handshake rather too late
in the game; they let themselves down, moreover, by allowing their resources to get dangerously
unbalanced. However, had they developed the handshake earlier, their penalty is unlikely to have
mattered. Team 5a incurred the largest penalty of any team, but still beat their opponents by
404 points!
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The overall levels of within-team convergence and between-team divergence are
better treated as by-products of adaptive strategies rather than as strategies them-
selves. Section 5.5 discusses the strategies that players actually used.
5.5 Strategy
5.5.1 Identification strategies
The linguistic strategies available to players to identify, and be identified as, team-
mates can be summarised as follows:13
• Dialect Recognition (DR): try to remember how different players use the lan-
guage and identify them based on this. For example, a player in Team 1a
reported noticing that her teammate did not use first-person pronouns with
verbs.
• Intentional Innovation (II): make changes to the language that are likely to be
recognisable. For example, players in Team 2a and Team 5a in started abbre-
viating resource names and repeating the abbreviations to indicate number.
• Mimicry (M): try to sound as much like the person you’re talking to as pos-
sible. For example, in both Game 2 and Game 5, the players who started
abbreviating resource names were soon imitated by their teammates. Play-
ers in several games also claimed to have intentionally imitated the linguistic
behaviour of their opponents (Team 5a did this in greetings; see below)
• Secret Handshake (SH): say something at the beginning of the interaction
that identifies you to your teammate (and ideally not your opponent), and
requires a specific response from them (see below for an example).
The strategies are referred to in abbreviated form in the last column of Table 5.1.
Inclusion in that column is based on players’ own reporting in feedback question-
naires of the strategies they employed and, where this can be clearly seen, evidence
in the data.
13As mentioned in Section 5.4.1, three of the twenty players claimed to have attempted to keep
track of their teammates’ resources (based on what they offered and asked for) so as to identify
them on this basis. Since they did not report success at this, it will be ignored in the following
analysis. It should also be noted that it is hard to identify cases of intentional mimicry in the
data; this may therefore be underreported.
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There seems to be some sign of implicational universals in strategy use. For
example, all teams employed Dialect Recognition, and most employed Mimicry as
well. Only one team claimed to use Intentional Innovation, but not Mimicry (and it
is possible that they simply neglected to report the latter strategy). This suggests
that Dialect Recognition is the simplest (or at least the most obvious) strategy,
and that Mimicry and Intentional Innovation are less basic, with some suggestion
that the latter may be the less basic of the two, though this is less certain (and
see Sections 6.4.1 and 7.3.1). No teams employed a Secret Handshake who did not
also employ all three of the other strategies. The significance of this pattern should
not be overstated, however. Apart from trying to keep track of the resources one’s
teammate’s claims to have, which is clearly not likely to be very reliable, Dialect
Recognition is the least a player of this game can do apart from doing nothing.
It is clear, moreover, that Secret Handshake is the most complex strategy, since it
involves coordination with another player; it also entails both Dialect Recognition
(as players have to recognise that their teammate is doing something special) and
Intentional Innovation (as players have to create a salient greeting).
As Table 5.1 shows, Secret Handshakes occurred in Games 4 and 5, and the teams
that used it were the most successful in the game. Team 4b’s Handshake had four
parts. The word for “hello” in this game was zojo, and, as early as the seventh





It was not entirely successful on this round, however, as neither member was
convinced that the other player was on their team (Player 3 voted 2 and Player 4
voted 1). Precisely the same sequence was repeated in the tenth round (by which
time Player 3 had also greeted Player 1 with zo, but with no response in kind).
This time, Player 3 voted 4 (but gave only three points of meat). It was not until
the thirteenth round that both members of the team worked out that they were on
to something. Happily for them, they were also paired up for the fourteenth round,
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which allowed them to make even more use of their Handshake, but by then it was
too late to develop it further.
Team 5a’s Handshake was much more impressive. In this game, the word for
“hello” was sekudi, but Team 5a did not use this between themselves. Instead, they
used jori noloku, which literally meant,“I have”. In early rounds (in fact, it began
in the second Practice round), this seems to have been meant literally. Members of
this team just dispensed with the ordinary greeting and got down to the business
of stating what resources they had. Members of the other team, however, tended
to begin with a greeting. This difference of approach soon became obvious to Team
5a, and by the seventh round they had turned it into something rather interesting:
Player 0: jori noloku
Player 0: ?
Player 1: jori nokolu tasabo tasabo vawu vawu vawu vawu . . .
As indicated by Player 0’s question-marked pause, jori noloku had become an
identity marker to these players; this also meant that it was beginning to resemble
a greeting—Player 0 did not immediately state what resources she had. A further
marker will be noticed in the above exchange: players in this team repeated resource
names to indicate how much of something they had. This was not especially unusual:
Team 2a did this too, and Team 4b also did it a little. Team 5a stood out, however,
as engaging in this very early on. Player 1 started it in the very first Practice
round, and this no doubt served as a reinforcing marker, along with jori noloku, by
which to identify each other, and in which to ground the Handshake. Later in the
game, when it became hard work typing everything out, they started abbreviating
the resource names (Team 2a did the same). Towards the last rounds of the game
it is not clear that there was much information being transmitted about the actual
amounts these players had. The point seems more that it reinforced their bond.
Team 5a’s Secret Handshake had other subtleties. Members of this team would
wait before beginning an interaction; if their interlocutor started with sekudi, they
would reply with the same, and imitate their opponent’s language throughout the
interaction. If, on the other hand, they judged that no sekudi was coming, they
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would begin with jori noloku. This backfired once, when Player 2 began the interac-
tion, for some reason, with sekudi. As a testament to the quality of the handshake,
neither thought the other was their teammate.
This team was unusual in its cleverness (and it seems the brains of the team
was Player 1), although the similarities with real-life greetings rituals,14 and the
Biblical “shibboleth”-story are striking. Nevertheless, it is equally striking that the
vast majority of players reported success at identifying their teammates without
resorting to such inventive strategies. Fascinating as they are, cases of such Secret
Handshakes should be seen as exceptional, and should not distract excessively from
the less salient successes of other teams.
5.5.2 Giving behaviour
The fourth column of Table 5.1 shows the mean amount of resources given away
per round by each team, and the mean amount given to teammates (whether or not
players guessed who they were paired with). The most successful teams were the
most generous (apart from Team 4b, who did score more than their opponents before
the penalty was applied). Indeed, there is a very clear—if unsurprising— correlation
between mean gift and score (r(8) = .998, p < .0005; based on provisional score).
In spite of this, most players were rather conservative in their gift-giving. Even in
the first two rounds, when players were told explicitly that they would be paired
with their teammates, no player gave away everything, and only two players ever
gave away more than half their resources (these were the two members of Team
5a). There are three points to be made about such conservativeness. First, there
are very few real-life situations where giving away all one’s resources is a good idea,
so it is possible that players were following a generally adaptive heuristic. Second,
as the results of Game 4 show, it was important to keep resources balanced, and
players knew it; this obviously encourages caution. Finally, there was a simple
physical constraint: giving away resources involved clicking on a + button. This
means that, the more resources one wishes to give away, the more effort is required.
When the amounts involved are relatively low, as was the case early in the game,
14And not only those employed by secret societies. Even “how do you do?” has, for most of the
people who use it regularly, a correct response that is not a direct answer to the question.
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this does not make much difference. Later in the game, however, particularly if
players have already amassed a large number of resources, it becomes increasingly
harder to give away a large proportion of one’s resources. Given the time limit,
there is obviously a ceiling on the amount that can be given away at all.
Nevertheless, only one team really rose high enough to hit this ceiling. This is
Team 5a, whose members were the only players in any game to ever give away more
than half their resources, and who also achieved by far the highest score. It should
not be surprising that this generosity occurred only in the team that employed a
Secret Handshake from early on. Not only does this powerful strategy create a more
secure environment for generous giving, but it is itself costly to establish—that is,
it is more complex, and requires more coordination, than any other strategy—and
is thus a non-conservative behaviour.
5.5.3 Summary
The most successful strategy was a combination of generous giving and the inten-
tional creation of salient markers consisting of more than one element. The latter,
as a particularly complex strategy, takes effort to establish and is thus the costli-
est of the identification strategies, but once established, is relatively cheap to use.
Generous giving is inherently risky, but a safer environment can be created for it
by the Secret Handshake.
An important point must be borne in mind: most players engaged very little in
either of these behaviours. The majority relied instead on recognising less salient
patterns of variation (this has been referred to here as Dialect Recognition), some
less complex innovation, mimicry, and a relatively conservative exchange of re-
sources. It is this behaviour, not the more sophisticated Secret Handshake strategy
that led to the divergence described in Section 5.4.2.
5.6 Discussion
This experiment showed that linguistic processes which take a considerable time
in real life can be modelled in a laboratory setting, using real human participants.
Not only did players succeed in bootstrapping linguistic identity markers in a new
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language in a very short time (under an hour), but their behaviour in the game led
the language to begin diverging into two “dialects.”
The results, in other words, were very promising, and this experiment can be
seen as a useful proof of concept. Nevertheless, there were shortcomings. Perhaps
the most obvious concerns the high level of within-team interaction at the start of
the game. Players were told nothing about who precisely their teammates were,
but they could not play entirely blind; for this reason, they were told that the
first player they spoke to would be their teammate. However, as was mentioned
in Section 5.2.3, this period of explicit within-team interaction was in fact quite
extensive: players knew that they would be paired with their teammates for both
practice rounds and for the first two rounds of the game proper. What is more,
they were in fact paired with their teammates for the first three rounds. This was
partly because it was assumed that players would need a relatively long period of
interaction with their teammates to be able to play the game. Second, this long
within-team interaction was supposed to simulate childhood, in which individuals
are less frequently exposed to outsiders without supervision. Nevertheless, in ret-
rospect, this was almost certainly unnecessary. The third round of the game was
always between teammates because, having just spent two rounds with their team-
mates, players were expected to be biased towards guessing they were paired with
an opponent in the third round (in fact, only seven of the twenty players guessed
they were paired with their teammates in this round). However, this problem could
have been avoided by having players explicitly paired with teammates only in the
first round, which would most likely have been a perfectly sufficient opportunity for
players to anchor themselves.
A similar issue was that players interacted more frequently with their teammates
overall than with either of their opponents. Although they interacted an equal
amount of time with members of each team, this meant interacting 50% of the time
with one’s teammate and no more than 29% of the time with either opponent.15
Although there is nothing wrong with this as such, it does not allow a clear distinc-
tion to be made between the pressure to mark identity and frequency of interaction
15As there were 14 rounds in the game, players did not interact an equal number of rounds with
both opponents. This was another minor shortcoming to be remedied.
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as explanations for the linguistic divergence. A control condition, either with a
lower frequency of interaction or without the pressure to mark identity, would be
necessary to make this distinction.
Those are the two chief shortcomings of the experiment. There were also three
smaller problems. First, this experiment did not entirely exclude participants who
had studied linguistics; participants were admitted who had studied a semester
or less of the subject. While it is unlikely that a semester of linguistics would
make a significant difference, individuals who have decided to study linguistics
are likely to be individuals with a particular interest in language and, perhaps,
linguistic variation specifically, and should probably have been excluded.16 Second,
a relatively high number of players neglected to say, in the exchange stage of the
round, whether or not they thought they were paired with a teammate. Since the
rounds were timed, it was impossible to enforce this strictly, but this indicated at
least that the importance of doing so should be stressed more clearly. Finally, as
mentioned in Section 5.4, one game was cut short by a power cut. This is not a
shortcoming of the experimental design, but it at least gave more reason to replicate
the experiment, incorporating improvements as suggested above. Chapters 6 and 7
describe two further, larger-scale, experiments that do just that.
16The importance of this should not be overestimated. It is certainly safer to exclude all students
of linguistics from an experiment that concerns language divergence. However, it is far from clear
that it makes a great difference. There are, after all, a host of potential biases that different
participants might bring, not all of which are related to language. As has been suggested elsewhere
(e.g. Sears 1986), we should be wary of taking the behaviour of Western undergraduate students
as accurately modelling the behaviour of all human beings. This participants in this experiment
included both undergraduate and postgraduate students, and the age range was relatively wide.
However, it would be very interesting to try running the experiment with non-university-educated
participants and with participants outside this age range.
Chapter 6
Controlling for the pressure to mark identity: a sec-
ond experiment
Chapter 5 described an experiment in which four participants played a game that
involved using an artificial “alien language” to negotiate anonymously to exchange
resources. The players were divided into two teams of two and the game was set up
in such a way that it was advantageous to give away resources to one’s teammate,
but not to one’s opponents. Owing to the anonymity of the interactions, players
were forced to rely on the alien language as a source of social markers, and they
successfully used them to identity each other. Over the course of the game, this led
the alien language to start diverging into team “dialects”.
However, as discussed in Section 5.6, it is difficult to be sure what caused this
divergence: each player interacted more with their teammate than with either of
their opponents, so frequency of interaction may well play an important role, or
perhaps even the only role, in the divergence. Indeed, frequency of interaction must
play some role: there must be a minimum level of interaction with one’s teammate,
both absolute and relative to opponents, that allows players to accommodate to
them. This leaves two questions: what is this minimum level, and is it sufficient
to account for the divergence, or is a pressure to mark identity necessary? The
experiment described in this chapter attempts to go some way to answering these
questions. It introduces a control condition in which there is no pressure to mark
identity, and it equalises the frequency of interaction between all players, so there
is no frequency bias towards interacting with one’s teammate. A further problem
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of the first experiment, noted in Section 5.6, was the relatively high interaction
between teammates in the first rounds of the game. This was significantly reduced
in the experiment described in this chapter.
6.1 Description of experiment
6.1.1 Overview
This experiment was carried out in May and June 2008, and involved forty partic-
ipants, who were divided into ten groups of four. Each of these ten groups played
a computer game. Five of the groups played a competitive version of the game, for
which they were divided into two teams of two; the object of this game, as in the
game described in Chapter 5, was for one’s own team to score more points than
the other team. In this case, however, players were also encouraged to beat their
opponents by as high a margin as possible: a prize was given not (as in the previous
experiment) to members of the winning team in each game, but to the members of
the team which, out of all the teams in the condition, beat its opponents by the
greatest margin.
The other five groups played a more cooperative game.1 In this game, all the four
players in a group were on the same team, and the object was to score as highly
as possible. Members of the team that got the highest score in the condition were
awarded a prize. In neither condition of the game were players told how many other
teams were playing or what score they had to beat.
The game played in this experiment was very similar to the game described
in Chapter 5. It consisted of a series of fifteen timed rounds in each of which
every player was, as in the previous experiment, paired pseudo-randomly with one
of the other players. As before, a round of the game involved using an instant-
messenger-style program to negotiate to exchange resources by typing messages
in an “alien language” (which consisted this time of twenty randomly generated
words; see Section 6.1.6), and, in the second stage, choosing whether or not to give
anything away.
1This condition will be referred to as the “Cooperative condition”, and the other condition as
the “Competitive condition”. The names refer to within-game competition/cooperation. Both
conditions, of course, involved elements of cooperation and competition.
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In the Competitive condition, players were paired with their teammates in the
first round of the game and the first of the practice rounds (of which there were
three) and were told as much. They were not told who they would be paired with
in any other round.
6.1.2 Participants
Forty participants were recruited via a student employment website. The adver-
tisement stated that the experiment “involved playing a game with three other
participants using an alien language”. It was specified that participants must have
a high level of English (so that they would be able to understand the instructions
without difficulty), and must not have studied linguistics or have done an exper-
iment for the same experimenter previously. As the experiment involved a lot of
reading and typing, prospective applicants were asked not to apply if they suffered
seriously from dyslexia or RSI. All but seven of the forty participants were native
speakers of English, and they came from a wide variety of academic backgrounds.
They ranged in age from 19 to 31. Participants were assigned to games on the basis
of availability and to teams at random. Each participant was paid £8, and the
members of the winning team in each condition were awarded £10 each.
6.1.3 Experimental procedure
The procedure was very similar to that of the previous experiment (see Section 5.2.3).
The instructions were revised and separate instructions written for the Cooperative
condition (see Appendix A).
After they had spent ten minutes learning the alien language, participants played
three practice rounds, whose score did not count towards the game proper. In both
the Competitive and the Cooperative conditions, players were paired with a different
partner in each of these practice rounds. In the Cooperative condition, players were
told as much. In the Competitive condition, players were told that the first person
they were paired with was their teammate. They were told the same in the game
proper. Players in the Cooperative condition (where everyone was on the same
team) were told nothing about the first round of the game proper; no player in
either condition was told anything about who they would be paired with in any
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of the later rounds of the game. As there were more practice rounds (three rather
than two) and more rounds in the game proper (15 rather than 14) than there had
been in the first experiment, the practice rounds were shorter in this experiment.
See Section 6.1.4 for more details.
After the practice rounds, the players were given a minute to relax and have a
last look over their wordlists, as before. These were then taken away, and players
began the 15 rounds of the game proper (as before, players were not told how many
rounds to expect). As noted above, players were told in advance that they would
be paired with their teammates for the first round. They were told nothing about
the following rounds. The order of these rounds was randomised, but no player
was paired with any other player for more than two rounds in a row. Every player
was paired with every one of the other players for five rounds. Every game in the
Cooperative condition was matched with a game in the Competitive condition, such
that the same alien language was used for both, and the order in which players were
paired was kept the same in both.
6.1.4 Game structure
Players began the game with more points than in the first experiment (28), and the
distribution was more uneven (see Section 6.1.5 for more details), but the five kinds
of resource remained the same. As before, players could see their available resources
on the left of the screen throughout the game. In this experiment, the chat stage
lasted for 180 seconds in the game proper and 120 seconds in the practice rounds.
The exchange stage lasted 30 seconds in the main game, and 20 seconds in the
practice rounds. Only in the Competitive Condition were players asked, “Were you
talking to someone on your own team?” since the question would be meaningless in
the Cooperative condition. The feedback stage, in which players were reminded
what they had given their partner and told what they received, lasted 20 seconds
in both the practice rounds and the main game. In the Competitive condition,
as before, players were told if their partner had been on their team or not; no
information of this sort was given in the Cooperative condition.
Since every player could be paired with one of three other players, and 14 (the
number of rounds in the first experiment) is not cleanly divisible by three, each
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game in the second experiment lasted 15 rounds. After all rounds had finished, the
teams’ scores were revealed, and the penalty was applied as in the first experiment.
In the Cooperative condition, a score was given for only one team, which was equal
to the sum of all the players’ resources.
6.1.5 Resources and scoring
Players began the game with 28 points each, divided between five resources: meat,
grain, water, fruit, and fish. Every player began the game with fifteen points in
one resource, seven points in one resource, three points each in two resources, and
no points in the remaining resource. These quantities were allocated to specific
resources at random, with the constraints that no two players in the same game had
precisely the same distribution, and that the resource in which a given player had no
points would be the resource in which their teammate had 15 points (therefore, no
team in any game had fewer than six points between them in any resource). It will
be noticed that the initial distribution of resources was more uneven than in the first
experiment (see Section 5.2.5). This was mainly intended to make the Cooperative
condition more interesting. Given that players in this condition did not have to do
anything but exchange lots of resources with each other, the main interest of the
game lay in coordinating resources to avoid unbalancing them. Players therefore
started the game in a more unbalanced state than in the first experiment.
The penalty was applied just as in the first experiment and, as in that experiment,
players could see how many of a given resource they had available throughout the
game, but not how many resources their team had, until the end of the game, when
the final team scores (or score) were revealed.
6.1.6 Alien language
The alien language was somewhat revised, and consisted of twenty, rather than
nineteen words. Redundancy was both removed and added. A separate word for
“goodbye” was found to be unnecessary, as it had been very little used in the first
experiment. However, separate words were provided for “need” and “want”, and
for “grain” and “corn”. This was intended as a seed for variation along which teams
might divide (see Section 6.3.2.1).
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The following is a sample set of words:
hello/goodbye – suve need – petupu
please – jimujo give – hiwo
thanks – yiyife meat – jewa
yes – tiligo grain – fekeda
no/not – gefa corn – kemohu
and – kuta water – fibi
I – holaki fruit – kena
you – doso fish – payawu
have – gajopo much/a lot of – zeyu
want – leli question word – bazeki
6.1.7 Summary of differences between first and second experiments
Several differences have been mentioned between this experiment and the one de-
scribed in Chapter 5. Table 6.1 provides a summary of the most important ones.
First experiment Second experiment
No. participants 20 40
No. conditions 1 (Competitive) 2 (Competitive, Cooperative)
No. rounds 14 15
No. practice rounds 2 3
Length of round (seconds) 230 230
Length of chat stage 180 180
Length of exchange stage 30 30
Length of feedback stage 20 20
Length of practice round 260 160
Initial points per player 7 28
Size of alien language 19 words 20 words
No. practice rounds
with teammate 2/2 1/3
No. rounds with teammate
(game proper) 7/14 5/15
Table 6.1: Summary of differences between first and second experiments
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6.2 Summary of terms
Most of the terms defined in Section 5.3 will not be used differently in this chapter,
and so will not be redefined. One term (team) is used with a slightly expanded
meaning, however, and this is explained below, along with any new terms.
Competitive condition In this condition, players were divided into two teams
of two and the object was for one’s own team to be the opposing team by as
great a margin as possible.
Cooperative condition In this condition, all four players were considered to
be on the same team, and the object of the game was for this team to get as
high a score as possible.
Pseudo-opponent See pseudo-team.
Pseudo-team In the analysis of the competitive condition, a player’s lin-
guistic output is compared with that of their teammate and with that of
their two opponents. So that players in the cooperative condition can
be compared on the same basis, each player in this condition is allotted a
pseudo-teammate. This simply means the first player they are paired with.2
The other two players are regarded as pseudo-opponents.
Pseudo-teammate See pseudo-team.
Team This means something slightly different depending on the condition: in every
game of the competitive condition there were two teams of two; in the
cooperative condition there was one team of four.
6.3 Results
Tables 6.2 and 6.3 summarise the results for this experiment. As in the first exper-
iment, there were two main dependent variables in this experiment:
1. Players’ success in distinguishing between teammates and opponents (in the
Competitive condition only).
2. The degree to which the alien language diverged into two “dialects”.
2In the third experiment, described in Chapter 7, it will take on a greater significance, as players
in the third experiment were paired more often with their teammates or pseudo-teammates than
with either of the other players (cf. the first experiment).
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As will be discussed in more detail in Section 6.3.1, players did not do especially
well at identifying their teammates, and there was no significant divergence in the
alien language in either condition (see Section 6.3.2). Section 6.5 will discuss what
this means. Section 6.3.3 will look at how teams’ scores relate to other results, and
Section 6.4 will discuss the strategies the players employed.
Final Convergence % Correct Mean Strategies
scorea levelb recognitionsc giftd employede
Game 1
Team a 110 (126) 0.89 61.5 (26) 2.3 (4.1) DR, II
Team b 102 (102) 0.86 64.3 (28) 1.8 (2.7) DR, II
Game 2
Team a 114 (163) 0.87 57.7 (26) 2.4 (4.0) DR
Team b 114 (131) 0.86 78.6 (28) 3.7 (6.2) DR, M, II
Game 3
Team a 205 (467) 0.88 62.5 (24) 13.3 (23.2) DR, M
Team b 236 (544) 0.93 50 (24) 16.7 (32.7) DR, II
Game 4
Team a 129 (224) 0.83 75 (24) 7.3 (9.1) DR
Team b 78 (245) 0.82 56 (25) 4.6 (3.7) DR
Game 5
Team a 131 (189) 0.89 74.1 (27) 5.2 (6.1) DR, II
Team b 110 (207) 0.86 65.4 (26) 4.2 (4.3) DR, M
Table 6.2: Summary of results from second experiment (Competitive condition).
a Provisional score given in brackets;
b 1 − mean distance between teammates (higher figure means greater conver-
gence); see Section 6.3.2;
c Excludes first round and rounds where players made no response; number of
responses made given in brackets (out of a possible 28);
d Based on all rounds; mean gift to teammates only given in brackets;
e See Section 6.4.1; DR = Dialect Recognition; M = Mimicry; II = Intentional
Innovation; SH = Secret Handshake.
6.3.1 Recognising team-mates
6.3.1.1 Feedback questionnaires
Compared with the first experiment (see Section 5.4.1), there was much greater
variation in players’ reported abilities at distinguishing between teammates and
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Final scorea Convergence levelb Mean giftc
Game 1
Team ad 490 (594) 0.92 15.3 (15.9)
Team b 401 (460) 0.87 16.1 (14.2)
Combined 911 (1054) 15.7 (15.1)
Game 2
Team a 197 (214) 0.79 8.5 (8.5)
Team b 296 (329) 0.88 5.8 (5.3)
Combined 493 (543) 7.15 (6.9)
Game 3
Team a 128 (140) 0.82 4.1 (3.1)
Team b 187 (213) 0.89 3.97 (4.7)
Combined 323 (353) 4 (3.9)
Game 4
Team a 156 (174) 0.89 5.7 (6.1)
Team b 169 (235) 0.89 4.2 (4.1)
Combined 325 (409) 4.95 (5.1)
Game 5
Team a 66 (117) 0.90 5.9 (5.5)
Team b 253 (279) 0.87 3.6 (4.3)
Combined 321 (396) 4.8 (4.9)
Table 6.3: Summary of results from second experiment (Cooper-
ative condition).
a Provisional score given in brackets;
b 1 − mean distance between pseudo-teammates (higher figure
means greater convergence); see Section 6.3.2;
c Based on all rounds; mean gift to pseudo-teammates only
given in brackets;
d Refers to pseudo-teams, for comparison with Competitive
condition (see Section 6.2).
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opponents. This time, as well as being asked, “Were you able to tell if you were
chatting to someone on the same team as you?” players were also asked “Were you
able to tell if you were chatting to someone on the other team?” As in the first
experiment, they were also asked, “If so, how?”
Of the twenty participants in the Competitive condition, only ten claimed to have
been able to recognise their teammates at least some of the time (of whom only three
gave an unqualified “Yes”). Of the remaining ten, six responded with an unqualified
“No”, and two with, “Not really,” or, “Not easily”. Of the remaining two, one said
he had tried to pay attention to what resources his teammate claimed to have, but
found this had been misleading. The other said that she had initially identified a
particular “misspelling” her teammate used, but that this had been corrected later
on in the game. One player, intriguingly, claimed to have been able to tell that his
teammate was female, but could give no explanation for this beyond “a gut feeling”.
In answer to the second question, about identifying members of the other team,
fourteen said they had managed to do so at least some of the time (seven gave an
unqualified “Yes”); of the remaining six, one said, “Not really,” and the others gave
an unqualified “No”. Of the twenty-five answers to either question that included
some information about what they relied on or tried to rely on, nineteen referred to
linguistic cues, of which six responses mentioned greetings specifically. One other
mentioned punctuation, and one mentioned that her teammate simply spoke less
than her opponents. Of the remaining six responses, one said that an opponent
had demonstrated “superior knowledge”, but did not explain this; presumably,
however, it refers to grasp of the language. One participant claimed, in answer to
both questions, to have relied on “intuition” and to have started to “recognise a
pattern”. The others referred to tracking their teammates’ resources, and one who
succeeded in identifying their teammate on the basis of their greeting identified
opponents by a “process of elimination”.
Obviously, players in the Cooperative condition were not asked either of the
above questions, since they were all supposed to be on the same team. They were,
however, asked, “Did you start to recognise other players by their use of the alien
language? If so, how?” Of the twenty players in this condition, only one answered
no to this question. Fifteen said they had, two said they had to some extent, one
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was uncertain, and one mentioned that they had always managed to communicate
especially successfully with one other player.
6.3.1.2 Explicit and implicit judgements in the Competitive condition
As can be seen from the third column of Table 6.2, more players in this experiment
failed to answer the question posed in the second stage of each round: “Were you
talking to a member of your own team?” In fact, only two of the ten teams had
perfect records (compared with six in the first experiment; see Table 6.2), and 7.9%
of potential responses are missing (22 out of 280). It is not entirely clear what
the reason was for this, though two partial explanations present themselves. First,
as discussed in Section 6.3.1.1, players found it difficult in this game to identify
their teammates, so a non-response may, in some cases, simply mean, “No idea”. A
second fact worth noting is that the two worst teams at responding (both in Game
3) also have the highest mean gift; six non-responses occurred in rounds 11-15, in
which players had begun giving away large amounts of resources (see Section 6.4.2),
and were therefore preoccupied in the second stage of these rounds with doing this,
rather than answering the question.
All 258 judgements that were made were submitted to a binomial sign test. As-
suming that players had a 0.5 chance of being right by guessing on a given round,
the result is significant (S = 91 incorrect; p < .001). This, however, is rather less
impressive than it seems. Had they guessed 1 or 2 every time, they would actually
have done better: S = 80 incorrect out of 280; assuming a 0.5 chance of success,
as for the previous result, this would also be significant (p < .001). The point, of
course, is that this was not a straightforward 50-50 choice, as the players had a 2 in
3 chance of being right by guessing no. At best, therefore, players seem simply to
have recognised that they were more likely to be paired with an opponent than a
teammate, and this would have become increasingly obvious throughout the game.
Definite responses (a guess of 1 or 4) were, as in the first experiment, more often
right than wrong, but less impressively so (72 correct against 25 incorrect). There
were also fewer of them (97 compared with 111 in the first experiment), in spite of
the extra round.
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As discussed in Section 5.4.1, there is another measure that can be employed to
get at players’ judgements: gift size. As in the first experiment, players’ gifts—as
a proportion of the the player’s resources at the time of donation—were analysed
for those rounds where they voted 1 or 2 (that is, for rounds when they claimed to
believe they were talking to opponents). Did players give more to teammates on
these rounds than to opponents? In fact, a Wilcoxon T test (where N1 = 32 and N2
= 121) showed that gifts to team-mates were significantly larger in these rounds than
gifts to opponents (T = 2504, p < .05); furthermore, gifts to team-mates in these
rounds did not differ significantly from gifts to team-mates where players guessed
3 or 4 (T = 913.5, N1 = 32 and N2 = 61; p > .05). Though apparently rather
mysterious, this suggests that, while players learnt that they were more likely to be
paired with an opponent than a team-mate, and made their explicit judgements on
this basis, they were still in many cases able to identify their team-mates, if only
on a subconscious level.3
In this context, it should be noted that there was a greater tendency in this ex-
periment towards “malign generosity”—players’ attempting to sabotage their op-
ponents by offloading unbalanced resources on them and giving them things they
explicitly did not ask for (more details will be given in Section 6.4.2). This does
not, of course, explain why gifts to teammates were larger than gifts to opponents.
6.3.1.3 Chatting time
The chat stage of every round lasted 180 seconds. However, players were not
obliged to chat for the whole of the time. It therefore seemed likely that play-
ers might chat for longer in the Competitive condition than in the Cooperative
condition. Since this interaction was the primary means of distinguishing between
teammate and opponent, they might be expected to spend longer over it when such
distinctions mattered. Intriguingly, however, players spent longer chatting in the
Cooperative condition (mean: 159.67 seconds) than in the Competitive condition
(mean: 153.58 seconds). A one-tailed T-test, performed on log-transformed data,
showed this to be significant (t = −2.23, df = 283.36, p < 0.01). This may reflect
players’ overall difficulty with identifying teammates in the Competitive condition.
3To look at it another way: players found it difficult to trust their intuition when it came to
making an explicit judgement.
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Not only did players have little confidence in their ability to identify teammates—
which would explain why they did not talk more in the Competitive than in the
Cooperative condition—they also tended to assume they were talking to opponents
(see Section 6.3.1.2). This would explain why they talked significantly less. In the
Cooperative condition, the content of the conversation mattered, as players wanted
to exchange useful resources with their teammates. In the Competitive condition,
players did not generally want to help the person they thought they were talking
to, so there was less point in exchanging information.
6.3.2 Divergence
In this experiment, there were 100 potential linguistic variables in each condition (20
initial words × 5 games). In the Competitive condition, 68 of these had more than
one variant to them by the end of the game, and 75 in the Cooperative condition.
289 new variants were introduced in the Competitive condition (giving a mean of
5.25 variants in every variable set), and 375 in the Cooperative condition (a mean
of 6 in every set).
The same method was used to measure divergence in the alien language as was
used in the first experiment (see Section 5.4.2 and Appendix C for more details).
There was no significant divergence (Competitive condition: p = .566; Cooperative
condition: p = .937). The competitive and cooperative conditions were also com-
pared directly by performing a Monte Carlo test on a vector of the scores for all
variable sets; there was no significant difference between them (p = .275). As in
the first experiment, within-team convergence scores were compared for every game
in the Competitive condition: there was no significant between-team difference in
convergence levels in any game.
6.3.2.1 Other sources of divergence
As in the case of word-level variants, and as in the first experiment, there was no
significant syntactic divergence in either condition (Competitive: p = .18; Cooper-
ative: p = .73) or any significant difference between conditions (p = .195).
It was mentioned in Section 6.1.6 that players were given synonyms in the data:
words for both “grain” and “corn”, though there was only one resource to which
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either could correspond, and words for both “need” and “want”, though there was
little to distinguish the two in terms of the game. It was anticipated that this might
provide a seed for divergence; it did not. Instead, the pattern was of all players, by
the end of every game, settling on one of the two variables—a result that recalls
Garrod and Doherty’s (1994) findings. If the frequencies of winning variables in
each game are summed and compared with the frequency of losing variables, then
the ratio for the grain/corn pair was 284 to 24 in the Competitive condition and
361 to 31 in the Cooperative condition—one variable was used 92% of the time in
both conditions, in other words. The ratios for the want/need pair were similar, if
slightly less unequal: 705 to 124 (85% dominance) in the Competitive condition;
607 to 219 (73%) in the Cooperative condition.
6.3.3 Comparison with score
In the first experiment, the teams with the best recognition rates tended to get
the best provisional score. In the second experiment, this did not occur. In fact,
the team that made the most correct guesses in this condition had the lower score
before penalty in every case (the same is true even if only definite guesses are
counted)! This suggests, as is supported by players’ own evaluations in feedback
questionnaires, that players were not doing well at all at recognising their team-
mates, at least on a conscious level (see Section 6.3.1). Nor was there a significant
correlation between level of convergence and score: r(8) = .49, p > .05 (the same was
true of the Cooperative condition: r(8) = .37, p > .05), or a significant difference
between levels of within-team convergence in any game.
6.4 Strategy
6.4.1 Identification strategies
Only three identification strategies were used in this condition:
• Dialect Recognition (DR): try to remember how different players use the lan-
guage and identify them based on this.
• Intentional Innovation (II): make changes to the language that are likely to
be recognisable.
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• Mimicry (M): try to sound as much like the person you’re talking to as pos-
sible.
It was suggested in Section 5.5 that there was some evidence for implicational
universals of strategy. The evidence is poorer here. Certainly, all players claimed
to have used Dialect Recognition, but there was no sign that either Intentional
Innovation or Mimicry was more basic than the other, as can be seen in Table 6.2.
There were, furthermore, no clear cases of a Secret Handshake (see Section 5.5.1),
although there were two cases of Intentional Innovation in greetings, which could
plausibly have developed into a Handshake. A player in Team 1b, for example,
started saying “hello” (loku) twice in a row (as separate utterances) from the tenth
round onwards, which her teammate noticed. This does not count as a Secret
Handshake, however, as there was no specific response required. Similarly, a player
in Team 3b started repeating the word for “hello” three times, in one utterance, at
the start of a round (suve suve suve). However, her teammate failed to catch on,
and she gave up the endeavour. It is worth noting, however, that this player was
also the least conservative player in the condition (she gave away a mean of 16.9
points per round; see Section 6.4.2), and the only player in the condition to give
her opponents less than half what she gave her team-mate. Her team won the game
and was the highest scoring team in the condition.
6.4.2 Giving behaviour
The fourth column of Table 6.2 and the third column of Table 6.3 show the mean
amount of resources given away per round by each team and pseudo-team, and the
mean amount given to (pseudo-)teammates (whether or not players guessed who
they were paired with). As before, every game in the Competitive condition for
which there was a winner (Game 2 was a draw) was won by the most generous team,
and combined mean gift is clearly correlated with score (r(8) = .977, p < .0005).4
In the Cooperative condition, the combined mean gift also correlates with score
(r(3) = .99997, p < .0005), although this is rather trivial, as every gift in this
condition contributes to the shared wealth. In every game in this condition, the
4As for the previous experiment, this is based on the provisional score, as the most meaningful
measure for these purposes. The correlation is still highly significant for final score as well, however.
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pseudo-team with the largest mean gift always has a smaller share of the score at
the end of the game. This too is not in the least surprising, since players in this
condition were not trying to keep their resources from anyone.
As mentioned in Section 6.3.1.2, players in this experiment were more inclined
than in the first experiment to malign generosity. Eleven players claimed in feedback
questionnaires to have employed this strategy, and two more to have used it as an
occasional alternative to giving away nothing. This most likely reflects the structure
of the game. Players were paired mostly with opponents, and found it difficult to
identify teammates; this meant that it was difficult to actively help their teammates.
The only remaining strategy was to try to actively scupper their opponents.
Overall, most players were rather conservative in their gift-giving. No player in
the Competitive condition gave away more than half their resources, even in the
first round of the game, when they knew they were paired with their teammates.
Even in the Cooperative condition, players were cautious. Game 1 in this condition
is something of an exception, and here one player did give away everything in the
first round, and continued to be generous throughout. This game contained the only
teams in the condition who gave away a mean gift of over 10; there were only two
such teams in the Competitive condition too, both in Game 3. Figure 6.1 shows the
pattern of gift giving over the course of the game. For most of the game, players were
rather conservative. However, they began giving away large amounts of resources
in the last five rounds of the game—a behaviour that appears to have originated
with Player 4 in the eleventh round and spread to the others. Players did not
discriminate successfully between team-mates and opponents in their generosity,
however. What, then, explains this behaviour? Feedback questionnaires suggest
players were mainly attempting to “dump” their excess points, with the intention
of unbalancing their opponents’ resources. There is an element of desperation in
this, however, evidenced by the late stage at which this occurred, and Player 4’s
comment that “strategy went out the window towards the end of the game.”
6.4.3 Summary of results
In this experiment, players did not do well at recognising their teammates (al-
though they noticed how infrequently they were paired with them) and the alien
Chapter 6. Controlling for the pressure to mark identity: a second experiment 119
Figure 6.1: Gifts per round in Game 3 of the Competitive condition
language did not diverge into team dialects, as it did in the first experiment, in
either condition.
Players in this experiment were very conservative in their gift giving, and there
was a greater trend towards “malign generosity” (see Section 6.4.2) than in the first
experiment. There were no examples of the most successful and salient strategy
used in the first experiment—the Secret Handshake—presumably because players
found the low level of contact with their teammates made it very hard to establish
one.
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6.5 Discussion
This experiment avoided most of the shortcomings discussed in Section 5.6: players
were paired knowingly with their teammates far less; players did not interact more
with any player than with the others; no participants had ever studied linguistics;
finally, there was no power cut in this experiment. The problem of players neglecting
to say whether they were talking to their teammate or not in the second stage of
a round, however, remained. There was also one new shortcoming introduced in
this experiment: a tendency, owing to the extra round, for the experiment to run
slightly over time. This was partly due to the game simply being longer in this
experiment than in the first, owing to the extra practice round and the extra round
in the game proper. It was only three minutes longer, however. The whole session
was made longer by the fact that participants were given as long as they wanted to
read through the instructions, and some participants would take a relatively long
time over this.
Neither of these problems was significant, however, and they are highly unlikely
to have influenced the answers to the main research questions. These alone, in
other words, were no reason to carry out a further experiment. There were other
reasons for this. The results of this experiment are clearly somewhat discouraging
for the social-selection model: they do not allow us to reject the null hypothesis
that the seemingly exciting results from the first experiment are explicable purely
with reference to frequency of interaction. This in itself, of course, is also no reason
to run a further experiment—it might be the case, after all, that divergence is
explicable purely with reference to frequency of interaction, and that finding would
be an interesting one. The reason for a further experiment, which will be described
in Chapter 7, is that the results from the second experiment also do not allow us to
reject the hypothesis that social marking played some role in the first experiment.
Had divergence occurred in the second experiment, the results would have been very
interesting. Since it did not, all they seem to suggest is that frequency of interaction
is important; they do not tell us how important, or if it is the only relevant factor
in divergence. It was to try to get at this that a third experiment was carried out.
Chapter 7
Raising the frequency of interaction: a third exper-
iment
In the first experiment, described in Chapter 5, the alien language showed signifi-
cant divergence into team dialects (see Section 5.4.2). Based on the data from this
experiment alone, this could have been due either to the pressure to mark identity,
or to the relatively high frequency of interaction between teammates (50%, while
the other rounds were split between the two opponents). The second experiment,
described in Chapter 6, lowered this frequency of interaction so that every player
interacted an equal amount of time with every other player. It also introduced
a control condition in which the frequency of interaction was kept the same, but
there was no pressure to distinguish between teammates and opponents. In this
experiment, the alien language did not diverge, and there was no significant dif-
ference between the Competitive and Cooperative conditions. This suggests that
frequency of interaction does play a role, which should not be surprising. As noted
in the introduction to Chapter 6, there must be some minimum level of interaction
with one’s teammate for sufficient accommodation between teammates to occur.
However, it does not mean that pressure for social marking does not play any role
at all. It may be that variation in frequency of interaction alone is sufficient for di-
vergence, but it may also be that accommodation can be modulated by pressures for
social marking. The next step is obvious: an experiment with the same frequency
of interaction as in the first experiment, but incorporating the two conditions of the
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second experiment (along with other improvements introduced in that experiment).
This chapter describes the results of doing precisely that.
7.1 Description of experiment
7.1.1 Overview
This experiment was carried out in October 2008, and involved forty participants.
These participants were divided between a Competitive and a Cooperative condition
just as in the second experiment, and the two conditions worked in the same way.
This time, however, the game proper lasted for 16, rather than 15, rounds. As
mentioned in Section 6.5, there had been a tendency for the experiment to run
slightly over time. To avoid worsening this, the rounds were made slightly shorter
(see Section 7.1.4). The number of practice rounds, the order in which players were
paired in them, and the information given to players about the first round (that
they would be paired with their teammate) were all kept the same as in the second
experiment. Players were paid the same amount, and prizes were awarded on the
same basis.
7.1.2 Participants
Forty participants were recruited via a student employment website. The adver-
tisement stated that the experiment “involved playing a game with three other
participants using an alien language”. It was specified that participants must have
a high level of English (so that they would be able to understand the instructions
without difficulty), and must not have studied linguistics or have done an exper-
iment for the same experimenter previously. As the experiment involved a lot of
reading and typing, prospective applicants were asked not to apply if they suffered
seriously from dyslexia or RSI. All but seven of the forty participants were native
speakers of English, and they came from a wide variety of academic backgrounds.
They ranged in age from 18 to 34. Participants were assigned to games on the basis
of availability and to teams at random. Each participant was paid £8, and the
members of the winning team in each condition were awarded £10 each.
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7.1.3 Experimental procedure
The procedure was very similar to that for the previous experiment (see Sec-
tion 5.2.3). The instructions were again revised for clarity, as some participants
had taken a relatively long time to read through them in the second experiment
(see Section 6.5; instructions can be compared in Appendix A. There is further
discussion in Section 8.1).
In this experiment, every player was paired with their teammate for 8 rounds and
for 4 rounds each with their two opponents. This meant that there were 16 rounds
in all in the game proper; these were preceded by 3 practice rounds, as in the second
experiment. As detailed in Section 7.1.4, the rounds were slightly shorter in this
experiment. The experimental design did not differ in any other respects.
7.1.4 Game structure
As in the second experiment, players began the game with 28 points, and these
points were distributed in the same way. In this experiment, the chat stage lasted
for 160 seconds in the game proper and 120 seconds in the practice rounds. The
exchange stage lasted 30 seconds, and the feedback stage lasted 15 seconds, in
both the main game and the practice rounds. There were 3 practice rounds and 16
rounds in the game proper.
7.1.5 Resources and scoring
Resources and scoring worked in the same way in this experiment as in the second
experiment. See Section 6.1.5 for more information.
7.1.6 Alien language
The alien language had the same number of words and the same meanings as in the
second experiment. The alien words themselves were generated anew for each pair
of games; alien dictionaries from the second experiment were not reused.
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7.1.7 Summary of differences between experiments
A few differences have been mentioned between this experiment and the one de-
scribed in Chapter 6. Table 7.1 provides a summary. The instructions were also
revised for clarity (see Appendix A).
First Second Third
No. participants 20 40 40
No. conditions 1 2 2
No. rounds 14 15 16
No. practice rounds 2 3 3
Length of round (seconds) 230 230 205
Length of chat stage 180 180 160
Length of exchange stage 30 30 30
Length of feedback stage 20 20 15
Length of practice round 260 160 165
Initial points per player 7 28 28
Size of alien language 19 words 20 words 20 words
No. practice rounds
with teammate 2/2 1/3 1/3
No. rounds with teammate
(game proper) 7/14 5/15 8/16
Table 7.1: Summary of differences between first, second, and third experiments
7.2 Results
Tables 7.2 and 7.3 summarise the results for this experiment. As in the first and
second experiments, there were two main dependent variables:
1. Players’ success in distinguishing between teammates and opponents (in the
Competitive condition only).
2. The degree to which the alien language diverged into two “dialects”.
As discussed in more detail in Section 7.2.1, players in the Competitive Condition
succeeded in identifying their teammates. Moreover, the alien language diverged sig-
nificantly in this condition, but not in the Cooperative condition (see Section 7.2.2).
This suggests that social factors do play a role in language divergence. Section 7.4
will discuss this in more detail. Section 7.2.3 will look at how teams’ scores relate
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to other results, and Section 7.3 will discuss the players’ strategies.
Final Convergence % Correct Mean Strategies
scorea levelb recognitionsc giftd employede
Game 1
Team a 588 (659) 0.86 92.6 (27) 20.8 (38.1) DR, M, II , SH
Team b 195 (251) 0.92 72.4 (29) 4.2 (6.8) DR, M
Game 2
Team a 59 (89) 0.92 60 (30) 2.1 (2.5) DR, II
Team b 141 (149) 0.89 68.97 (29) 1.8 (3.1) DR, II
Game 3
Team a 146 (162) 0.87 65.5 (29) 3.9 (6.1) DR, M, II
Team b 122 (161) 0.86 83.3 (30) 2.7 (4.4) DR, M, II
Game 4
Team a 142 (176) 0.93 62.96 (27) 4.3 (6.1) DR
Team b 1057 (1248) 0.86 100 (25) 36.8 (71.6) DR, II, SH
Game 5
Team a 78 (91) 0.88 62.1 (29) 1.2 (1.7) DR
Team b 95 (95) 0.86 73.3 (30) 1.1 (1.6) DR, II
Table 7.2: Summary of results from third experiment (Competitive condition).
a Provisional score given in brackets;
b 1 − mean distance between teammates (higher figure means greater convergence); see
Section 7.2.2;
c Excludes first two rounds and rounds where players made no response; number of
responses made given in brackets (out of a possible 30);
d Based on all rounds; mean gift to teammates only given in brackets;
e See Section 7.3.1; DR = Dialect Recognition; M = Mimicry; II = Intentional innova-
tion; SH = Secret Handshake.
7.2.1 Recognising team-mates
7.2.1.1 Feedback questionnaires
As in the second experiment, players in the Competitive condition were asked if they
had been able to tell if they were talking to their teammate, and if they had been
able to tell if they had been talking to an opponent. Eight of the twenty participants
gave an unqualified “Yes”, citing linguistic cues (including greetings). Four said they
had sometimes been successful, and four said they had become successful towards
the end of the game. Only four players said no. In the Cooperative condition, in
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Final scorea Convergence levelb Mean giftc
Game 1
Team ad 252 (309) 0.90 5.8 (6.9)
Team b 179 (194) 0.85 6.4 (6.1)
Combined 433 (503) 6.1 (6.5)
Game 2
Team a 212 (370) 0.89 15.4 (15.94)
Team b 477 (526) 0.86 9.1 (8.8)
Combined 691 (896) 12.3 (12.4)
Game 3
Team a 367 (387) 0.85 14.5 (15.9)
Team b 438 (456) 0.87 8.3 (7.7)
Combined 817 (843) 11.4 (11.8)
Game 4
Team a 195 (232) 0.80 6.9 (6.6)
Team b 282 (313) 0.94 6.7 (7.5)
Combined 477 (545) 6.8 (7.1)
Game 5
Team a 690 (1421) 0.89 24.97 (26.3)
Team b 578 (679) 0.91 37.2 (33)
Combined 1411 (2100) 31.1 (29.7)
Table 7.3: Summary of results from third experiment (Cooperative
condition).
a Provisional score given in brackets;
b 1 − mean distance between pseudo-teammates (higher figure
means greater convergence); see Section 7.2.2;
c Based on all rounds; mean gift to pseudo-teammates only
given in brackets;
d Refers to pseudo-teams, for comparison with Competitive con-
dition (see Section 6.2).
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answer to the question, “Did you start to recognise other players by their use of
the alien language?” ten of the twenty players gave an unqualified “Yes”, three
said they had occasionally done so, four said they had not, but that they had been
aware of differences between the other players’ use of language. The other three
gave an unqualified “No”.1
Since a player in the second experiment had claimed to have been able to tell that
his teammate was female, players in this experiment were also asked, “Could you
tell anything about who your team-mate was (gender, age, identity etc.)? How?”
Only four people made any guess. These are worth reproducing here if only for the
window they provide onto gender stereotypes:
• (By a male participant) “Possibly female because I think guys are less prone
to use exclamation marks.”2
• (By the female teammate of the previous participant) “I thought my partner
might be female, with use of exclamations etc.”
• (By a male participant) “I think a guy. He wasn’t too generous. Just a
guess. . . ”
• (By a female participant) “Female. She seemed very nice!”
Similarly, players in the Cooperative condition were asked, “Could you ever tell
anything (gender, age, identity etc.) about who you were talking to? How?” Sev-
enteen of the twenty participants answered no. The remaining three responded:
• (By a female participant) “I guessed one was probably male. Not sure why.”
• (By a female participant) “It seemed that the emphasis on having a lot by
misspelling ‘mujeju’ was expressive in a ‘feminine’ manner.”
• (By a male participant) “No, not at all. I had an argument with who I thought
was a girl but I’m not sure”.
1However, one of these thought that other players had been able to recognise her “Because I
typed on the screen before”, presumably meaning that she had started typing messages during
the feedback stage of the previous round.
2Interestingly, in answer to the question, “Were you able to recognise your teammate?” his
(female) teammate replied: “Yes. I use a lot of exclamation marks when I write & found the other
person did this too.”
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7.2.1.2 Explicit and implicit judgements in the Competitive condition
There were slightly fewer failures in this experiment to answer the question, “Were
you chatting to a member of your own team?” This time, 5% of potential responses
were missing (15 of 300; compared with almost 8% in the second experiment), and
three teams had perfect records. This is a small improvement on the second exper-
iment, but not an enormous one. As in the second experiment (see Section 6.3.1.2),
there seems to have been a connection with generous gift-giving, as can be seen
in the case of Teams 1a and 4b, for example. Both these teams developed Secret
Handshakes (see Sections 5.5.1 and 7.3.1), which helped create a relatively secure
environment for generous gift-giving between teammates, meaning that the mem-
bers of these teams were preoccupied in the second stage of the round with giving
away resources to each other.
In this experiment, unlike the second one, players were equally likely to be paired
with an opponent as with a teammate, and they did significantly better than chance
at noticing which was the case (S = 75 incorrect out of 285; p < .001). In fur-
ther contrast to the second experiment, there was no significant difference between
gifts to opponents and teammates on those rounds where players thought they were
paired with opponents (T = 3620.5, N1 = 49 and N2 = 127; p > .05). There was
no significant difference, however, between the time spent chatting in the Compet-
itive condition (mean: 140.74 seconds) and in the Cooperative condition (mean:
137.6937; t = 1.43, df = 297.45, p > .05). As in previous experiments, the vast
majority of definite guesses were correct (148 against 27 incorrect).
7.2.2 Divergence
In this experiment, as in the second, there were 100 potential variables in each
condition. In the Competitive condition, 73 of these had more than one variant to
them by the end of the game, and 79 in the Cooperative condition. 349 new variants
were introduced in the Competitive condition (giving a mean of 5.78 variants in
every variable set), and 336 in the Cooperative condition (a mean of 5.25 in every
set).
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The same method was used to measure divergence in the alien language as was
used in the first two experiments (see Section 5.4.2 and Appendix C for more de-
tails).
There was a significant between-team difference in within-team convergence in
one game of the Competitive condition: Game 4 (p = .035). This is interesting,
since the less converged of the two teams in this game employed a Secret Hand-
shake (see Section 7.3.1). This suggests that the Handshake helped create a secure
environment for the team that used it, in which there was less pressure for conver-
gence in other respects. The overall divergence results for this experiment are also
very interesting. In the first experiment, the divergence could have been explained
by frequency of interaction alone. In the second experiment, there was no diver-
gence in either condition. In this third experiment, however, there was a significant
tendency towards divergence in the Competitive condition (p = .001), but not in
the Cooperative condition (p = .154); and this difference in significance reflected a
significant difference between conditions (p = .027; on the need for such a test, see
Gelman and Stern 2006). Frequent interaction alone was not, therefore, sufficient
to cause divergence, although a comparison between the second experiment and
this one (see Chapter 9) suggests that both factors must play a role.
7.2.2.1 Other sources of divergence
As in the first two experiments, there was no significant tendency for syntactic
divergence in either condition, although the result for the Competitive condition
approached significance (Competitive: p = .058; Cooperative: p = .99); there was,
moreover, a significant difference between the level of syntactic divergence in the
two conditions (p < .05).
Results on synonym pairs (“grain” vs “corn” and “want vs need”) were as in
the second experiment (see Section 6.3.2.1). For the grain/corn pair, the overall
ratio of winning variable to losing variable was 263 to 25 (91%) in the Competitive
condition and 304 to 87 (78%) in the Cooperative condition. The want/need ratios
were 654 to 129 (84%) in the Competitive condition and 691 to 188 (79%) in the
Cooperative.
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7.2.3 Comparison with score
In four out of the five games in the Competitive condition, the team that made
the greatest number of correct judgements also won the game; and in the one game
where this was not the case—Game 3—the scores before penalty were extremely
close (161 and 162). Similarly, the team that made the most definite guesses won
Games 1, 4 and 5. Game 3, as noted, was very close. Game 2 was not. In this game,
however, one member of the winning team made only one definite guess, which may
reflect nothing more than a more cautious personality.
Unlike the first experiment, there was a significant correlation between recog-
nition rate—the percentage of rounds in which players correctly judged whether
they were talking to a teammate or opponent—and score (r(8) = .86, p < .005).
Figure 7.1 is a plot of the relationship. As in previous experiments, there was no
significant correlation between level of convergence and score (Competitive condi-
tion: r(8) = −.38, p > .05; Cooperative condition: r(8) = −.25, p > .05) and, as
noted in Section 7.2.2, there was a significant difference between levels of within-
team convergence in only one game—Game 4—where the most closely converged
team was in fact the losing team. As discussed above, this should not surprise
us. The overall levels of within-team convergence and between-team divergence
are better treated as by-products of adaptive strategies rather than as strategies
themselves, and one of the strategies employed by the winning team in Game 4




All four strategies used in the first experiment were used again here:
• Dialect Recognition (DR): try to remember how different players use the lan-
guage and identify them based on this.
• Intentional Innovation (II): make changes to the language that are likely to
be recognisable.
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Figure 7.1: Scatterplot of recognition rate against score
• Mimicry (M): try to sound as much like the person you’re talking to as pos-
sible.
• Secret Handshake (SH): say something at the beginning of the interaction
that identifies you to your team-mate (and ideally not your opponent), and
requires a specific response from them (see below for an example).
Again, inclusion of strategies in Table 7.2 is based mainly on self-reporting. As
can be seen from the table, Dialect Recognition was again the only strategy to
be used by all players, confirming that it is the simplest and most basic strategy.
There is no reason, based on any of the data so far, to consider either Mimicry or
Intentional Innovation as more basic than the other. Both are hard to identify in
the data, and both may be underreported by the players themselves (with regard
to mimicry, for example, players may mention trying to imitate their opponents to
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trick them, but may not mention trying to sound like their teammates). Assum-
ing accurate reporting, however, this experiment produced the first case of Secret
Handshake without Mimicry. This is not especially surprising. Both Intentional
Innovation and Secret Handshake involve changing something in the language, and
the latter implies the former. Mimicry, however, is unnecessary for the develop-
ment of a Secret Handshake, although the first steps towards such a handshake
may involve it.
Secret Handshakes were employed in this experiment by Teams 1a and 4b. The
more sophisticated of the two Handshakes, and the most sophisticated to be used
in any of the experiments was Team 1a’s. It evolved to have three parts: one player
gave the word for ‘hello’: vobu; the other responded by repeating it twice: vobu
vobu; and the first responded again with vobu vobu!!!. This developed into a strict
form. In the twelfth round, Player 3 tried to crack the code. The sequence went as
follows:
Player 2: vobu
Player 3: vobu vobu
Player 2: vobu vobu!!!
Player 3: vobu vobu!!!
That final repetition of vobu vobu!!! was apparently enough to tell Player 2 that
her partner for that round was not her teammate. The difficulty for an outsider in
cracking such a code lies in never seeing the whole sequence in its entirety.
Team 4b’s Handshake, although this team was more successful, was far simpler,
and looks easy to crack. Player 4 introduced it in the very first of the practice
rounds: she would greet everyone with Dulu X (“I [am] X’), while Player 3 would
greet with Dulu A (“I [am] A”). This counts as a Secret Handshake, since it contains
more than one element, and the first element to be used requires the other as a
specific response. In fact, it is formally no less complex than the Handshake used
in the first experiment (described in Section 5.5.1); it is merely more transparent.
Compared with Team 1a’s handshake, however, it is clearly less complex: the order
or elements is freer and there are only two of them. The Handshake did not evolve
further because the opposing team were apparently unable to crack it (although
one member of Team 4b reported fearing they would)! One of their opponents
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responded, both in one of the practice rounds and in four rounds of the game proper,
with Dulu k. He apparently failed to understand the basis of what his opponents
were doing, and was not recognised as their teammate. His own teammate made
no similar attempts.
7.3.2 Giving behaviour
The fourth column of Table 7.2 and the third column of Table 7.3 show the mean
amount of resources given away per round by each (pseudo-)team, and the mean
amount given to (pseudo-)teammates (whether or not players guessed who they
were paired with). In the Cooperative condition, there is the expected correlation
between combined mean gift and score (r(3) = .999996) and, as in the second
experiment, the pseudo-team with the largest mean gift always has a smaller share
of the score at the end of the game. In the Competitive condition, the team with
the highest combined mean gift did not win the game in every case (although there
is the expected correlation between mean gift and score: r(8) = .996); the team
with the highest mean gift to teammates, however, did.
In both conditions, most players were again rather conservative in their gift-
giving. In the first round of the Competitive condition, only one player gave away
everything (in Team 4b), and only one other gave away more than half their re-
sources (the other member of Team 4b). As in the second experiment, two teams
stand out as being the least conservative, with a mean gift of over 10: Teams 1a and
4b. These teams are different from the two in the second experiment, however (see
Section 6.4.2); first, they were not playing in the same game, so cannot have influ-
enced each other; second, they were consistently generous—all gave away more than
20% of their resources on at least four rounds apart from the first (where all gave
over 30%). Third, they were more discriminating in who they gave their resources
to. Finally, their generosity was benign, rather than malign; there is no reason to
think they were deliberately trying to unbalance their opponents’ resources. It is,
of course, not surprising that generosity only occurs as a consistent behaviour in
those teams that developed Secret Handshakes, for reasons already discussed.
Only one player claimed to have generally aimed to scupper his opponents by giv-
ing them large amounts of resources to unbalance their resources (cf. Sections 6.3.1
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and 6.4.2), although two others claimed to have done this to a small extent on occa-
sion, but only when they had too much of something, and in addition to a general
policy of giving nothing. Three players said they gave a little to opponents early in
the game, but then started giving nothing. Two of these do not say why they gave
anything at all in early rounds; the third, apparently misunderstanding the point
of the game, or choosing to opt out of the competition, claimed he had been trying
to “foster cooperation”, but that he gave this up.
7.3.3 Summary of results
In this experiment, as in the first, players did considerably better than chance at
identifying their teammates, and their behaviour in the game led the alien language
to begin diverging significantly. This occurred only in the Competitive condition,
however, where there was a pressure to distinguish between teammates and oppo-
nents. In the Cooperative condition, where there was no such pressure, but where
frequency of interaction was similarly biased, the alien language did not diverge.
Players were once again (as in both previous experiments) notable for their con-
servatism in gift-giving in both conditions. All the main strategies used in the
first experiment were seen again, although there were fewer examples of “malign
generosity” in gift giving, whereby players attempt to sabotage their opponents by
giving them large gifts that will unbalance their resources. This experiment saw
the third example of a Secret Handshake, and the most complex example so far.
7.4 Discussion
The results of this experiment are highly intriguing. In Section 5.6, it was sug-
gested that the divergence seen in the first experiment may simply be the result
of frequency of interaction, or that the long period of knowing interaction between
teammates at the start of the game might have played an important role. This third
experiment, by having only one round of knowing interaction between teammates
in the practice rounds and the game proper,3 and by including a control condition
in which the only pressure for divergence is frequency of interaction, shows that this
3It would be interesting in future studies, however, to see whether players need any such rounds
at all.
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cannot be the case. Nevertheless, as the results of the second experiment show, a
pressure for social marking alone cannot explain the divergence. There must also
be a minimum level of interaction between teammates (apparently around 50%).
The second and third experiments can thus be treated as two conditions of one
experiment, with the second experiment as a Low-frequency condition, and the third
as a High-frequency condition. Figure 7.2 summarises the experimental design.
Tables C.4 and C.5 compare divergence levels for all conditions.
Figure 7.2: Diagram of experimental design (No. of participants given in brackets)
As can be seen Section 7.1.7, however, there were small differences between the
two experiments beyond frequency of interaction. Chapter 8 will discuss these in
more detail, and will describe a further small experiment designed to investigate
the importance of these differences.

Chapter 8
Explaining variation in gift size: a fourth experi-
ment
8.1 Comparing the second and third experiments
Taken together, the results of the second and third experiments provide an intrigu-
ing picture, which supports and elaborates on the findings of the first experiment.
The results suggest that a pressure to mark group identity, combined with at least
a 50% level of contact between teammates, can sow the seeds of language diver-
gence in a very short time, but that neither the social pressure nor the frequency of
interaction alone is sufficient (although variation in frequency of interaction alone
would doubtless lead to divergence over longer time periods; cf. Dunbar 2003, 230).
However, as summarised in Section 7.1.7, there are some differences aside from
frequency of interaction between the second and third experiments. First, to fit
more rounds into the third experiment, each round was made 25 seconds shorter
(see Section 7.1.1 and 7.1.4). It is unlikely that this had any serious influence on
the main research questions—the players’ ability, that is, to distinguish between
teammates and opponents, and the degree to which the alien language diverged
into dialects. One would expect, after all, that having more time to chat would
help players identify each other and pick up on linguistic cues, but players in the
second experiment clearly found this a very hard task. The second change worth
noting is that the instructions were revised for clarity, and this meant that the
need to balance resources was less heavily emphasised in the instructions for the
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third experiment, although it was still stated more than once (see Appendix A to
compare). Again, there is no reason to think that this had any influence on players’
ability to recognise each other, or on the level of divergence in the alien language.
However, it is possible that it might have encouraged greater conservativeness in
gift-giving. While the difficulty in identifying teammates in the second experiment
no doubt encouraged caution in the Competitive condition, one would not expect the
same caution in the Cooperative condition, and there does seem to be a difference
between the overall mean gift in the Cooperative condition of the second experiment
(7.3) and of the third (13.5). Moreover, a large number of players in the second
experiment claimed to have tried to sabotage their opponents by giving them large
gifts so as to unbalance their resources (see Section 6.3.1.2). While this most likely
reflects players’ frustrations at being unable to recognise their teammates, leading
them to focus on malign opponent-based strategies rather than benign teammate-
based ones, it may also suggest that players in this experiment attached greater
importance to balancing resources than in the third.
To confirm whether or not any of this had had an effect, it was decided to partially
replicate the second experiment, using the instructions and the round length from
the third experiment. To save time and money, only two games were played in each
condition. In this chapter, and subsequent ones, for the sake of comparison, the
second and fourth experiments will be referred to as the Low-frequency conditions,
and the first and third experiments as the High-frequency conditions.1
8.2 Description of experiment
8.2.1 Overview
This experiment was carried out in January 2010, and involved sixteen participants.
These participants were divided between a Competitive and a Cooperative condi-
tion just as in the second and third experiments, and the two conditions worked in
the same way. The game proper lasted for 15 rounds, as in the second experiment,
but each round lasted for 205 seconds, as in the third experiment. The number of
1These terms refer to the relative frequency with which a given player was paired with their
teammate or pseudo-teammate.
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practice rounds, the order in which players were paired in them, and the informa-
tion given to players about the first round (that they would be paired with their
teammate) were all kept the same as in the second and third experiments. Owing to
inflation, players were paid £9 rather than £8, but prizes were awarded as before.
8.2.2 Participants
Sixteen participants were recruited via a student employment website, and the same
advertisement was used as for the second and third experiments. All but four of
the sixteen participants were native speakers of English, and they came from a wide
variety of academic backgrounds. They ranged in age from 18 to 25. Participants
were assigned to games on the basis of availability and to teams at random.2 Each
participant was paid £9, and the members of the winning team in each condition
were awarded £10 each.
8.2.3 Experimental procedure
The procedure was very similar to that for the previous experiments (see Sec-
tion 5.2.3), and the instructions were exactly as in the third experiment (see Ap-
pendix A).
As in the second experiment, every player was paired with their teammate for
5 rounds and also for 5 rounds each with their two opponents. This meant that
there were 15 rounds in all in the game proper, preceded, as in the two previous
experiments, by 3 practice rounds. Each round lasted 205 seconds.
8.2.4 Game structure
As in the second and third experiments, players began the game with 28 points,
and these points were distributed in the same way. As in the third experiment,
the chat stage lasted for 160 seconds in the game proper and 120 seconds in the
practice rounds. The exchange stage lasted 30 seconds, and the feedback stage
lasted 15 seconds, in both the main game and the practice rounds. There were 3
practice rounds and 15 rounds in the game proper.
2As in the first experiment, however, two participants in one game turned out unexpectedly to
know each other; they were put, without their knowledge, in separate teams.
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8.2.5 Resources and scoring
Resources and scoring worked in the same way in this experiment as in the second
and third experiments. See Section 6.1.5 for more information.
8.2.6 Alien language
The alien language had the same number of words and the same meanings as in
the second and third experiments. As before, the alien words themselves were
generated anew for each pair of games; alien dictionaries from the second and third
experiments were not reused.
8.2.7 Comparison of experiments
Table 8.1 gives a full summary of differences between the four experiments.
First Second Third Fourth
No. participants 20 40 40 16
No. conditions 1 2 2 2
No. rounds 14 15 16 15
No. practice rounds 2 3 3 3
Length of round (seconds) 230 230 205 205
Length of chat stage 180 180 160 160
Length of exchange stage 30 30 30 30
Length of feedback stage 20 20 15 15
Length of practice round 260 160 165 165
Initial points per player 7 28 28 28
Size of alien language 19 words 20 words 20 words 20 words
No. practice rounds
with teammate 2/2 1/3 1/3 1/3
No. rounds with teammate
(game proper) 7/14 5/15 8/16 5/15
Table 8.1: Summary of differences between all four experiments
8.3 Results
Tables 8.2 and 8.3 summarise the results for this experiment. The main dependent
variable for this experiment was the mean gift size, since it was expected that this
might differ from that in the second experiment, owing to the emphasis put on
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keeping resources balanced in the instructions. In fact, the overall mean gift size
was considerably higher in the Cooperative condition than in previous experiments,
and slightly lower in the Competitive condition. Table 8.4 provides a summary.
These results are somewhat surprising, and will be discussed in Section 8.3.1.
Other dependent variables will be discussed in Sections 8.3.2 to 8.4.1.
Final Convergence % Correct Mean Strategies
scorea levelb recognitionsc giftd employede
Game 1
Team a 170 (199) 0.92 80.8 (26) 6.5 (11.4) DR M II SH
Team b 94 (134) 0.84 67.9 (28) 2.1 (3.7) DR M II
Game 2
Team a 178 (221) 0.83 76.92 (26) 6.6 (12) DR M
Team b 169 (183) 0.82 57.7 (26) 3.2 (3.4) DR
Table 8.2: Summary of results from fourth experiment (Competitive condition).
a Provisional score given in brackets;
b 1 − mean distance between teammates (higher figure means greater conver-
gence); see Section 8.3.3;
c Excludes first two rounds and rounds where players made no response; number
of responses made given in brackets (out of a possible 28);
d Based on all rounds; mean gift to teammates only given in brackets;
e See Section 8.4.1; DR = Dialect Recognition; M = Mimicry; II = Intentional
Innovation; SH = Secret Handshake.
8.3.1 Giving behaviour
The fourth column of Table 8.2 and the third column of Table 8.3 show the mean
amount of resources given away per round by each team of pseudo-team, and the
mean amount given to (pseudo-)teammates (whether or not players guessed who
they were paired with). Only one player in the Competitive condition claimed
to have attempted to sabotage his opponents by giving them a lot of resources;
the other seven tried to give nothing. In the Cooperative condition, there is the
expected relationship between combined mean gift and score. In both games in this
condition, as before, the pseudo-team with the largest mean gift has the smaller
share of the score at the end of the game. In both games in the Competitive
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Final scorea Convergence levelb Mean giftc
Game 1
Team ad 1648 (2927) 0.84 61.8 (56.3)
Team b 1026 (1661) 0.87 87.4 (82.1)
Combined 2675 (4588) 74.6 (69.2)
Game 2
Team a 2956 (3601) 0.93 75.1 (71)
Team b 1909 (2039) 0.82 109.2 (108.6)
Combined 5080 (5640) 92.2 (89.8)
Table 8.3: Summary of results from fourth experiment (Cooperative
condition).
a Provisional score given in brackets;
b 1 − mean distance between pseudo-teammates (higher figure
means greater convergence); see Section 8.3.3;
c Based on all rounds; mean gift to pseudo-teammates only given
in brackets;
d Refers to pseudo-teams, for comparison with Competitive con-
dition (see Section 6.2).
condition, the team with the highest mean gift won the game. In both conditions,
however, the data points are too few for inferential statistics to be very meaningful.
Table 8.4 summarises the mean gifts in the second, third, and fourth experiments.
There are some surprises, most notably that the overall mean gift size for the
Cooperative condition is considerably higher in the fourth experiment than in either
of the previous experiments, and for the Competitive condition, rather lower; the




Competitive (overall) 6.2 7.9 4.6
Competitive (teammate) 9.6 14.2 7.6
Cooperative 7.3 13.5 83.4
Table 8.4: Summary of mean gifts
There are several factors that might be expected to influence gift size:
1. Identity of recipient.
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2. Relative certainty about identifying teammates.
3. Perceived importance of balancing resources.
4. Individual variation.
The first seems to make a clear difference. The overall mean gift to teammates
in the Competitive condition is greater in every experiment than the overall mean
gift; the same difference is not seen in Cooperative conditions. This is as should be
expected, and means that most players at least understand the aim of the game. We
should expect the second factor to amplify this; the more certain players are in their
identification of teammates, the larger we should expect their gifts to be. This may
go some way to account for the difference between the second and third experiments
with respect to the Competitive condition. Based on this, we should expect players
to behave in every round of the Cooperative conditions as they do in Competitive
rounds where they are certain they are paired with teammates: these two factors
should encourage large gifts. The third factor may pull in the other direction,
however. It is easier, if one is concerned about dramatically unbalancing resources,
to be relatively conservative about gift giving. On the other hand, while most
participants reported trying to give as little as possible to opponents, a few claimed,
on occasion, to have deliberately tried to unbalance their opponents’ resources by
giving them a lot of some resource that they already claimed to have too much of
(see Sections 5.5.2, 6.4.2, and 7.3.2, where this is referred to as “malign generosity”).
Very few participants seem to have done this, however, as evidenced both by their
own feedback and by the fact that the mean gifts to teammates were higher than
to opponents. In any case, as suggested above in Section 8.1, it seems plausible
that the greater emphasis on balancing resources in the instructions for the second
experiment explains the difference between that experiment and the third with
respect to mean gifts in the Cooperative condition.
This leaves the results from the fourth experiment. The above will not account
for the differences between these results and the previous experiments. The Com-
petitive conditions are not such a problem to explain. While the overall mean is
smaller than in the second experiment, this can be explained by the unusual be-
haviour of players in Game 3 of that experiment (see Section 6.4.2). If data from
this game is excluded, the mean gift becomes 3.9 overall, and 5 to teammates. The
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results from the fourth experiment then look as expected: slightly higher than in
the second experiment, perhaps owing to less caution over balancing resources, but
somewhat lower than in the third experiment, owing to greater uncertainty as to
the identity of teammates.
The mean gifts from the Cooperative conditions, however, cannot be explained
so easily. The question is perhaps not so much why gifts in the fourth experiment
should be so high, but why they should be so low in the other experiments. Caution
about balancing resources may go some way to explaining it in the second experi-
ment, but there is no reason for any greater caution in the third than in the fourth.
The most likely explanation is that participants are simply biased towards conser-
vatism. Giving away large amounts of resources in real life is something that is
discouraged, at least in most modern countries. If this is true, then what explains
the generosity in the fourth experiment? The only obvious explanation for that
seems to be individual variation between participants, and it should be borne in
mind in this respect that, provided other participants are not actively ungenerous,
only one participant needs to be actively generous to encourage such behaviour.
And if they encourage it early enough in the game, then there are more resources
to play with throughout.
An example of such encouragement can be seen in Game 3 of the Competitive
condition in the second experiment. The generous giving seems to have started with
one player, before spreading throughout all players. Can this explain what happened
in the fourth experiment? Figures 8.1 and 8.2 show the pattern of gift giving
throughout the two games. As generosity was apparent from early on, practice
rounds are included. As can be seen, gifts are quite low in the first round of both
games, and certainly not remarkably high. No player gave away everything, for
example. However, the appearance and spread of generosity can be observed. For
example, in the fourth round of Game 1 (see Figure 8.1)3 Player 3 stands out in
his generosity. In this round, he was paired with his pseudo-teammate Player 4.
In the following round, Player 4 is similarly generous to Player 2, who is rather
generous in the following round. A similar pattern can be seen in Game 2, except
3Since there were three practice rounds, this makes it the first round of the game proper.
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it seems to start with Player 4 in the fifth round.4 It seems, therefore, that the
unusually high mean gifts in these games may be explained by the presence in
each of them of one player inclined towards generosity. The results from all the
experiments together suggest that such individuals are relatively unusual, but the
role of individual differences in generosity in this paradigm would be an interesting
subject for future investigation.5
8.3.2 Recognising team-mates
8.3.2.1 Feedback questionnaires
Of the eight players in the Competitive condition, only three claimed in feedback
questionnaires to have generally been able to identify their teammates, and two of
these had managed to develop a Secret Handshake (see Section 8.4.1); the other
mentioned other linguistic cues. One said he had had occasional success towards
the end of the game. Half of the players reported no success. This is comparable
to the second experiment, in which only half of players reported success at this.
There were similar responses to the question, “Were you able to tell when you were
talking to opponents?” Four said they had. Two of these had been the players using
a Secret Handshake, and one of the others was their opponent, who mentioned this
Handshake as a means of identifying them. Her teammate reported partial success
only. The other player who claimed to have generally succeeded reported using
linguistic cues to do so. Of the remaining four players, three reported no success,
and one failed to answer the question.
4The seesawing that can be observed, whereby a player gives a lot away in one round, and far
less in the next round, is partly explicable as a response to their last partner: while they gave away
a lot in the previous round, they did not necessarily receive as much. Not only does this mean
they have considerably less to give away in the next round, but that they may be temporarily
discouraged from doing so.
5There is evidence that a variety of factors can influence cooperative behaviour, such as gender
and anonymity (Dufwenberg and Muren 2006), observation (Haley and Fessler 2005), training in
economics (Frank et al. 1993), and levels of the hormone oxytocin (Zak et al. 2007). Neverthe-
less, participants in this experiment were no more or less anonymous or under observation than
participants in previous ones. Oxytocin levels, understandably, were not ascertained. Of the two
players who seem to have started off the generosity in these games, the first was male and the
second female. The first had, in fact, studied economics, although Frank et al. (1993) found an
effect in the other direction. However, economic training might have helped this player realise
sooner than average that generous gift-giving was a good strategy.
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Figure 8.1: Gifts per round in Game 1 of the Cooperative condition
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Figure 8.2: Gifts per round in Game 2 of the Cooperative condition
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In the Competitive condition, there were only a couple of intriguing responses to
the question, “Could you tell (or guess) anything about who your team-mate was
(e.g. gender, age, identity, nationality etc.)? If so, how?”:
• (By a female participant)“No. But he is quick and polite.”
• (By a male participant)“Not very good at the game. Very impulsive.”
The responses in the Cooperative condition were more interesting:
• (By a male participant) “I think I guessed the gender because I reckon girls
are more polite.”
• (By a female participant) “I thought the player with all the exclamation
marks, repetition was female.” (cf. Section 7.2.1.1)
• (By a male participant) “One player was friendly to the point of flirty . . . I
hope it was a girl . . . I think you could tell gender by politeness, punctuation,
jokey tone.”
• (By a male participant) “Perhaps some of the males in the group may have
been more aggressive.”
8.3.2.2 Explicit and implicit judgements in the Competitive condition
There were 6 failures in this experiment to answer the question, “Were you talking
to a member of your own team?” representing 0.05% of potential responses. Only
one of the four teams had a perfect record.
As can be seen from the third column of Table 8.2, players were more often
right than wrong, which is significant only if players are assumed to have a 50%
chance of being right (S = 31 incorrect out of 106 responses; p < .001); the same
caveats apply as in the second experiment (see Section 6.3.1.2), and again players
could have done similarly well by guessing no every time. One team, however,
did succeed in employing a Secret Handshake (see Section 8.4.1), and it can be
assumed on that basis that members of this team actually succeeded in recognising
each other. Members of this team made 22 definite guesses, of which only two were
incorrect. In both games, the team that made the most definite guesses won.
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A Wilcoxon T test revealed no significant difference between gifts to teammates
and gifts to opponents in those rounds where players guessed they were paired with
opponents (N1 = 7 and N2 = 54; p > .05).
There was no significant difference between the time spent chatting in the Com-
petitive condition (mean: 140.43) and in the Cooperative condition (mean: 143.12; t
=−0.85, df = 109.1, p = 0.198). It cannot be assumed that this reflects a significant
difference between the second experiment (where there was a significant difference)
and the third and fourth experiments. As the chat stage was 20 seconds shorter
in the third and fourth experiments, the difference may reflect a ceiling, whereby
players are more inclined to stop chatting in the last 20 seconds of the stage.
8.3.3 Divergence
In this experiment, there were 40 potential variables in each condition (20 words in
each game × 2 games). In the Competitive condition, 25 of these had more than
one variant to them by the end of the game, and 28 in the Cooperative condition.
144 new variants were introduced in the Competitive condition (giving a mean of
5.76 variants in every variable set), and 142 in the Cooperative condition (a mean
of 5.07 in every set). This is similar to previous experiments.
The same method was used to measure convergence and divergence in the alien
language as was used in previous experiments. In no game was there a significant
between-team difference in within-team convergence, and in neither condition was
there significant divergence between teams (Competitive: p = .364; Cooperative:
p = .306); nor were the two conditions significantly different (p = .29). This is
consistent with the results in the second experiment. Similarly, there was no signif-
icant syntactic divergence in either condition (Competitive: p = .66; Cooperative:
p = .65), nor any significant difference between conditions in this respect either
(p ≈ 1).
Results for synonym pairs were similar to those in previous experiments. For
the want/need pair: 181 to 19 (91%) in the Competitive condition and 229 to 35
(87%) in the Cooperative condition. The imbalance in the grain/corn pair was less
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striking, however: 69 to 29 (70%) in the Competitive condition and 91 to 47 (66%)
in the Cooperative condition.
8.3.4 Comparison with score
In both Competitive games, the winning team was the team that did best at recog-
nising teammates and the most generous. The data points, however, are too few
for inferential statistics to be meaningful.
8.4 Strategy
8.4.1 Identification strategies
All four strategies used in the first and third experiments were used again here:
• Dialect Recognition (DR);
• Intentional Innovation (II);
• Mimicry (M);
• Secret Handshake (SH).
Team 1a’s Secret Handshake began in the first round of the game proper, and
simply involved each player greeting each other, repeating the last character of the
word for “hello” (nopa). For example (from the eighth round):
Player 0: nopaaaaaaaaaaaa
Player 1: nopaaaaaaaaaaa
They also tended to do the same for “goodbye” at the end of an interaction. This
time, their opponents did imitate the greeting, and had a little success. However,
they were not completely successful at this. When Team 1a were actually paired up
together, they tended to respond to the question, “Were you talking to someone on
your own team?” by voting 4, meaning, “Definitely”, and they would give each other
correspondingly large amounts of resources. When tricked by their opponents, on
the other hand, they were more cautious, voting 3, and giving away some resources,
but not as many as to each other. The Handshake was not quite foolproof, therefore,
but it was effective. In the eighth round, having realised their opponents had caught
on, Player 2 followed his greeting with a smilie – :) – and Player 1 responded with
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the same. In subsequent rounds, this became an obligatory part of their Handshake.
Player 3 caught on to this in the eleventh round, and fooled Player 2 completely.
In the twelfth round, however, Player 1 was not to be fooled so easily. It seems the
clue lay in Player 3 not making nopa long enough. In her feedback questionnaire,
Player 1 described the greeting, and said both players had to make it the same
length. In fact, this did not occur in any interaction in the game! However, there
was never a difference of more than two letters between members of Team 1a. This
was something that Team 1b never caught on to.
In spite of the cleverness of this Handshake, it is striking that Team 1a did not
get the highest score in the condition; Team 2a scored more. This is particularly
interesting given that this team apparently did not employ any such sophisticated
Handshake. Moreover, Player 2 of Game 2 reported that he initially found it difficult
to recognise his teammate (though he said this was mainly because they were paired
up rather infrequently). His teammate, however, seems to have been especially
adept at identifying relatively subtle cues. As well as learning to recognise one
of her opponents by his use of ropa for repa to mean “I”, she noticed that her
teammate tended to type faster than everyone else.
8.4.2 Summary of results
As in the second experiment, only half the players claimed to have been generally
successful at identifying their teammates; this time, however, there was no sign
of a gap between explicit and implicit judgements of identity. Nor did the alien
language show any significant tendency to diverge. Gift giving was at a similar
level in the Competitive condition in this experiment as in the second experiment.
In the Cooperative condition, however, gifts were strikingly large. This is most
likely due to the presence of a particularly generous player in both games, whose
generosity spread to the other players.
All the main strategies identified in previous experiments were used again in this
one. This experiment contained the fourth example of the most interesting of these,
a Secret Handshake.
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8.5 Discussion
With respect to the two main research questions of the experiments so far—can
players identify their teammates, and does their behaviour in the game lead to
socially structured divergence in the alien language?—this experiment supported
the findings of the previous three experiments.
The main reason for carrying out this fourth experiment was to determine whether
or not the small differences between the second and third experiments, in round
length and in instructions, might have influenced gift-giving behaviour. The results
from this fourth experiment are slightly ambiguous. As regards the Competitive
condition, if the unusually high mean gifts from Game 3 of the second experiment
are ignored, then the overall mean gift for the fourth experiment is slightly higher,
but still lower than the overall mean gift in the third experiment. This suggests
there may be a very small effect from the instructions, a conclusion that may be
further supported by the difference in the number of players attempting to sabotage
their opponents by giving them a large number of resources. However, it is worth
bearing in mind that a team in the fourth experiment succeeded in devising a Secret
Handshake. This made recognising teammates relatively straightforward, and the
level of frustration present in the second experiment, which, it was suggested, might
have encouraged “malign generosity” towards opponents, was not present here. In
any case, there is no evidence at all to suggest that the differences between the
second and third experiments had any influence on the answers to the main research
questions.
Chapter 9
Discussion of experimental results
9.1 Summary of findings
Four experiments were carried out, which can be categorised as High- or Low-
frequency conditions depending on whether players were paired with their team-
mates for half the rounds (High-frequency) or only a third of them (Low-frequency).
The first and third experiments were High-frequency experiments, and the second
and fourth were the Low-frequency experiments. The second, third, and fourth
experiments, moreover, consisted of two conditions each: a Competitive condition,
in which players in a game were divided into two teams of two, and a Cooperative
condition, in which the four players were all on the same team. There were two
main research questions:
Recognition: Were players able to distinguish between their teammates and their
opponents?
Divergence: Did the strategies they used to play the game lead the alien language
to diverge?
The answers to both questions depended on the relative frequency with which
players interacted with their teammates; the answer to the second question de-
pended in addition on whether there was a pressure for players to make the dis-
tinction mentioned in the first question. In the High-frequency conditions only,
players did significantly better than chance at identifying their teammates. In
the Low-frequency conditions, players’ success can be explained in terms of their
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Low-frequency High-frequency
Competitive Poor recognition;a Good recognition;b
No divergence.c Divergence.d
Cooperative No divergence.c No divergence.d
Table 9.1: Summary of results for conditions
a See Sections 6.3.1 and 8.3.2.
b See Sections 5.4.1 and 7.2.1.
c See Sections 6.3.2 and 8.3.3.
d See Sections 5.4.2 and 7.2.2.
simply having realised that they were more likely to be paired with their oppo-
nents than their teammates (although there was some evidence that players in the
second experiment did better at implicit identification than they were aware; see
Section 6.3.1.2). Only in the High-frequency Competitive conditions did the alien
language show signs of significant divergence. Only in these conditions, that is, were
players significantly more like their teammates than their opponents in their use of
the alien language. Most interestingly, while every player in the High-frequency Co-
operative conditions was paired twice as often with one other player than with either
of the others, this frequency bias did not lead these pairs to diverge significantly
from the other players. Table 9.1 summarises these results.
The results suggest, first, that human beings are very adept at using variation in
language (and potentially other cultural systems) to create markers of identity and
to infer social information about other individuals, at least given a minimum level
of interaction with members of their own community; moreover, they can do this
very quickly (the experiments lasted about an hour each). Second, they suggest
that a pressure to use language in this way influences its cultural evolution, causing
members of the same group to converge with each other and to diverge away from
members of disfavoured groups. The results do not show that such a pressure is
a necessary condition—that is, that divergence can never occur through variation
in the frequency of interaction alone. Indeed, the results show that frequency of
interaction plays an important role in causing divergence (which did not occur in
the Low-frequency conditions). It would, moreover, be rather surprising if biases
in frequency of interaction did not lead to divergence on their own over long time
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periods. What the experiments suggest, however, is that a pressure to use linguistic
variants to signal identity speeds up divergence. In evolutionary terms, this all looks
rather as if it could be understood in terms of drift and selection (cf. Section 2.4.3
and Chapter 4), and it would be similarly misguided to assume that biological
speciation events can occur only as a result of the latter. Section 9.5 will return to
the question of analogies with biology (see also Chapter 4).
9.2 Bridging the alien-human gap
Gilbert and Troitzsch (2005), with reference to simulations in the social sciences,
make a distinction between “explanatory” and “predictive” models, the difference
chiefly lying in the level of detail modelled, which influences the degree to which
accurate predictions can be made. “Phenomenological” models, by contrast with
both, attempt simply to model the phenomenon in question without any claim
to explanation or prediction. The experimental model presented in this thesis is
at least explanatory, since it has a claim to be modelling a real-life phenomenon.
It is predictive in the sense that it allows a broad prediction to be drawn from it,
specifically that a pressure for social marking will lead to faster linguistic divergence.
At this level, however, any explanatory model can be argued to be predictive, and
the model does not make any claim to be a simulation of a particular real-life
situation.1
Yet, if the model is to have a real claim to being explanatory, the connections
between it and the real world must be made clear. The scenario with which par-
ticipants are presented at the start of the experiment (see Appendix A) makes this
somewhat explicit. The population being modelled is one that was previously rel-
atively well integrated and linguistically homogeneous, but which becomes divided
in two for some reason. What precisely the teams might correspond to in real life
is open to interpretation. The Biblical story in which the Gileadites tested the
Ephraimites by asking them to say “shibboleth” (Judges 12:5–6) is a classic exam-
ple whose relevance to this area of research has not gone unnoticed (see e.g. Kinzler
1How could it, given the abstractions necessary for the experiment to be carried out? It
is doubtful whether narrowly predictive models of language change can be implemented at all,
except computationally.
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et al. 2007: 12577). This is a case of social significance being attached to a linguistic
variant, of which there were certainly examples in the experiment.
9.2.1 Serbo-Croatian disintegration
The shibboleth story is not a story of language divergence as such, however: the
divergence had already occurred before the events took place. Where, then, to
seek real-life cases of linguistic divergence in which social divergence plays a causal
role? On the face of it, the twentieth century provided several political situations
that somewhat resemble the social structure in the Competitive condition of the
experiment—a group splintering into two or more parts. An example of the linguis-
tic consequences of such events is provided by David Norris’s (1993) Teach Yourself
Serbo-Croat, which became, in 2003, Teach Yourself Croatian. On the face of it,
this is evidence of language divergence in a single decade. In reality, of course, it
is not language divergence so much as rebranding (see Greenberg 2004 for a de-
tailed study of the four-way disintegration of Serbo-Croat), and it is nothing new.
Much linguistic ink, after all, has been spilt for decades on the question of what it
means to call something a language (for a discussion of the issues, see Chambers
and Trudgill 1998: 3–12; Croft 2000: 13–20). The extent to which it has actually
influenced the distribution of linguistic variants, which remains primarily geograph-
ically conditioned, is doubtful (Norris, personal communication), and work remains
to be done. Nevertheless, there have certainly been efforts among some Croatian
linguists, for instance, to emphasise the differences between Croatian and Serbian
and to consolidate a distinct standard (focusing primarily, for the sake of relative
ease, on written rather than spoken language)—both enterprises that have been the
source of considerable controversy (Greenberg 2004: 115–34). Such linguistic engi-
neering should not surprise anyone who has read a popular history of the English
language; modern American spelling owes much to Noah Webster, for example.
This is not, however, all that similar to what happened in the experiments. The
divergence seen there is not best explained as the result of such intentional be-
haviour (this will be discussed in more detail in Section 9.3). Indeed, while some of
the differences between British and American English are explicable with reference
to lexicographers and linguists, this cannot account for anything near the majority
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of differences between the two dialects. The Balkan linguistic situation is an attrac-
tive real-life situation to relate to the experiment, and is currently a popular topic
for research. It may well be, furthermore, that political events of the last two two
decades have sown the seeds of greater future divergence between the languages
involved. Nevertheless, it is also a good example of why simulations, both com-
putational and experimental, must play an important complementary role in the
study of language change and variation. While we can make tentative predictions
about future divergence between Balkan languages, it will be a long time before we
see it for sure, and picking apart the factors that bring it about will be difficult.
There is, after all, already variation between groups of speakers: Serbs and Croats
can already tell each other apart linguistically. This removes a certain pressure for
socially based divergence. The experiment provided something that is impossible
to find in real life: a language that was initially homogeneous, where every speaker
initially received identical input. This is an advantage of the model, and of models
generally, because it allows the researcher to abstract away from complicating fac-
tors. It does, however, make the model that much less similar to real-life cases—in
real life, the input to multiple speakers is never identical. This is not to imply that
simulations should not be made to relate to the real world. The point is merely
that to do so is far from trivial, and that points of difference between models and
reality are not necessarily drawbacks.
9.2.2 Classic sociolinguistic studies
The caveat from the previous section being borne in mind, other real-life linguistic
cases are worth mentioning. Chapter 3 made reference to Labov’s (1963) study of
change in Martha’s Vineyard. The results of the experiment are very much in line
with Labov’s findings here, and they should not be taken necessarily as contradicting
his later downplaying of the role of identity in language change (see Labov 2001:
191, 506; Section 3.3 of this thesis). The experiment did not produce divergence
as a result of frequency of interaction alone, but this does not mean that it would
not have occurred given more time. The point is that social pressures significantly
increase the rate of divergence.
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The other case worth mentioning here, also discussed in Chapter 3, with partic-
ular reference to work by Trudgill (2004, 2008a,b), is that of New Zealand English,
or rather of colonial dialects in general. The development of this kind of dialect
presents a particularly interesting area for research. It involves both convergence
between settlers and divergence from the people they left behind, as well, in certain
cases, as between different groups of settlers. There is, furthermore, the advantage
that these dialects began developing over a century ago, meaning that there has
been enough time for significant change, but not so much time that the origins are
lost in the mists of history. Indeed, the New Zealand case is made particularly fas-
cinating for research purposes by the existence of recordings, made in the 1940s, of
the first generation of native New Zealanders (see Gordon et al. 2004 for a detailed
account of this and the development of this dialect in general). The starting point
in such cases is also much cleaner than in many cases of dialect formation—Trudgill
(2004: 26) refers to “tabula rasa situations”. One must be clear: the linguistic start-
ing position can hardly be called homogeneous in these cases—but, as noted before,
it practically never can—the advantage of the colonial setting is that the dialects
settlers bring with them are likely to lose a considerable amount of their original
geographical and social significance (Trudgill 2004: 2), and they do not encounter
any local dialects of the same language. For Trudgill, of course, this dialect con-
tact is the key to explaining new colonial dialect formation. It is worth stressing
again (see Section 3.3.1) that this view has much to recommend it. The question is
whether identity can so easily be rejected as a plausible factor in dialect formation.
This was discussed in Chapter 3, and the discussion will not be repeated here. The
experiment can, however, be understood as a model of colonial dialect formation,
where at least some contact remains between settlers and those who remain behind.
For such cases, it predicts that, where there is a pressure for settlers to distinguish
themselves and to be able to recognise outsiders who speak the same language (and,
it must be stressed, this need not involve the establishment of a coherent new na-
tional identity), then we should expect this pressure to hasten the formation of a
new colonial dialect. This, moreover, occurs through accommodation and alignment
between speakers, not in spite of it.
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9.2.3 Midlan High
All the examples of real-life dialect formation discussed so far have been relatively
large-scale. Such a focus may lead us to overlook somewhat smaller-scale everyday
instances of socially grounded linguistic divergence. This is in fact ubiquitous, and
familiar to most people who recall the social pressures they experienced as adoles-
cents. Indeed, there is evidence that this age group is one of the most influential in
terms of the propagation of linguistic variants (Kerswill 1996; Kerswill and Williams
2000).
Emma Moore spent three years in the company of female members of one year of
a Bolton high school, which she refers to by the pseudonym “Midlan High” (Moore
2003, 2004). Here she observed a social split into two groups, defined by attitudes
and behaviour: the “Populars” and the “Townies”, the latter being more inclined to
engage in such behaviours as drinking and drug taking (although the Populars also
engaged in the first activity), and the former more inclined to play an active role
in the life of their school. As might be anticipated, Moore found that the divergent
social practice was reflected in “increasingly divergent linguistic practice” (Moore
2004: 385), with regard to four variables that she examined: nonstandard were, tag
questions, negative concord and right dislocation. She makes an important point
about this divergence, however. On the face of it, her data identify “nonstandard
were and negative concord as Townie variants, tag questions as a Popular variant
and right dislocation as a neutral sociolinguistic marker” (ibid.: 390). However,
this obscures the fact that none of the girls involved rejected any of the variants
completely. To ignore the Popular girls’ use of nonstandard variants would be to
fail to recognise that these variants, and the extent to which they used them, played
a role in their own identity. The same variants, in other words, meant something
different for the two groups of girls, and that social meaning was expressed not only
in their use of the variants, but in the frequency with which they used them.
This nuanced view should be borne in mind in interpreting the results of the ex-
periment. It was not the case that players could be divided into categories as “users
of variant x” and “users of variant y”. There were, granted, a few cases of variants
being used only by members of one team (the Secret Handshakes were a very salient
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example of this), but this was not the norm. Context, moreover, was important. As
the first utterance of an interaction, “jori noloku” in Game 5 of the first experiment
had a very particular significance (see Section 5.5.1); used later on simply to mean
“I have”, it did not have this significance. Its use as a greeting, moreover, depended
on who its user thought they were talking to. In general, it should not be forgotten
that every player had to talk to every other player, and the alien language could
not be split at the end of any game into “Team 1 words” and “Team 2 words”. The
divergence, measured in terms of relative distance between players, was based on
the proportions according to which players used particular variants, not on categor-
ical differences. What is more, there was considerable intra-team variation, and it
should not be assumed that player’s identities in the Competitive conditions of the
game were entirely team-based. In both Competitive and Cooperative conditions,
it is clear from feedback questionnaires that players noticed individual variation
between all three of the other players, and were conscious of the ways they them-
selves differed in their use of the language not only from their opponents, but also
from their teammates. In addition to this, players’ use of particular variants was
conditioned by the immediate context. Section 9.3 will discuss the role of mimicry,
along with other strategies in the game. Even in the Cooperative condition, how-
ever, players were influenced in their use of language by their partner in the round;
the role of accommodation, its contribution to divergence, and the ways in which
it was affected by competitiveness and frequency of interaction will be examined in
Section 9.4.
9.3 The role of players’ strategies
Sections 5.5, 6.4, 7.3, and 8.4 discuss the strategies that players used in the Com-
petitive conditions. As discussed in these sections, four main linguistic strategies
can be identified:
• Dialect Recognition (DR): try to remember how different players use the lan-
guage and identify them based on this.
• Intentional Innovation (II): make changes to the language that are likely to
be recognisable.
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• Mimicry (M): try to sound as much like the person you’re talking to as pos-
sible.
• Secret Handshake (SH): say something at the beginning of the interaction
that identifies you to your team-mate (and ideally not your opponent), and
requires a specific response from them
The relationship between these strategies and the divergence that occurred in the
High-frequency conditions is worth exploring. None of these strategies is explicitly
about causing the alien language to diverge; the closest we get to that is in Secret
Handshakes, which involve two members of the same team coordinating with each
other to produce a multi-turn variant not shared by members of the opposing team.
However, to the extent that this is about causing the language to diverge, this
stops at the greeting. Furthermore, the divergence calculated was based on word-
level variation (see Appendix C), so variants that stretched over more than one
conversation turn, as these Handshakes did by definition, did not contribute to
it. Indeed, since Secret Handshakes were generally so successful in creating a safe
environment for teammates to exchange resources, we might even expect there to be
less overall convergence between teammates who used them, though this occurred
in only one case (see Section 7.2.2), which should therefore be treated with caution.
This suggests that the overall divergence, if it has anything to do with players’
strategies, is better explained by the other three strategies. Again, however, it
must be stressed that there is no reason to assume that any of these strategies were
employed with the purpose of creating divergence; their purpose was to recognise
one’s own teammate and to appear to be the teammate of one’s interlocutor (the
extent to which a distinction was made between teammate and opponent in this
respect is discussed in Section 9.4). The relation between this and the linguistic
divergence that arose in the game is best understood in terms of Keller’s (1994)
invisible-hand model of language change, in which the small-scale behaviour of
individuals contributes to the emergence of large-scale phenomena, without any
intention on the part of the individuals that these phenomena be created. For
this reason, straw-man characterisations of the role of social factors in language
change that rely on teleological mechanisms (some are mentioned, for example,
in Section 3.3) should be treated with care. This, in general, is an argument for
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the utility of cultural-evolutionary explanations of language change as a means of
shifting focus from the speaker to the language. In the history of linguistic thought,
for example, a focus on speakers led to language universals being taken as evidence
for a highly complex, and—as Kinsella (2009) argues—evolutionarily implausible,
set of language-specific constraints in the human brain. A focus on language as an
adaptive system in its own right, on the other hand, makes clearer the possibility
that language universals can be understood as the result of adaptation to the human
brain, rather than the other way round (Lass 1997; Kirby et al. 2004; Evans and
Levinson 2009; Chater et al. 2009).
Such a shift in focus, however, does not in any way imply that the divergence seen
in the game was not the result of players’ strategies. How, then, do the linguistic
strategies listed above contribute to divergence? Their role is best understood if the
distinction between innovation and propagation (see Section 3.1.2) is borne in mind.
Intentional Innovation clearly plays a role in the first: it is one means by which new
variants get created. The other means is accidental innovation. The majority of
new variants arising in the games can most likely be accounted for by the second,
rather than the first, process. There are a few cases where innovations look clearly
deliberate, and many players claimed to have deliberately innovated, but there is
no reason to reject the more parsimonious assumption that this accounts for a
relatively small proportion of new variants, and that the majority of them arose as
a result of errors in production and recall.
If innovation, whether intentional or accidental, accounts for the appearance of
new variants, mimicry accounts for their propagation. Whether it accounts for it
entirely depends on whether the term is understood to refer to all cases in which
a variant is copied from one individual to another (in which case, this is trivial,
since that is the only means by which propagation can occur) or if it refers only to
intentional imitation, as might be expected from its inclusion in the list of strate-
gies. The distinction is important. As discussed in Section 3.3.1.2, speakers in
a dialogue can be expected to automatically align themselves linguistically (and
not only linguistically; see Pickering and Garrod 2004; Garrod and Pickering 2007)
purely for the sake of establishing common ground, regardless of whether or not
they want to signal affiliation. If players do want to signal affiliation, then we
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should expect greater alignment, whether consciously or unconsciously. Lakin and
Chartrand (2003), for example, showed experimentally that a pressure for affiliation
increases rates of “nonconscious mimicry” of behaviour, and that individuals who
have previously failed to affiliate themselves to a group subsequently exhibited more
mimicry than individuals who had previously been more successful. Lakin et al.
(2008) showed similar results, and demonstrated, moreover, that excluded individu-
als mimicked in-group more than out-group members (see also Williams et al. 2000,
2005, and, for a review of research into imitation more broadly, Hurley and Chater
2005). In addition to this level of unconscious mimicry, several players explicitly
stated that they had deliberately attempted to imitate both their teammates and
their opponents (see Section 9.4 for more discussion of this). In this way, variants
were propagated between players.
We can, as discussed in Sections 3.2 and 3.3, expect that the propagation of
variants will be biased by variation in the frequency of interaction and by social
factors. Both were manipulated in this experiment. The division of players into
teams in the Competitive conditions led players to employ the strategy referred to
above as Dialect Recognition. This is how variants acquire social significance: there
is in language, it must be quite clear, no intrinsic social meaning attached to any
particular variant (just as there is no intrinsic semantic meaning attached to any
particular phonetic variant).2 Instead, variants must become associated mentally
with particular individuals or groups, which means that some association outside
the minds of hearers—that is, a correlation—must be recognised between variants
and speakers. Again, such associations may be recognised on a conscious or an
unconscious level (and this is the source of the distinction drawn in sociolinguis-
tics between stereotypes and indicators). In any case, the recognition that certain
2It must be added, in point of contrast, that some variants may be intrinsically liable to attract
certain meanings (otherwise there would be no onomatopoeia) or certain aesthetic valuations,
which will affect their distribution. We might expect uvular and pharyngeal sounds, for example,
to be less common in the world’s languages, owing to the association of the relevant articulators
with snoring, gargling, choking and coughing up phlegm—English speakers, for example, often
make reference to phlegm in disparaging references to languages with “guttural” consonants.
Indeed, it turns out that these sounds are rather uncommon in the world’s languages. Only 19.1%
of languages in the WALS Database, for example, have uvular consonants (Maddieson 2008). This
is intended, it should be noted, merely as a suggestive anecdote. Little serious work has yet been
done on the association between typological frequency and aesthetic judgement. Such valuations,
moreover, are not social in the sense meant here.
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variants are more likely to be associated with one team than the other encourages
variation in their use.
9.4 The role of accommodation/interactive alignment
Had the alien language diverged in the High-frequency Cooperative condition as well
as in the Competitive condition, then the divergence would be best explained with
reference to interactive alignment and frequency of interaction alone (cf. Trudgill
2004, 2008a). The fact that it did not is evidence that the pressure to distinguish
between teammates and opponents played an important role, and influenced the
degree to which players accommodated to each other. As discussed in Section 9.3,
there is evidence that human beings unconsciously vary the degree to which they
mimic others’ behaviour depending on their sense of affiliation, and that they do this
selectively depending on the person they are talking to (Williams et al. 2000, 2005;
Lakin and Chartrand 2003; Lakin et al. 2008). There are in fact two ways in which
the pressure for social marking might have influenced rates of accommodation:
1. Players in the Competitive condition accommodated more to their teammates
than to their opponents.
2. Players in the Competitive condition accommodated more to everyone than
in the Cooperative condition.
The second possibility would account for the divergence owing to the biased
frequency of interaction. The fact that there was no divergence in the Low-frequency
conditions is not evidence against the first explanation, however, since players did
so badly at recognising when they were talking to their teammates. The fact that
it is advantageous in the game (and, broadly speaking in real life) to always appear
to be on the same side as one’s interlocutor seems to be a good motivation for
preferring the second explanation, and certainly, as shown in Tables 5.1, 6.2, 7.2,
and 8.2, many players claimed to have deliberately tried to imitate their opponents.
However, we might still expect there to be a bias in accommodation. Attempts
to align oneself with members of another group come in different sorts. It has long
been the case in Britain, for example, that a child born into the working class can—
as a result of education and career path—join the middle class quite legitimately.
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In this context, the consequences of not quite having the right accent can vary, and
may well affect employment opportunities, but it tends (on the whole) not to lead
to violence. If an individual fails in an attempt to trick their way into another
group, on the other hand, then the consequences range to the considerably more
serious, as the history of espionage reveals (and as shown in the Biblical shibboleth
story). In this latter case—which is closer to the situation in the game—it is better
not to even attempt to accommodate to one’s opponents unless one is sure of one’s
imitative abilities. It is better to be taken for an honest outsider than a deceitful
one; better, in other words, to be captured as a prisoner of war than as a spy. It
is even worse to be taken for a spy by your own people; if one is rejected by one’s
opponents, there is at least a chance of getting home. If one is rejected by one’s
own, then there is no home left.3 There is real-life pressure, then, to accommodate
primarily to one’s own group and to be cautious about accommodating to one’s
opponents (which, in itself, can lead to rejection by the home group), and we might
expect this to lead to a general bias which would influence players’ behaviour in
the game. However, it should be borne in mind that the pressure in the game
itself cannot, clearly, be quite as strong as in real life. For reasons of ethics, no
in-game punishment could ever be anywhere near as great as real-life rejection, or
the punishments meted out on captured spies. For this reason, we cannot expect
players to be as cautious. There is a further point to be made, which concerns the
alien language. There are several advantages to using a small artificial language in
the experiment: it limits explicit strategising; it makes the initial linguistic state of
all players clear and relatively equal; it allows language change to be observed over a
very short time period. Without it, in other words, the experimental results would
have been considerably less interesting. However, the fact that the language is not
native to any of the players and, moreover, was learnt by all of them during the half
hour before the experiment began makes attempting to imitate one’s opponents less
risky. In real language it is relatively easy to recognise a poor attempt to mimic
3The case of the social climber is a little different. Frequently the adoption of the cultural
practices of a group to which one has a legitimate claim to belong can lead to rejection by the
group one grew up in. This is evidently hard, but at least the rejected individual is likely to have
somewhere to go. The worst scenario is to be accepted by neither group.
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one’s own accent; in the game, accents had not had long enough to develop to be
so clearly fixed in the minds of players.4
And yet, in spite of this, players seem to have had a strong sense that there was
a right and a wrong in the language, stating in feedback that some other players
“had a better grasp” of it, or “made a lot of mistakes”. Stereotypes, or at least
markers in the sociolinguistic sense (see Section 2.4.1, footnote 6), also developed,
with players recognising distinctive variants used by other players, or with the
other team as a whole. There are, then, multiple pressures both to accommodate
to every other player and to accommodate more to one’s teammates. Nor should
it be assumed that all players behaved the same; as seen in Section 7.2.2, at least
one team employing a Secret Handshake converged less than other players. Since,
moreover, there was individual variation in the strategies that players employed and
the degree to which they employed them, it seems likely that there should have been
individual variation too in the relative degree to which players imitated teammates
and to opponents, whether consciously or unconsciously.
This is as far as such speculation can get us; it is time to look at what light the
data can shed. The following analysis was undertaken: every time a non-canonical
word form (i.e. a form not included in the original wordlist) was used by both
partners in the chat stage of a round, the second user of the form was taken to be
accommodating to the first. Consider, for example, the following exchange (from
the Competitive condition of the third experiment), in which k is an abbreviated
variant of kazuru, meaning “I” and v is a variant of venu, meaning “want”:
Player 1: datu
Player 3: datu
Player 1: k hanete konura
Player 1: e kofu
Player 1: k hanete kofu
Player 3: hanate rogu
Player 1: v rogu
. . .
4As shown, for example, in Section 7.3.1, some variants arose in the game that were also
very hard to imitate accurately. These super-reliable markers represent a minority of variants,
however. More generally, it would be fascinating to carry out an iterated version of this game,
where variation between teams was maintained across generations.
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Player 3: k v kanura
Player 3: pafa v?
As can be seen, Player 1 uses these abbreviated forms from early on in the
round, and by the end of the round, Player 3 is also using them. With respect to
these variants, we could say that Player 3 is accommodating to Player 1. For any
variant in a round, the first such case of accommodation was categorised depending
on whether it was to a player’s teammate or opponent (subsequent uses of the
same variant in the same round were excluded to avoid the results being biased by
rounds in which the same variant was repeated multiple times). Tables 9.2 and 9.3
give a summary.5 The last row of each table gives the mean number of words
accommodated to per interaction.
As the tables show, the difference between accommodation rate to teammates
and accommodation rate to opponents seems mostly to be explained by frequency
of interaction; in the Low-frequency conditions (the second and fourth experiments),
players interacted a third of the time with their teammates and two thirds of the
time with their opponents, and this is reflected in accommodation rates, where
players accommodate roughly a third of the time to their teammates. Similarly, in
the High-frequency conditions (the first and third experiments), players interacted
half the time with their teammates and half the time with their opponents, and
the accommodation rate is not far off 50% for each. There is, however, a striking
difference in the third (High-frequency) experiment between the Competitive and
Cooperative conditions (in fact, this is the greatest difference between any two of
the average scores per round) showing that players accommodated more overall in
the Competitive condition (p < .001, based on a one-tailed binomial test). This
supports the second hypothesis given above, that the divergence in this condition
is explained by players’ accommodating more overall, rather than by players’ ac-
commodating more to their teammates specifically. The same is not seen in the
second experiment, where the difference between overall accommodation rate in
the Competitive and Cooperative conditions is rather smaller (p > .05). This sug-
gests, interestingly, that while a pressure to distinguish between teammates and
5These scores exclude data from the practice rounds, in which players had wordlists in front of
them.
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opponents increases the rate of accommodation, it requires that players be reason-
ably confident about making such distinctions. It is intriguing, however, that there
is a very slightly significant difference between conditions of the fourth experiment,
but in the other direction (p = .046). If this is meaningful, it is most likely related
to the particularly high rates of gift giving in this condition (see Section 8.3.1),
and it would be interesting in future research to investigate the connection between
generosity and accommodation more closely.
First Second Third Fourth
To teammate 144 73 163 23
(58.5%) (31.3%) (55.3%) (34.3%)
To opponent 102 160 132 44
(41.5%) (68.7%) (45.6%) (65.7%)
Total 246 233 295 67
Mean per interaction 1.76 1.55 1.84 1.12
Table 9.2: Summary of accommodation rate (Competitive condi-
tions)
Second Third Fourth
To teammate 72 87 29
(34.1%) (50.3%) (32.6%)
To opponent 139 86 60
(65.9%) (49.7%) (67.4%)
Total 211 173 89
Mean per interaction 1.41 1.08 1.48
Table 9.3: Summary of accommodation rate (Cooper-
ative conditions)
It seems that the first hypothesis also has some explanatory role to play. A
one-tailed binomial test shows a significant difference between the rate of accom-
modation to teammates and to opponents in the Competitive conditions of the first
and third experiments (first: S = 144, p < .01; third: S = 163, p < .05). This
suggests that players did accommodate significantly more to teammates in these
conditions than to opponents. There is no such significant difference in any other
condition of the experiment.
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In summary, it appears that the divergence seen in the High-frequency Com-
petitive conditions is chiefly to be explained by greater overall accommodation in
the Competitive conditions, but that players in these conditions also accommodate
somewhat more to teammates than to opponents. Intriguingly, however, a certain
level of confidence in one’s ability to distinguish between teammates and opponents
seems necessary before players increase their accommodation. This is surprising,
since it is beneficial to always seem to be on the same team as the interlocutor of
the moment. It may be that players simply do not see it in those terms, and treat
accommodating to their teammates as a different strategy from imitating their op-
ponents; and where they cannot make the necessary distinctions, they implement
neither.
9.5 Social selection
Section 2.4.3 introduced the term “social selection”, defined as the (conscious or
unconscious) selection of variants on the basis of their social significance. The role of
social factors in language change was discussed in rather more detail in Section 3.3,
and Chapter 4 discussed the degree to which selection need imply a memetic model
of cultural evolution, and concluded that this was not likely to be a useful model
except in a relatively limited context. This does not mean, however, that terms like
“selection” are any less useful, merely that it may be misleading to assume that the
processes involved are the same on the level of variants as in biological evolution.
So where did selection occur in the experiment? Most obviously, it occurred
in production. This is what is involved in Mimicry and in the accommodation
described in Section 9.4: players (whether consciously or unconsciously) used one
variant in preference to another to accommodate to their interlocutors, in some cases
(where this is identified as a deliberate strategy on the part of the players) explicitly
because this allowed them to be identified as members of a particular team. This
can be seen particularly in the Secret Handshakes: a particular greeting or response
is selected because of its significance in identifying the speaker’s affiliation.
We can be clear from the data and the participants’ feedback that this kind of
selection occurred. It is important to note, moreover, that it is contextual. As was
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made clear in Section 9.4, players accommodated to both teammates and opponents;
this means that social selection occurred with regard to the immediate discourse
context. Even when players thought they were talking to their opponents, and
recognised variants as being associated with those opponents, they selected these
variants. The selection bias here can be summed up in Keller’s (1994: 100) maxim
to “talk like the others talk”, on which Trudgill is so keen (e.g. Trudgill 2004: 27).
However, to the extent that players accommodated more to their teammates than
to their opponents (see Section 9.4), there was another overarching bias, to “talk
especially like your people talk”. This still involves differential selection of vari-
ants at the point of production; but it also involves a different kind of selection.
When a speaker selects a variant on the basis of its association with their inter-
locutor, it does not seem unreasonable to employ evolutionary terms and say that
the speaker’s language is adapting to its immediate environment. Given this, and
given that speakers apparently vary the degree to which they do this between en-
vironments, then there is also selection of accommodation-degree, and this in turn
will be influenced—in real life—by selection of environments.6
A further point is worth making, which recalls the discussion in Section 3.1.2.3.
It was stated above that a speaker’s language adapts to its immediate environment;
this, as noted, is selection at the point of production. Assuming that the variants
a speaker hears and produces influence their competence, and that there is some
frequency effect involved, then we should expect the various biases described above,
over time, to influence speakers’ competence—and the probability with which they
are likely to produce a given variant (since this is obviously not entirely predictable
on the basis of accommodation alone; speakers do not simply sound like their inter-
locutors). Since production depends on competence, of course, this will feed back
into interactions and exercise its influence on the variants that are propagated.
Debates about multilevel selection in biology boil down mainly to the question of
whether such phenomena as group selection and niche construction are necessary
levels of explanation, or if the data they are invoked to account for can be equally
6This was mentioned in Section 3.3.1.2 as the relatively uninteresting case of social factors
influencing accommodation indirectly. In the game, of course, players in the game were denied
the opportunity to choose who they were paired with. It would be interesting to give them this
opportunity in future research.
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well accounted for in a gene-centric view (Traulsen and Nowak 2006; West et al.
2007; Lehmann et al. 2007; Wilson 2007). Similarly, this section has discussed
various different evolutionary pressures on language change. While it may well be
the case that biological evolution is best understood from a gene’s-eye-view, it does
not seem true to say (as was discussed in Chapter 4) that the different pressures
operating on language change can be usefully reduced to a memetic account, even
if such an account can be a useful lens through which to view certain linguistic
phenomena.
9.6 Conclusion
The experiments described in this thesis provide good support for the role of a pres-
sure for social marking in speeding up language divergence. This pressure works
by influencing the degree to which speakers align with each other in communicative
interactions, which varies according to both social context and to the identity of
the interlocutor. This chapter also attempted to bridge the gap between the exper-
imental findings are real-world speech communities. It did not, however, attempt
to put the findings in the broader context of the evolution of language. This will




The experimental work described in Chapters 5 to 9 of this thesis is primarily about
modelling divergence in modern language. However, there are clear evolutionary
dimensions to it. First, as discussed in Section 9.3, a cultural-evolutionary perspec-
tive on the results of the experiments is illuminating, since it shifts a focus from
an interpretation that puts a potentially misleading emphasis on players’ strategies
(see also Chapter 4). Second, there is the biological perspective. Chapter 2 put
sociolinguistic marking in the context of the evolution of cooperation, giving an
ultimate explanation for why accents and dialects matter. That chapter did not,
however, go so far as to sketch an account of what this adds to our understanding of
how language evolved, in the sense of the biological evolution of the apparatus that
allows us to use language. Section 10.4 will go some way towards doing this, albeit
tentatively—the amount that can be said with certainty about our distant evolu-
tionary past is limited, particularly with regard to such a phenomenon as language,
which is unique in nature, and leaves no fossils (cf. Christiansen and Kirby 2003).
This does not mean, of course, that researchers have avoided such questions, and
Sections 10.1 to 10.3 will critically examine several claims about human evolution
relevant to the central question of this thesis.
10.1 A bias towards language
It seems likely that the drive to attach socially relevant interpretations to biolog-
ical and cultural cues is, at least in its most basic form, the result of biological
evolution. Human beings are far from being the only animals to do this (Beecher
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1982; Halpin 1991; Komdeur and Hatchwell 1999), and we must suppose that we
acquired the basic ability relatively early in our evolutionary history—most likely
as a development of kin-recognition mechanisms (see Section 2.2.1.1). It also seems
inescapable, however, that for modern human beings the behaviour has a signifi-
cant learnt component. The ways in which human beings can differ from each other
is enormous, and it would be ludicrous to expect to find all the details of human
variability written in the genome. Indeed, the most parsimonious assumption is
that human beings are equipped with a keen eye for variation and a bias towards
cooperating most with close kin and individuals with attributes in common with
kin.1 Knowledge of the relative reliability of specific kinds of cues can be acquired
through learning.
Experiments described in Kinzler et al. (2007) provide evidence for an innate
social bias towards traits associated with close kin. In these experiments, 5- to 6-
month-old infants from American-English-speaking families looked reliably longer
at images of adult women who had previously been seen speaking American English,
compared with women who had been seen speaking Spanish or American English
played backwards (the same effect was not seen where the women’s faces were
replaced with animated geometric shapes). Infants were also more likely to choose
toys apparently presented to them by speakers of their own language. This is good
evidence that preference for one’s mother’s language appears very young, though
that in itself is not new (see e.g. Moon et al. 1993). More interestingly, it shows
that this influences social behaviour. However, there is no reason on the basis of
this particular study to assume that language is a special case, and that the results
do not simply reflect a broader bias towards all traits associated with one’s mother,
or with close kin more generally.
A later study (Kinzler et al. 2009) presents evidence for an intriguing sub-
tlety in children’s social preferences. In these experiments, 5-year-old monolingual
American-English-speaking children from predominantly white neighbourhoods were
1There may, of course, be some (well defined) cases where interacting with outsiders is prefer-
able, such as in mate choice, where high levels of inbreeding can be harmful (see for example
Bateson 1983b, and in particular Bateson 1983a, for a discussion of this). This does not contra-
dict the main point.
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shown pairs of pictures of other children and, in most conditions, played a record-
ing, apparently of the children speaking. For each pair, the participants were asked
which of the two they would prefer to be friends with. There were two independent
variables: the race of the children (black, white, ambiguous) in the pictures and the
language of the recording (French, American-accented English, French-accented En-
glish, silence). Accent turned out to be more important than race for making friend
choices: specifically, children preferred to be friends with silent children of their own
race, but preferred native-sounding children of another race over foreign-sounding
children of the same race. Interestingly, children did not distinguish significantly in
their preferences between children speaking French and children speaking French-
accented English, suggesting that “children do not grant ‘native’ social status to
people who communicate in their native language, yet speak with a foreign accent”
(627).
These results are convincing. A further claim made by the researchers—that this
reflects an innate rather than a learned bias—is less convincing, however. It is,
after all, quite possible that the participants had had more exposure to children
of other races, presented as members of their own group, than to children with
different accents (on television and in films if not in real life). The researchers
were aware of this issue, and attempted to answer it with a further experiment that
replaced race with visual distortion (where the height:width ratio was changed from
1:1 to approximately 2:3), and found that children still preferred accent. This is
a clever response, but it remains problematic. First, the aim was presumably to
present the participants with images of children who look different from themselves
in an unfamiliar way. The example pictures given in the paper, however, look more
like distorted photographs of ordinary children than ordinary photographs of odd-
looking children. It is, moreover, likely that most of the children were somewhat
familiar with the idea of faces that had been visually distorted in this way, from
fairground mirrors, television, and so on. In any case, it cannot be assumed that
the children took the pictures to represent the children as they looked in real life; no
evidence is given that they did. It can be countered that, presented only with the
pictures and no linguistic cues, participants preferred to be friends with the children
in undistorted images. This is indeed notable; however, all it means is that, given
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no other information, the participants chose the children whose picture looked most
normal. They had, after all, to choose one of them. The second problem is that,
even if the participants accepted the distorted pictures as pictures of odd-looking
children, then their reaction can still be accounted for in terms of learnt behaviour.
Even if the participants had never seen faces distorted in this particular way before,
they might still have learnt that children who look different in some way should
still be accepted as part of the group (indeed, this is a message many parents are
very keen to instil in their children). In this context, after all, “race” means little
more than “salient physical difference”.
The researchers are not claiming that human children are innately biased to treat
head shape in particular as of low social importance. Instead, they are claiming two
things. In both Kinzler et al. (2007) and Kinzler et al. (2009) they claim that we
prefer to interact with individuals similar to our close kin, and that this bias can be
shown at a very young age, suggesting that it is innate. The existence of kin recog-
nition and imprinting mechanisms in other species (see e.g. Sluckin 1973; Hepper
1991) suggests that we should expect as much, and these studies provide compelling
evidence for it. Their second claim, made only in Kinzler et al. (2009), is more con-
troversial: that we are innately biased to pay particular attention to linguistic cues.
This remains entirely possible, and, if the bias exists, it could potentially be rela-
tively ancient—it may, for example, relate to conspecific vocalisations, rather than
to language per se. However, while the experiment described above shows elegantly
that such a specific bias exists in some form, at least in modern American children,
it does not succeed in showing satisfactorily that this is innate, rather than learnt,
behaviour. It is a very promising basis for a broader research project, however,
and if the results could be replicated cross-culturally, and accent compared with
a broader range of variables, both natural and artificial, then this would be very
interesting indeed. Such a study is, in fact, currently being planned by members of
the Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology.
Constructing a plausible evolutionary story remains a difficult task, and Kinzler
et al. are on very shaky ground when they attempt to relate their results to a more
specific account of human evolution:
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Given that social groups in ancient times likely differed in accent, but
not in race, children may be predisposed to rely primarily on accent to
guide their social evaluations of novel individuals. (Kinzler et al. 2009:
632)
This is indeed consistent with their findings. Unfortunately, not only would the
opposite scenario also be quite consistent with them, but the scenario described
would fit equally well, if not better, with different findings. We know from experi-
ence that human beings do not simply ignore race, and, indeed, there is experimental
evidence that amygdala responses to human faces are influenced by the interaction
between the race of the face and the race of the participant (Hart et al. 2000). As
noted above, we mean little more by “race”, in this context, than “salient physical
difference”; this is why Kinzler et al.’s (2009) use of distorted photographs made any
sense at all. All these experiments confirm that people take note of salient physical
difference, and they show that children take it into account in making friends. In
the scenario described above, any person who looked obviously different would very
clearly be an outsider, and could be recognised as such before they even opened
their mouths. We might thus expect race to remain a very important marker. If
we expect any distinction between race and accent given the scenario above, we
might perhaps expect that, if human beings were able to make subtler distinctions
in one of the two areas, it would be in accent. If people of different races are less
frequently encountered than people with different accents, then a strong associa-
tion of “otherness” with anyone who looks different would be enough; it would be
more important to distinguish between five subtly different accents. But even this
is not absolutely clear. What “differed in accent, but not in race” means is that the
level of linguistic variation was greater than the level of physical variation among
the individuals one would most often expect to encounter. In this case, if there
were any observable physical differences at all between social groups (and we might
expect there to be some, at least given some degree of reproductive isolation and
inbreeding), they would be particularly subtle, and more subtle than differences
in accent (since language changes faster than physical attributes). We might thus
expect human beings to have a subtler sense of physical than of linguistic differ-
ence! This is if we assume any innate difference at all. It might equally be the
case—and this would be more useful—that human beings are flexible enough to
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learn subtle distinctions in whatever system necessary. It is certainly quite clear
that subtler distinctions between accents must be learnt, and that speakers are not
immediately adept, on hearing two unfamiliar accents, in distinguishing well be-
tween them. American-English speakers, for example, tend to find it difficult on
arrival in the UK to distinguish between different British regional accents. It is
thus not clear that the scenario described above would lead us necessarily to expect
the results that Kinzler et al. (2009) found—it is not even clear what it would lead
us to expect with any confidence. Their findings are in fact more obviously con-
sistent with a scenario in which people have come to live in multiracial societies,
where racial variation is familiar, and no longer as reliable an indicator of being an
outsider as accent. This is the situation in the modern United States, where the
experiment was carried out. It is of course true, as suggested in Section 2.4.2 , that
accent is in general a more reliable indicator of group membership than biological
traits, but this does not mean that human beings are innately disposed to recognise
this fact.
Kinzler et al. (2009) present an elegant study with very interesting results. It
remains, moreover, entirely possible that human beings attach especial social im-
portance to conspecific vocalisations, or even to specifically linguistic behaviour.
This would be very interesting and, indeed, entirely consistent with the main claim
of this thesis. In the absence of good evidence, however, our default assumption
should be that we are biased only to prefer individuals who are like us in some way,
and that the relative importance we attach to different biological and cultural cues
is learnt rather than biologically evolved behaviour.
10.2 Selection for variability
The central question of this thesis concerns the influence of a biologically evolved
behaviour on cultural evolution. It is interesting to ask, however, whether there has
been influence in the other direction. In other words, has the usefulness of language
as a source of cultural markers led to a selective pressure on the biological evolution
of the language faculty; has there, in other words, been selection for variability?
Dunbar (2003: 230) argues that there has:
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After all, if language evolved to allow individuals to exchange informa-
tion, one might expect stability to be an important consideration . . .
since it is not beyond the wit of evolution to have produced language
structures that are more resistant (if not totally resistant) to corrup-
tion in this way, the implication is that the corruptibility of language is
precisely the whole point (and has been deliberately selected for).
Dunbar’s premise, that we should expect considerable pressure for an unchang-
ing language, echoes Labov (2001: 5): “It is hard to avoid the conclusion that
language, as an instrument of communication, would work best if it did not change
at all.” Obvious as this statement may sound, it is misleading. Even if we char-
acterise communication very narrowly as the transmission of propositions, changes
of environment as a result of migration or technological innovation uncontrover-
sially introduce a need for new lexical items. In fact, Labov notes that additions
of vocabulary, along with prestige forms, are a special case; his explicit focus is on
“alterations in the mechanism of the language” (ibid., 6). There are other reasons
to treat the lexicon as different: first, the addition of lexical items is not associated
with the same negative reactions as structural change (ibid.); second, it is accepted
in all linguistic theories that the lexicon can continue to be added to throughout
a speaker’s lifetime, while grammatical structure is assumed to consolidate at a
relatively early age, and to be rather resistant to change thereafter—though the
degree to which this is the case and the basis for the phenomenon is still very much
subject to debate (Newport et al. 2001; Abrahamsson and Hyltenstam 2008).
So while changes in the lexicon can be directly attributed to the need to express
new ranges of propositions—that is, to environmental change—it is harder to find
examples of structural linguistic change (Labov’s “alterations in the mechanism”)
that have the same basis. Models like that described in Kirby (1999) and Kirby
et al. (2008), however, assume just such a change: the introduction of structure
to an unstructured proto-language to allow speakers to express novel meanings. It
could of course be countered that this study is concerned with the very early stages
in human language—a movement from something we might not call language to
something that we would—and that Labov is concerned with modern language.
This is true, but extensions of paradigms by analogy (e.g. the regularisation of the
past tense of English climb) are a smaller-scale example of a very similar process,
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and these are both common in modern language and frequently deprecated in their
early stages.
Structural change can also result from changes in technology. The invention of
writing, like other forms of recording, allowed utterances to be preserved out of
context; it might be expected that this would lead to structural changes to com-
pensate for the lack of contextual information. Wray and Grace (2007) make this
argument, and suggest further that we should expect changes in population struc-
ture to be reflected in language change, as small close-knit speech communities have
more common ground to rely on and, therefore, less need for explicitness. Record-
ing technologies like writing can be seen as a special case of this, since they again
open up the language to a wider audience. Wray and Grace’s claim is supported
by empirical work by Lupyan and Dale (2010). It is a useful approach, since it may
help in answering a classic hard problem in historical linguistics: the “why then?”
question (cf. Weinreich et al. 1968). For example, the development of the different
ways of talking about the future in English are fairly well understood in terms of
grammaticalisation and semantic change. Considering, however, that speakers of
earlier forms of English managed to go about their daily business happily without
such forms, and that many millions of speakers of different modern languages do
likewise, it is not clear what, at different points in the history of English, changed
to make the need for such forms more compelling. It seems likely, to the extent that
there are identifiable factors that contributed to these tipping points, that changes
in technology and population structure are among them.
It is, then, far from obvious that even a language designed solely for commu-
nicating propositions should not be expected to change. Moreover, it is not the
case that language communicates only propositions. It seems reasonable to say, for
example, that a speaker with an Edinburgh accent is communicating their connec-
tion with Edinburgh. This hangs somewhat on one’s definition of communication.
Scott-Phillips (2008) is a useful discussion of how the term can be defined (with
respect not only to language), and concludes, in line with Maynard Smith and
Harper (2003), that it should be defined in adaptive terms, where both the signal
and the response must be adaptive. It may be argued on the basis of this definition
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that there is a difference between the two cases such that, while the transmis-
sion of propositional information is adaptive on both sides—and thus constitutes
a signal in the strict sense employed by Scott-Phillips (2008; see also Diggle et al.
2007)—the transmission of social information is best treated as a cue, where only
the response is adaptive. This is due to a (potential) difference in the intentions
of the speaker, who usually intends to transmit the propositional content, but may
not intend to transmit the social information. There are two responses to this: first,
the speaker may very well intend to convey the social information, so this is at least
a case of a signal some of the time; second, adaptation must be understood not
only on the level of the signaller’s intentions, but also on the level of the evolution
of the signal itself. In both cases, the association of a particular meaning with a
particular combination of sounds, be that meaning social or non-social, is the re-
sult of cultural-evolutionary processes. As it is hoped this thesis has shown, the
fact that a particular combination of sounds is associated with the social meaning
“Edinburgh” (or whatever) is the result of adaptation. It seems highly likely that
language is designed to transmit social information as much as it is designed to
transmit propositions.
The communication of social information relies on great variability in language.
Social groups change rapidly, at least by comparison with the rate of technological
change, and other environmental changes, through most of human history. To
some extent this is Dunbar’s point; Dunbar, however, contrasts two communicative
functions of language—communication of propositions, and communication of social
information—and suggests that one leads us to expect stability, while the other does
not. For reasons given above, however, it should not be assumed that this is the
case; it may be that human communication in general is best served by a relatively
high minimal level of variability.
Since this question concerns selective pressure for variability, it is on the earliest
stages of human language that we should again focus our attention. The claim
that there has been pressure for variability in human language can be understood
in two ways, depending on one’s model of how we came to have language (see also
Section 4.1):
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Biological faculty: the structure of human language is primarily the result of
biological evolution and language-specific selection. (e.g. Pinker and Bloom
1990; Hauser et al. 2002)
Cultural tool: Human language is primarily a cultural artefact. (e.g. Kirby 1999;
Everett in preparation)
The first model implies a relatively high level of genetic specification of the lan-
guage faculty. Within this model, “selection for variability” can be understood
either in terms of a barrier to greater specification (which seems to be what Dunbar
is implying), or as a pressure for a very highly specified system to becomes less
highly specified (cf. Deacon 2003; Yamauchi 2004). The second model implies that,
while humans must be biologically ready (or pre-adapted) for language, there is
relatively little in the genome that is language-specific; language, rather, arises out
of (and adapts to) more general cognitive and physical characteristics. To some ex-
tent, this model can be understood in terms of the “barrier to greater specification”
mentioned above. The advantage of this second account, however, is that it makes
the pressure for variability fundamental to the nature of language; in Kirby’s (1999)
model, for example, it is because of its ability to adapt culturally that language is
language. Its ability to adapt to later cultural innovations is more convincingly,
and more parsimoniously, explained with reference to this than on its own terms.
The question that lies behind these two models concerns the degree to which the
innate knowledge that constrains language learning is language-specific, and it has
been the subject of decades of fierce debate (see Sampson 2005 for a detailed dis-
cussion of the history and the main arguments involved). Answering it conclusively
will require a great deal of further research in psycholinguistics, neuroscience, and
genetics.
10.3 Bilingualism and maturational constraints
There has long been good evidence that children find it easier to acquire native-like
competence in a language than adults (Penfield and Roberts 1959; Lenneberg 1967).
Children are even able to acquire native-like competence in more than one language
at the same time, and without fundamental delay or confusion (Petitto and Holowka
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2002; De Houwer 2009). The standard explanation accounts for the difference in
terms of a “critical”, or “sensitive”,2 period during which individuals are better able
to acquire language. The fact that children are very good at acquiring native-like
competence and adults are not contributes significantly to the reliability of speech
patterns as a marker of identity. There is clearly no reason to suppose, however,
that the reduced ability among adults was selected for on this basis. Indeed, there
are very obvious advantages to being able to acquire native-like competence in
new languages and dialects in adulthood; the reduced capacity to do so must be
explained either in terms of some disadvantage to retaining the capacity (which may
relate to brain plasticity in general, rather than to language acquisition specifically)
or in terms of some inevitable reduction in plasticity, perhaps related to the physical
or chemical properties of the brain. The use of speech patterns as a marker must
be parasitic on this reduction; it cannot be the reason for it.
There are arguments, however, that the difference between children’s and adults’
ability to acquire language is related to human social behaviour. Hagen (2008a)
claims, on the basis of archeological evidence, that:
All human cultures have two moral codes; one that applies intra-culturally
(to “us”), and one that applies inter-culturally (to “them”, whoever they
may be). Throughout history, humans have been capable of committing
atrocities against others that would be considered morally offensive if
committed against one of their own. (55)
This leads him to the conclusion that, while it is is highly advantageous to rapidly
learn to communicate with other members of one’s own group from a young age,
“there would have been no substantial benefits” from being able to acquire new
languages later in life (57). This is clearly compatible with the evolutionary claims
made in this thesis, but not exclusively so. It is important to be able to distinguish
outsiders from insiders even if our default response to the former is not violent.
Hirschfeld (2008), indeed, is highly critical of Hagen’s claims and proposes to the
contrary that “the ease with which children simultaneously learn multiple languages
evinces a state of sustained cooperation and exchange between groups” (183; this is
2This term is preferred by some (e.g. Oyama 1978; Patkowski 1980) who wish to avoid making
a strong claim about the criticality of maturational constraints. It should also be noted that there
are in fact assumed to be different sensitive periods for different aspects of language (Neville et al.
1992); vocabulary acquisition continues in all speakers into adulthood.
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discussed in more detail in Hirschfeld 2001). Certainly he is right to point out that
what is meant by late bilingualism is often not what is meant by childhood bilin-
gualism: the former need only involve learning one language in adulthood, having
already acquired one’s first language; childhood bilingualism, on the other hand,
tends to involve simultaneous learning (ibid.). A lot depends on the importance of
this distinction. It certainly seems, on the face of things, that acquiring two lan-
guage simultaneously is an impressive task. If it is indeed impressive enough that
we must assume it to be an adaptation, then this points towards an evolutionary
history in which children were often required to be bilingual. As Hisrchfeld suggests
(ibid.), this seems, at least on the face of it, more consistent with peaceful movement
of women between communities than with the capture of women as “spoils of war”.
Hirschfeld may, however, be relying too much on the apparent impressiveness of
early bilingualism. Certainly within a generativist framework, which assumes that
children approach the acquisition task with a great deal of prior linguistic knowl-
edge, and that the differences between human languages are relatively superficial
(cf. Hagen 2008b: 187), acquiring two languages is not necessarily much harder than
acquiring one. In usage-based models, the main alternative to generative models,
we should also not expect children to be specifically adapted to learn more than
one language at once, since such models generally assume only minimal specific
adaptation to learn one! Until we can say with any real clarity how much harder
we should expect the task to be, we cannot assume that bilingualism provides ev-
idence for any special adaptation, or any basis for making inferences about our
evolutionary history.
Hagen demands less from language acquisition research: for his claim it is enough
that children do considerably better than adults at acquiring native-like compe-
tence; and this is held to be the case by most researchers in the field. Nor does his
claim rely on any special adaptation of the language faculty. The point is rather
that, while it may seem extremely useful for adults to be able to acquire native-
like competence in new languages, the ability is obviously not useful enough for
evolution to have given it to us. After all, adults are perfectly able to learn new
languages, at least well enough to engage in social interaction and trade. The cost
to a child of failing to learn any language is far far greater than the cost to an
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adult of failing to learn a second one. This, indeed, appears to be all we need
to explain the relative poorness of adult language learning, if we assume on more
general principles that brain plasticity decreases with age (see e.g. Nieto-Sampedro
and Nieto-Diáz 2005). There remain problems with Hagen’s argument, however.
First, as noted above, other historical scenarios are entirely compatible with the
data. All the data suggest is that the pressure to acquire native-like competence
in a new language has historically been significantly greater for children than for
adults. Yet, while Hagen is right that moral attitudes to within-group relations
are different from moral attitudes to between-group relations, this does not neces-
sarily mean that inter-group relations have been predominantly violent. A great
deal of entirely amicable interaction between groups is perfectly possible, provided
at least some members of both groups are able to get some sort of communication
off the ground, and there are ample examples in history of amicable, or at least
non-violent, interactions between different groups based on even quite rudimentary
levels of communication.
Indeed, all this seems to be somewhat missing the point: learning an entirely new
language is a difficult task even for children; as Hagen himself says (2008b: 187):
“In reality, it takes about two years of sustained (not occasional!) exposure for a
child to become a fluent speaker of a language.” In that time and with that kind of
exposure even an adult can get good enough at a language to get by. And getting
by is good enough; sounding like a native may get you accepted faster, but if you
are able to spend at least two years in sustained contact with members of another
culture, then the problem of being accepted is likely already to have been solved.
There is a related question: learning an entirely new language is uncontroversially
time-consuming; but what about learning a new accent or dialect of a language one
already speaks natively? This, moreover, is likely to be of more frequent use: two
groups who speak only slightly differing dialects of the same language are likely
to be in relatively close proximity to each other. It would surely be useful for
members of one group to occasionally pass themselves off as members of the other,
and any individual who could do so would surely have a selective advantage. Why
then, if this is likely to be advantageous, are adults not better at imitating non-
native accents? The most obvious reason is that learning to imitate another accent
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convincingly, without sustained exposure to it (by which time the learner has been
identified as an outsider), is a very difficult task that should not be underestimated.
There is simply a great deal to learn. The actors and impressionists who achieve it
today (and many do not achieve it well enough to satisfy a native) do so only with
considerable training and practice. This is why identification based on accent is so
reliable: an accent is a very complex marker. And it is important to get it right: to
get it almost right, but not quite, is to risk being identified as an impostor. This is
the worst result. It is better to be seen as an honest outsider than as a dishonest
intruder (see also Sections 2.4.2 and 9.4).
10.4 A tentative sketch
It is time to sketch some sort of evolutionary scenario for the origins of sociolinguistic
marking.
It seems to be the case, first of all, that human beings have a general ability to
observe physical and behavioural traits in conspecifics and compare them on the
basis of these with members of their own group. It seems furthermore to be the case
that we are biased towards interacting with individuals who are most like members
of our own group. There is good reason to suppose that both the ability and the bias
are innate, and that they considerably predate the emergence of Homo sapiens ; it
seems likely that they evolved originally for kin recognition, and mechanisms of kin
recognition are common throughout the animal kingdom (a detailed discussion can
be found in Hepper 1991). There is even some evidence for it, albeit controversial,
in plants (Dudley and File 2007; Klemens 2008; Dudley and File 2008). There is no
strong reason to suppose, therefore, that this behaviour is especially connected with
language. First, it seems likely that vocalisations were used for this purpose before
the advent of language; certainly vocal kin recognition occurs in other species—it
is the most common means of kin recognition in birds (Sharp et al. 2005), and it
occurs in many, though not all, species of primate (Halpin 1991: 245; Rendall et al.
1996). Second, vertebrates use kin recognition cues from all sensory modalities
(Halpin 1991: 231), and several different kinds of cue are used among primates
(ibid., 245–7); humans seem to use the same broad range of cues for this purpose
as they use to distinguish between individuals (ibid.).
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It remains possible, of course, that human beings are innately predisposed to pay
linguistic markers special attention, and Kinzler et al. (2007, 2009) provide evidence
for that. As discussed in Section 10.1, however, their results fall short of showing
conclusively that this is an innate bias. As was argued, to show that would require
a more extensive, and very carefully designed, cross-cultural study. If such a study
were to find that we treat linguistic cues as special, there would be an important
further step to be taken in unravelling the evolutionary story. This would be to
draw a distinction between language and speech; in other words, do we treat sign
language the same way? If not, and it turns out that we treat speech as special,
then the next question must be whether this is in fact true of speech, or of vocali-
sations more generally. While the sign-language question is relatively easy to test,
this one is not. While nonnative accents can be straightforwardly compared with
native ones, as in Kinzler et al.’s study, a four-way distinction of the sort shown in
Table 10.1 is tricky, since it is not entirely clear what should go in the bottom row—
so much of human vocalisation has been co-opted by language that it is not clear
what a truly non-linguistic human vocalisation would be that was culture-specific.
In-group Out-group
Linguistic Native accent Foreign accent
Non-linguistic Native babbling? Foreign babbling?
Table 10.1: Four kinds of human vocalisation
The best answer, it would seem, is to look beyond our species. As noted above,
there is evidence of vocalisation-based kin recognition in other primates (Halpin
1991: 245; Rendall et al. 1996); chimpanzees are also able to identify individuals on
the basis of their vocalisations (Izumi and Kojima 2004). If it can be shown that
both humans and chimpanzees treat vocal cues as especially reliable, then this is
good evidence for such a bias being pre-linguistic. Chimpanzees may even show
signs of social marking that goes beyond pure kin recognition: there is evidence for
group-specific variation in wild chimpanzees that cannot be explained by habitat
or genetics (Crockford et al. 2004).
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While Occam’s razor urges us to treat those aspects of human language that we
find in our closest relatives as prelinguistic in origin, the reverse is not true. We
cannot assume that if something is present in humans, but absent in other pri-
mates, that it evolved after we had language, or even that it evolved for language.
It is at least possible that the fine motor control human beings possess over their
speech organs did not evolve specifically for linguistic communication, but rather to
extend the range of possible non-linguistic vocalisations. Certainly, as researchers
of sign language are keen to point out, the vocal-auditory channel (pace Hockett
1960) is not a necessary component of language. Proponents of a gestural origin for
language3 have given various reasons why language is more likely to have started
with the hands than the mouth, including, most prominently, greater continuity
with other primates and a greater degree of iconicity, by which symbols might be
bootstrapped. This seems very plausible, but explaining the transition from sign
to speech in such a model is problematic (Levelt 2004; Emmorey 2005). The most
obvious argument, that this left the hands free for other things, is rather weak. It
is hard to believe that this can have constituted a significant enough evolutionary
pressure for the development of the fine motor control over the vocal tract enjoyed
by modern humans. This problem is avoided somewhat if the evolution of the vocal
tract is explained non-linguistically, allowing it to take over the burden of language
when it was already somewhat developed.4 Accounts based on sexual selection are
one possible explanation (cf. Miller 2001), and it has been argued convincingly,
through comparison with other species, that the descended larynx did not evolve
for speech, but as a means of exaggerating body size (Fitch and Reby 2001). There
is an advantage of parsimony in arguments by Dunbar (1993, 1996, 1998), which ex-
plain a great deal with reference to an increase in social group size. In this account,
human vocalisations took over some of the role of grooming, since this allowed more
individuals to be groomed more quickly and more cheaply. A growth in group size
also makes the identification of members of one’s own group a harder task, which
3Kendon (2002) provides a good review of the historical development of this hypothesis, which
is an old one (dating at least to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries with Bulwer 1644, and
Condillac 1746). Modern proponents include: Hewes (1976); Corballis (2002); Volterra et al.
(2004); Arbib (2005); Tomasello (2008).
4Though we should almost certainly envisage this not as a sudden transition, so much as a
parallel development where language evolved as a combination of gesture and speech (e.g. Brown
2010; Kendon 2010), and where the latter came eventually to dominate.
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makes reliable social markers more important (see Section 2.4.2). Potentially, a
consequent need for greater subtlety in this domain—along with other pressures, as
noted above—could have contributed to the development of finer control over the
vocal tract. Testing this hypothesis is a hard task, however, although comparative
studies (like Fitch and Reby 2001) are a potential way in, and computational simu-
lations could shed light on its plausibility. It is, it should be noted, very consistent
with the hypothesis discussed above that human beings are innately biased to pay
especial attention to linguistic (or at least vocal) markers.
The use that modern humans make of language as a source of social markers
almost certainly has its origins relatively deep in our evolutionary history, in ver-
tebrate kin-recognition mechanisms. This exploitation of language by modern hu-
mans, as shown in this thesis, influences its cultural evolution. It is plausible that it
also contributed something to the biological evolution of the vocal tract, although
this is uncertain, as is the question of whether human beings are biologically predis-
posed to treat linguistic markers as special. Answering these questions will require
a broad methodology, including cross-cultural experiments with human subjects,




The main question of this thesis, as stated in Chapter 1, is this:
Does the need for social marking lead languages to diverge into new
dialects (or at least hasten their divergence)?
The results of the experiments described in Chapters 5 to 9 suggest that the
answer is yes. Section 11.1 will summarise these results, Section 11.2 will summarise
how the divergence came about, and Section 11.3 will discuss possibilities for future
developments of this experimental paradigm (see Chapter 10 for a discussion of
possible future research employing different methods).
11.1 Summary of experimental findings
11.1.1 First experiment
The first experiment, described in Chapter 5, was a useful proof of concept, which
showed that language divergence could be modelled experimentally in the labora-
tory. The experiment drew inspiration from work by Nettle and Dunbar (1997) and
Nettle (1999), who investigated a very similar question computationally, and from
Garrod and Doherty (1994), who showed how the structure of paired interactions
in a community of participants can affect linguistic coordination.
Participants played a game in which they typed messages to each other, using
an artificial “alien language”, to negotiate to exchange resources. There were two
teams of two players in each game and there was an advantage to giving away
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resources to teammates. However, as the interactions were anonymous, players had
to infer from the way their interlocutors used the alien language whether or not
they were on the same team or not. The experiment showed that human beings
are capable of coming up with useful sociolinguistic markers in under an hour in a
language they have only just learnt, and suggested that this can lead the language
to diverge significantly into socially structured dialects.
The experiment also revealed the linguistic strategies participants used to play the
game. Three of these are relatively straightforward: Dialect Recognition involves
paying attention to how other speakers use language; Mimicry involves trying to
sound like other speakers; and Intentional Innovation involves deliberately creating
novel forms by which you stand out to others, or at least to your teammate. The
most interesting, and also the rarest, example of this was dubbed “Secret Hand-
shake”. This took the form of a greeting, or at least began with an utterance early
on in the dialogue. This timing matters, since it is clearly preferable to establish
identity as early as possible. However, what made it interesting was that the initial
utterance required a specific response. Since opponents could only see one half of
the handshake at any one time, imitating it was difficult. Such Handshakes, there-
fore, set up relatively secure environments in which players could exchange large
amounts of resources with their teammates without giving too much away to their
opponents.
However, although this first experiment produced impressive and intriguing re-
sults, it suffered from limitations. Players spent a relatively long time paired with
their teammates at the start of the game. Moreover, although players only inter-
acted with their teammates for half the game proper, this meant that every player
was paired for twice as long with the one player who was their teammate than with
either of their opponents. This did not allow a very certain conclusion to be drawn
that the divergence was due to social selection. It might be better explained with
respect to frequency of interaction.
11.1.2 Second experiment
In an attempt to resolve the questions left by the first experiment, the second
experiment (described in Chapter 6) reduced the number of rounds at the start
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of the game in which players were paired with their teammates and introduced a
control condition, in which all four players were on the same team. This experiment
also changed the frequency of interaction such that every player interacted with
every other player the same amount (in both conditions). This time there was
no divergence (in either condition), and players did poorly at recognising their
teammates. No team succeeded in establishing a Secret Handshake. This suggested
that the divergence seen in the first experiment may have been the result of the
relatively high frequency of interaction between teammates. However, the results
did not show for certain that frequency of interaction was the only factor to play a
role.
11.1.3 Third experiment
In order to see if a pressure for social marking might still also play a role, the third
experiment (described in Chapter 7) took the frequency of interaction from the first
experiment, but retained the control condition from the second. All of the strategies
used in the first experiment were used in this one, and two teams employed Secret
Handshakes; both of these scored very highly. As in the first experiment, there was
a significant tendency for divergence in the Competitive (two-team) condition, and
players did well at recognising their teammates. However, there was no significant
divergence in the Cooperative (one-team) condition, even though every player in
this condition was paired twice as long with one of the other players than with
either of the other two. This is good evidence that, while frequency of interaction
does play an important role in divergence, it is not sufficient on its own, at least
given the time available. A pressure for social marking, in other words, significantly
speeds up new-dialect formation.
11.1.4 Fourth experiment
There was a difference between the instructions for the second and the third exper-
iments: although both sets of instructions mentioned that there was a penalty for
unbalanced resources, those for the second experiment emphasised it more strongly.
In case this had influenced gift giving, a smaller-scale experiment was run that
used the instructions from the third experiment, but the frequency of interaction
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from the second. The results supported the findings with regard to the main re-
search questions, and players in the Competitive condition behaved very much like
those in the second experiment (although one team succeeded in employing a Secret
Handshake). However, the Cooperative condition stood out in comparison not only
with the Cooperative condition in the second experiment, but also with that in the
third: players were extremely generous. This appears to have been the result of
the presence of one particularly generous player in each game, who influenced other
players early enough for generosity to take off as a strategy.
11.2 How the divergence came about
Since all players learnt exactly the same alien language, but no two players ended
up using it in exactly the same way, all players can be said to have diverged from
each other. This came about through innovation, some of which was a deliber-
ate strategy. Players did not diverge equally and, where there was pressure for
players to identify their teammates and sufficient interaction between them, team-
mates converged more with each other than with their opponents. This unbalanced
convergence is how the between-team divergence came about (cf. Section 3.2).
The within-team convergence occurred through players’ accommodating to each
other. The Interactive-alignment model of dialogue (Pickering and Garrod 2004,
2006; Garrod and Pickering 2007) suggests that this should occur to an extent in
any interaction as a means of establishing common ground, and this partly accounts
for the convergence. However, there was variation in the degree to which players
accommodated to each other. In the High-frequency conditions (the first and third
experiments), where there was significant divergence, players not only accommo-
dated more overall in the Competitive than in the Cooperative condition, but also
accommodated more to teammates than to opponents. This strongly suggests that
linguistic variants had acquired social meaning, with players associating particular
variants (sometimes contextually, as in the case of Team 5a’s Secret handshake in
the first experiment; see Section 5.5.1) with particular players or teams, and that
this influenced how players used them. From a cultural-evolutionary point of view,
this can be understood in terms of selection (although, as discussed in Chapter 4
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and Section 9.5, not strictly in terms of replicator dynamics): players—whether con-
sciously or unconsciously—selected variants on the basis of their social significance,
which influenced the overall distribution of these variants.
This suggests, in line with Nettle and Dunbar (1997), Nettle (1999), Atkinson
et al. (2008), and Baxter et al. (2009), that social selection should not be ignored
in explanations of new-dialect formation and linguistic diversity, although it should
not be assumed that it must play an important role in every case of divergence,
since we should expect isolation and random drift to lead to the formation of new
dialects given enough time (cf. Livingstone and Fyfe 1999; Livingstone 2002; Dun-
bar 2003; Trudgill 2004, 2008a). Given increasing globalisation and long-distance
communication, however, few communities are now very isolated. We should ex-
pect greater contact to lower the rate of divergence though drift, and it may be
that social selection will need to play an increasing role in explaining divergence in
future centuries.
11.3 Future developments
Owing to the time and money involved in carrying out experiments with human
subjects, experiments tend to be somewhat small in scale. Those described in this
thesis are no exception, and a valuable future direction for the paradigm would be
to investigate how larger populations of participants affect results. Nevertheless,
this would undoubtedly lead experiments to take longer. A somewhat cheaper al-
ternative (although not without its own disadvantages in terms of loss of genuine
one-on-one interaction) would be an online version of the experiment that partici-
pants could engage in from their own homes, without an experimenter being present.
Since it would be difficult to arrange for enough participants to be present at the
same time, this would involve altering the paradigm somewhat, perhaps developing
it into a more abstract, even less directly linguistic form (ongoing work presented by
Dale and Lupyan 2010, involving the creation and interpretation of visual-signs for
real-world objects, suggests a potential framework). A complementary approach to
this would be computational simulation, which could be used to predict the results
of expanding the game.
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In fact, the game can be extended in two dimensions: synchronically (or pseudo-
synchronically), as described above, and diachronically. Although the wordlists and
cartoons given to players in the training stage of the game can be seen as modelling
the output of a previous generation of speakers, the experiment was not a model
of multi-generational change. It would therefore be very interesting to use the
linguistic output from one game as the input for the next, to form a diffusion chain
(cf. Kirby et al. 2008). The expectation is that the dialects would become more
stable over time. The most significant challenge in carrying out such an experiment
would lie in reducing the large amount of variation to a manageable size in such a
way that there remained a meaningful connection between one generation and the
next.
A further avenue to explore is in changing social dynamics. The teams in the
experiment were pre-determined: players had no idea who else in the room was
their teammate and had no choice in the matter; nor were they given any freedom
to switch allegiance over the course of the game. It would be very interesting
to introduce this freedom, particularly if players were given different dialects of
the alien language at the start of the game, which, it might be expected, would
lead them to disproportionately ally themselves with the players most like them
linguistically.
Finally, there is the question of individual differences. As can be seen in Chap-
ters 5 to 9, players varied in their generosity and conservativeness. As noted in
Sections 8.3.1 and 9.4, it would be interesting to investigate this further, particu-
larly the influence this may have on accommodation rates. Players also varied in
the linguistic strategies they employed, and it seems that human beings vary in the
degree to which they can (or tend to) imitate other people’s accents, learn second
languages, and accommodate to other speakers (Giles et al. 1973; LoCastro 2001).
The role of individual variation in this area, and its influence on cooperation, could
be investigated experimentally either by selecting participants on the basis of their
abilities or by artificially manipulating the degree to which they can accommodate.
This thesis presents not only a contribution to our understanding of how lan-
guages diverge, but also an experimental paradigm for its investigation which, it
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is hoped, will be used and adapted to contribute further to our understanding of




The following pages contain the instructions for each experiment (which were pre-
sented to the participants as a series of screens that they could click through at
their leisure) and the feedback questionnaires (which were given to them on pa-
per; response boxes are not included). To save space, example screenshots from
the instructions will be included here for the first experiment and the Cooperative
condition of the second experiment only, although they were used in all four of
them.
To save space, and for ease of use, the raw data from the experiments is not
included here, but is available online at: http://www.ling.ed.ac.uk/homes/gareth/
alien_language_experiment/data/
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A.1 Instructions for the experiments
A.1.1 First experiment
The game
Welcome, and thank you for taking part. You’re going to learn an alien language
and use it to play a game with some other people. Please read through the following
screens, which explain how it works. . .
You are living in a community on another planet. The whole community used
to get on, but recently it’s become divided into two groups of equal size. You are
a member of one of these groups. Each group has a certain amount of resources
available to it (like water and various kinds of food), and each member has a different
amount of each resource (you may even start the game with none of a particular
resource).
The object of the game is for your team to get more resources overall than the
other team. You can do this by trading them, and there is a very simple rule that
makes this useful:
Anything you give away is worth double to the person who
receives it.
So, for example, if you give 1 point of meat to someone, they will then have 2
new points of meat. This means that exchanging resources with your own team is
very good, as it increases your team’s overall total. Giving resources to the other
team is usually bad.
There is one other thing to bear in mind: you need to keep the resources balanced.
At the end of the game, the difference between your team’s highest scoring resource
and the lowest scoring resource will be deducted from the score. For example, if
you have 100 points of meat, less of everything else, and 0 points of something, you
will lose 100 points.
Each round of the game is a few minutes long and consists of three stages.
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Stage 1 – Chat
In the first stage, you use the communicator to negotiate with another player
for resources. If you don’t have any water, ask them for some. They will want
something in return.
But beware! The communicator is broken and will connect you randomly with
another player every round. It won’t tell you who you’re talking to, so you don’t
know if the other person is on your team or not. You’ll have to guess!
The decision you make is important for the next stage (which begins when the
timer runs out) . . .
Example of stage 1
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Stage 2 – Exchange
In the second stage, you can decide to give some of your resources to the player
you’ve just spoken to. If you think they’re on your team, giving them something is
probably a good idea. If you think they’re on the other team, it’s most likely a bad
idea. You’re perfectly free to just sit back and not give them anything.
If you do think they’re on your team and want to give them something, just click
“+” next to the resource you want to give. If you make a mistake or change your
mind, click“−” to take away a point.
You can give as much or as little as you like (provided you have the resources to
do so). Remember that every point you give counts as double to the receiver, and
to keep your resources balanced
Please also indicate how confident you are that this person is on your team. Your
choice in this case does not affect the game.
When the timer runs out, you move to stage 3. . .
Example of stage 2
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Stage 3 – Feedback
In the third stage, you finally find out if you’ve been dealing with a member of
your own team or a member of the other one. It also reminds you if you gave them
anything, and you find out if they gave you anything.
When the timer runs out, you start a new round from stage 1. This time, the
communicator might connect you with the same person again, or it might connect
you with someone new.
The game carries on like this for a set number of rounds. At the end of the game,
you get to see how well your team did. . .
Example of stage 3
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Stage 4 – Final results
This is the end of the game, and you get to see how well your team did.
Note the penalty for unbalanced resources. The difference between your team’s
greatest resource and smallest resource is deducted from the total score. This is
why it’s important to find out what a player needs before you give them something.
Example of stage 4
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Alien language
There is a catch. You are living on an alien planet, and you have to use an
alien language. You are not allowed to use English, or any other real
language, in the game. This is cheating, and you’ll be disqualified. You’re also
not allowed to use numbers.
You’ll learn the alien language in a moment, then you’ll play a practice round to
get used to the game, and then you’ll start the game properly.
Don’t worry at all about making mistakes in the language. The important thing
is to make yourself understood without using English (or any other real language).
And for your team to do well, of course.
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A.1.2 Second experiment: Competitive condition
The game
Welcome, and thank you for taking part. You’re going to learn an alien language
and use it to play a game with some other people. Here is how it works. . .
You are living in a community on another planet. The whole community used
to get on, but recently it’s become divided into two groups of equal size. You are
a member of one of these groups. Each group has a certain amount of resources
available to it (like water and various kinds of food), and each member has a different
amount of each resource (you may even start the game with none of a particular
resource).
The object of the game is for your team to get more resources overall than the
other team. You can do this by trading them, and there is a very simple rule that
makes this useful:
Anything you give away is worth double to the person who
receives it.
So, for example, if you give 1 point of meat to someone, they will then have 2
new points of meat. This means that exchanging resources with your own team is
very good, as it increases your team’s overall total. Giving resources to the other
team is usually bad.
There is one other thing to bear in mind: you need to keep the resources balanced.
At the end of the game, the difference between your team’s highest scoring resource
and the lowest scoring resource will be deducted from the score. For example, if
you have 100 points of meat, less of everything else, and 0 points of something, you
will lose 100 points (the difference between 100 and 0).
Each round of the game is a few minutes long and consists of three stages.
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Stage 1 – Chat
In the first stage, you use an on-screen communicator to negotiate with another
player for resources. If you don’t have any water, ask them for some. They will
want something in return.
But beware! The communicator is broken and will connect you randomly with
another player every round. It won’t tell you who you’re talking to, so you don’t
know if the other person is on your team or not. You’ll have to guess!
The decision you make is important for the next stage (which begins when the
timer runs out) . . .
Stage 2 – Exchange
In the second stage, you can decide to give some of your resources to the player
you’ve just spoken to. If you think they’re on your team, giving them something is
probably a good idea. If you think they’re on the other team, it’s most likely a bad
idea. You’re perfectly free to just sit back and not give them anything.
If you do think they’re on your team and want to give them something, just click
“+” next to the resource you want to give. If you make a mistake or change your
mind, click“−” to take away a point.
You can give as much or as little as you like (provided you have the resources to
do so).
Please also indicate how confident you are that this person is on your team. Your
choice in this case does not affect the game.
There are two things to remember:
• Every point you give counts as double to the receiver
(this is how your team can accumulate points).
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• You need to keep your team’s resources balanced (there
is a penalty at the end if you have too much of one resource
compared to others).
When the timer runs out, you move to stage 3. . .
Stage 3 – Feedback
In the third stage, you finally find out if you’ve been dealing with a member of
your own team or a member of the other one. It also reminds you if you gave them
anything, and you find out if they gave you anything.
When the timer runs out, you start a new round from stage 1. This time, the
communicator might connect you with the same person again, or it might connect
you with someone new.
The game carries on like this for a set number of rounds. At the end of the game,
you get to see how well your team did. . .
Stage 4 – Final results
This is the end of the game, and you get to see how well your team did.
Note that there is a penalty for unbalanced resources. The difference between
your team’s greatest resource and smallest resource is deducted from the total score.
This is why it’s important to find out what a player needs before you give them
something.
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Alien language
There is a catch. You are living on an alien planet, and you have to use an
alien language. You are not allowed to use English, or any other real
language, in the game. This is cheating, and you’ll be disqualified. You’re also
not allowed to use numbers.
You’ll learn the alien language in a moment, then you’ll play a practice round to
get used to the game, and then you’ll start the game properly.
Don’t worry at all about making mistakes in the language. The important thing
is to make yourself understood without using English (or any other real language).
And for your team to do well, of course.
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A.1.3 Second experiment: Cooperative condition
The game
Welcome, and thank you for taking part. You’re going to learn an alien language
and use it to play a game with some other people. Here is how it works. . .
You are living in a community on another planet. Each member of the community
has a set of resources (water and various kinds of food) in different amounts (you
may even start the game with none of a particular resource). The object of the
game is to increase the amount of resources your community has overall. You can
do this by trading resources, and there is a very simple rule that makes this useful:
Anything you give away is worth double to the per-
son who receives it.
So, for example, if you give 1 point of meat to someone, they will then have 2
new points of meat.
However, there is a catch: you need to keep the resources balanced. At the end
of the game, the difference between the community’s highest scoring resource and
the lowest scoring resource will be deducted from the score. For example, if you
have 100 points of meat, less of everything else, and 0 points of something, you will
lose 100 points (the difference between 100 and 0).
Each round of the game is a few minutes long and consists of three stages.
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Stage 1 – Chat
In the first stage, you use an on-screen communicator to negotiate with another
player for resources. If you don’t have any water, ask them for some. They will
probably want something in return.
However, the communicator is broken and will connect you randomly with an-
other player every round. It won’t tell you who you’re talking to.
Example of stage 1
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Stage 2 – Exchange
In the second stage, you can decide to give some of your resources to the player
you’ve just spoken to.
If you want to give them something, just click “+” next to the resource you want
to give. If you make a mistake or change your mind, click “−” to take away a point.
You can give as much or as little as you like (provided you have the resources to
do so).
There are two things to remember:
• Every point you give counts as double to the receiver
(this is how the community can accumulate points).
• You need to keep your community’s resources balanced
(there is a penalty at the end if you have too much of one resource
compared to others).
When the timer runs out, you move to stage 3. . .
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Example of stage 2
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Stage 3 – Feedback
In the third stage, you are reminded what you gave the other player and you find
out if they gave you anything.
When the timer runs out, you start a new round from stage 1. This time, the
communicator might connect you with the same person again, or it might connect
you with someone new.
The game carries on like this for a set number of rounds. At the end of the game,
you get to see how well the community did overall. . .
Example of stage 3
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Stage 4 – Final results
This is the end of the game, and you get to see how well you did.
Note the penalty for unbalanced resources. The difference between your greatest
overall resource and smallest resource is deducted from the total score. This is why
it’s important to find out what a player needs before you give them something.
Example of stage 4
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Alien language
There is a catch. You are living on an alien planet, and you have to use an
alien language. You are not allowed to use English, or any other real
language, in the game. This is cheating, and you’ll be disqualified. You’re also
not allowed to use numbers.
You’ll learn the alien language in a moment, then you’ll play a practice round to
get used to the game, and then you’ll start the game properly.
Don’t worry at all about making mistakes in the language. The important thing
is to make yourself understood without using English (or any other real language).
And for your community to do well, of course.
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A.1.4 Third and fourth experiments: Competitive condition
The game
Welcome!
You are a member of a community of colonists on a distant planet. The whole
community used to get on, but recently it’s become divided into two groups of equal
size. You are a member of one of these groups. Each group has a certain amount
of resources available to it (like water and various kinds of food), and each member
has a different amount of each resource.
Your goal is to get more resources than the other team. You can do this by
trading them, and there is a very simple rule that makes this useful:
Anything you give away is worth double to the per-
son who receives it.
For example, if you give 1 point of meat to someone, they will then have 2 new
points of meat. This is 1 new point of meat for your whole team! This means that
exchanging resources with your own team is very good. And giving resources to the
other team is usually bad.
You should also try to keep your team’s resources balanced. At the end of the
game, the difference between your team’s highest scoring resource and their lowest
scoring resource will be deducted from the total score.
The game consists of a series of rounds, each of which consists of three stages.
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Stage 1 – Chat
In the first stage, you use an on-screen communicator to negotiate with another
player for resources. Here you can tell the other player what you have to exchange,
and what you want from them.
But beware! The communicator is broken and will connect you randomly with
another player every round. It won’t tell you who you’re talking to, so you don’t
know if the other person is on your team or not. You’ll have to guess!
The decision you make is important for the next stage (which begins when the
timer runs out). . .
Stage 2 – Exchange
In the second stage, you can decide to give some of your resources to the player
you’ve just spoken to. If you think they’re on your team, this is probably a good
idea; if you think they’re on the other team, this is probably a bad idea.
If you want to give something, click “+” next to the resource you want to give.
If you make a mistake or change your mind, click “−” to take away a point.
You can give as much or as little as you like.
Please also indicate how confident you are that this person is on your
team (your choice in this case does not affect your score)
And remember: Every point you give counts as double to the receiver (this is
how your team can accumulate points).
When the timer runs out, you move to stage 3. . .
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Stage 3 – Feedback
In the third stage, you finally find out if you’ve been dealing with a team-mate or
an opponent. You’re also reminded what you gave them, and told what they gave
you.
When the timer runs out, you start a new round from stage 1. This time, the
communicator might connect you with the same person again, or it might connect
you with someone new.
The game carries on like this for a set number of rounds. At the end of the game,
you get to see how well your team did. . .
Stage 4 – Final results
This is the end of the game, and you get to see how well your team did. The score
you see is for your whole team, not just you. Note the penalty for unbalanced re-
sources. The difference between your team’s greatest resource and smallest resource
is deducted from the total score, so it’s good to find out what your team-mate needs
before you give them anything.
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Alien language
One final thing: You are not allowed to use English, or any other real
language, in the game. This is cheating, and you’ll be disqualified. You also
can’t use numbers.
Instead, you’re going to use an alien language. You’ll learn that in a moment;
then you’ll play a practice round to get used to the game; and then you’ll start the
game properly.
Don’t worry at all about making mistakes in the language. As long as you
don’t use a real language, you can do what you like with the alien words. The
important thing is to make yourself understood without using English (or any other
real language). And for your team to do well, of course.
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A.1.5 Third and fourth experiments: Cooperative condition
The game
Welcome!
You are a member of a community of colonists on a distant planet. Each member
of the community has a certain amount of resources (like water and various kinds
of food), in different amounts.
Your goal is to increase the amount of resources your community has overall. You
can do this by trading them, and there is a very simple rule that makes this useful:
Anything you give away is worth double to the per-
son who receives it.
For example, if you give 1 point of meat to someone, they will then have 2 new
points of meat. This means 1 extra point of meat for the whole community!
You should also try to keep your team’s resources balanced. At the end of the
game, the difference between your community’s highest scoring resource and their
lowest scoring resource will be deducted from the total score.
The game consists of a series of rounds, each of which consists of three stages.
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Stage 1 – Chat
In the first stage, you use an on-screen communicator to negotiate with another
player for resources. Here you can tell the other player what you have to exchange,
and what you want from them.
But beware! The communicator is broken and will connect you randomly with
another player every round. It won’t tell you who you’re talking to.
Stage 2 – Exchange
In the second stage, you can decide to give some of your resources to the player
you’ve just spoken to.
If you want to give something, click “+” next to the resource you want to give.
If you make a mistake or change your mind, click “−” to take away a point.
You can give as much or as little as you like.
And remember: Every point you give counts as double to the receiver (this is
how your community can accumulate points).
When the timer runs out, you move to stage 3. . .
Stage 3 – Feedback
In the third stage, you’re reminded what you gave the other player, and told
what they gave you.
When the timer runs out, you start a new round from stage 1. This time, the
communicator might connect you with the same person again, or it might connect
you with someone new.
The game carries on like this for a set number of rounds. At the end of the game,
you get to see how well your community did. . .
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Stage 4 – Final results
This is the end of the game, and you get to see how well your community did.
The score you see is for your whole community, not just you. Note the penalty for
unbalanced resources. The difference between your community’s greatest resource
and smallest resource is deducted from the total score, so it’s good to find out what
the other person needs before you give them anything.
Alien language
One final thing: You are not allowed to use English, or any other real
language, in the game. This is cheating, and you’ll be disqualified. You also
can’t use numbers.
Instead, you’re going to use an alien language. You’ll learn that in a moment;
then you’ll play a practice round to get used to the game; and then you’ll start the
game properly.
Don’t worry at all about making mistakes in the language. As long as you
don’t use a real language, you can do what you like with the alien words. The
important thing is to make yourself understood without using English (or any other
real language). And for your community to do well, of course.
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A.2 Feedback questionnaires
A.2.1 First experiment
1. What do you think this experiment was about?
2. How well do you think you did in the game?
3. Were you able to tell if you were chatting to someone on your own team? And
if so, how?
4. What did you do if you thought they were on the other team?
5. Did you ever try to trick the other team? How?
6. Did you make any deliberate changes to the alien language?
7. Please list any specific strategies you used, or tried to use, during the game,
and say how successful you think they were.
8. Is there anything else you’d like to comment on?
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A.2.2 Second experiment
Competitive condition
1. What do you think this experiment was about?
2. How well do you think you did in the game?
3. Were you able to tell if you were chatting to someone on the same team as
you? And if so, how?
4. What did you do if you thought they were on the same team?
5. Were you able to tell if you were chatting to someone on the other team? And
if so, how?
6. What did you do if you thought they were on the other team?
7. Did you ever try to trick the other team? How?
8. Did you make any deliberate changes to the alien language?
9. Please list any specific strategies you used, or tried to use, during the game,
and say how successful you think they were.
10. Is there anything else you’d like to comment on?
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Cooperative condition
1. What do you think this experiment was about?
2. How well do you think you did in the game?
3. What did you find most difficult?
4. Did you make any deliberate changes to the alien language?
5. Please list any specific strategies you used, or tried to use, during the game,
and say how successful you think they were.
6. Could you ever tell (or guess) anything about who you were talking to (gender,
age, identity, nationality etc.)? If so, how?
7. Is there anything else you’d like to comment on?
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A.2.3 Third and fourth experiments
Competitive condition
1. What do you think this experiment was about?
2. How well do you think you did in the game?
3. Were you able to tell if you were chatting to someone on the same team as
you? And if so, how?
4. What did you do if you thought they were on the same team?
5. Were you able to tell if you were chatting to someone on the other team? And
if so, how?
6. What did you do if you thought they were on the other team?
7. Did you ever try to trick the other team? How?
8. Did you make any deliberate changes to the alien language?
9. Please list any specific strategies you used, or tried to use, during the game,
and say how successful you think they were.
10. Could you tell (or guess) anything about who your team-mate was (e.g.
gender, age, identity, nationality etc.)? If so, how?
11. Is there anything else you’d like to comment on?
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Cooperative condition
1. What do you think this experiment was about?
2. How well do you think you did in the game?
3. What did you find most difficult?
4. Did you start to recognise other players by their use of the alien language? And
if so, how?
5. Did you make any deliberate changes to the alien language?
6. Please list any specific strategies you used, or tried to use, during the game,
and say how successful you think they were.
7. Could you ever tell (or guess) anything about who you were talking to (gender,
age, identity, nationality etc.)? If so, how?
8. Is there anything else you’d like to comment on?
Appendix B
Alien language cartoons
For the last five of the ten minutes players had to learn the alien language, they
were given 12 cartoons to look at, several of which included full sentences in the
language, giving them some idea of possible syntax. Figure B.1 shows how they
were presented on screen. Players could click on the thumbnails to see them full-
size. The seven cartoons that were not simply pictures of the resources are shown
in larger scale on the following pages.
Figure B.1: Index of cartoons
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Figure B.2: Cartoon: “hello!”
Chapter B. Alien language cartoons 231
Figure B.3: Cartoon: “I have fish”
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Figure B.4: Cartoon: “do you want fruit?” “Yes!”
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Figure B.5: Cartoon: “have much corn”
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Figure B.6: Cartoon: “no need meat!”
Chapter B. Alien language cartoons 235
Figure B.7: Cartoon: “I have no water”
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Figure B.8: Cartoon: “goodbye and thanks!”
Appendix C
Calculating divergence
The divergence reported in this thesis is based on a comparison of intra-team and
inter-team convergence. A condition showing significant divergence, therefore, is a
condition in which players are significantly more like their teammates than their
opponents in their use of the alien language.
Players were compared on the basis of variable sets. A variable set is a set of all
the word-forms used in a particular game with a particular meaning, together with
a frequency count for every player. The example from the first experiment (see
page 92) is repeated below (Table C.1), where the number in brackets represents
the proportional frequency: that is, the raw frequency count for that word divided
by the sum of frequencies for that player in that set. Player 3, for example, used
three different words to express the meaning “want/need”. The frequency counts
for these three words is 21, so the proportion for the form rohapi, which was used
11 times, is 11 / 21 = 0.52.
Team 1 Team 2
Player 1 Player 2 Player 3 Player 4
rohapi 34 (.97) 27 (.93) 11 (.52) 10 (.48)
roahpi 1 (.03) 2 (.07) 0 (0) 0 (0)
ropahi 0 (0) 0 (0) 9 (.43) 9 (.43)
rophui 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (.05) 0 (0)
wohapi 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 2 (.09)
Table C.1: Example variable set from first experiment
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Team 1 Team 2
Player 1 Player 2 Player 3 Player 4
yaji 23 (.82) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
jadi 0 (0) 17 (.37) 0 (0) 0 (0)
yadi 0 (0) 25 (.54) 0 (0) 0 (0)
yagi 5 (.18) 4 (.09) 69 (1) 56 (1)
Table C.2: Example variable set scoring 0.5
Team 1 Team 2
Player 1 Player 2 Player 3 Player 4
Player 1 0 .455 .41 .41
Player 2 .455 0 .455 .455
Player 3 .41 .455 0 0
Player 4 .41 .455 0 0
Table C.3: Mean distances from example set in Table C.2
For every condition of the experiment, all the variable sets were gathered together
and scored. This score was based on the mean Euclidean distance between players
(that is, between the proportional frequency counts, rather than the raw counts).
If every player in a given set was closer to their teammate than to either opponent,
the set was scored 1 (as was the case for the set in Table C.1). If this was true
of both members of one team, but not the other, then the set was scored 0.5 (see
Tables C.2 and C.3). Otherwise the set was scored 0. The sum of these scores gave
an overall divergence score for each condition. To test whether or not this overall
score was significant, a Monte Carlo test was carried out. This meant shuffling
all the raw frequency counts, recalculating the proportions, and rescoring all sets
thousands of times (in fact every dataset was shuffled and rescored 10,000 times, a
figure that balanced reliability with practicality).1 In fact there were three ways in
which the data could have been shuffled:
1. Any frequency score can appear anywhere else in the entire dataset;
2. Any frequency score can appear anywhere else in the same variable set;
3. Any frequency score can appear anywhere else in the same row.
1See Edgington (1995) for a good introduction to randomisation tests, including arguments in
favour of their wider use on the basis of their transparency, applicability, and versatility—they
can be tailored to a very broad range of problems.
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There are advantages and disadvantages to each of these. The first is the simplest.
However, information about the structure of variable sets is lost with this method: in
every set, certain variants are particularly favoured, and others (such as the results
of occasional typing errors) not. This is an important fact that is not captured
in the first model. The third maintains this structure, but there is a danger here
that the results might be skewed by data from one game. The second measure is
an unhappy compromise, since it has both the disadvantages, but neither of the
advantages, of the first and third methods. As it happens, the dilemma of which
to choose need not concern us too much: all three methods produce similar results
(see Tables C.4 and C.5). Results reported in the main body of the thesis are based




First experiment 0*** 0*** 0***
Second experiment .827 .887 .566
Third experiment .006** .023* .001**
Fourth experiment .43 .644 .364




Second experiment 1 .999 .937
Third experiment .447 .616 .154
Fourth experiment .579 .578 .306





This appendix includes two papers published before completion of the thesis: Roberts
(2008) and Roberts (2010).
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Language and the freerider problem: an experimental paradigm 
 
Gareth Roberts 
Language Evolution and Computation Research Unit, 





Change and variation, while inherent to language, might be seen as running 
counter to human communicative needs. However, variation also gives language 
the power to convey reliable indexical information about the speaker. This has 
been argued to play a significant role in allowing the establishment of large 
communities based on cooperative exchange (Enquist and Leimar 1993; Dunbar 
1996). There has, however, been little experimental investigation of this hypothesis. 
This paper presents a preliminary study intended to help fill this gap. Participants 
played a team-game online in which they negotiated anonymously for resources 
using an artificial language. Players succeeded in using linguistic cues to distinguish 
between their team-mates and their opponents and this led to the development of 
between-team variation in the use of the language. 
 
Keywords: Language evolution; Language change; Freerider problem; Historical 
linguistics; Sociolinguistics; Cultural evolution; Experimental 
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DRAFT COPY – PLEASE DO NOT CITE WITHOUT PERMISSION OF AUTHOR 
 
Much recent work has recognised that language is an adaptive system in its own right (see e.g. 
Deacon 1997/1998, Steels 2000, Kirby and Hurford 2002, Christiansen and Chater 2007). This 
has deep roots – the image of language as a living thing was popular among eighteenth- and 
nineteenth-century linguists, who took it in some cases to fanciful extremes (such as Jacob 
Grimm’s Sprachgeist).  In modern evolutionary linguistics, however, it represents a change of 
focus: rather than assuming that language is highly genetically specified and focussing attention 
on the selective pressures that led to this, the cultural evolutionary standpoint shifts some of the 
burden of explaining linguistic structure onto the pressures acting on language itself. For 
example, in acquiring a language, an infant is exposed to only a small part of it. This has 
traditionally raised questions as to the cognitive mechanisms involved in forming correct 
generalisations about the language. From a cultural evolutionary viewpoint, however, the 
“transmission bottleneck” (for an early use of this term see Deacon: 110) helps explain 
something about its structure. Language is forced to change to be learnable; low-frequency 
irregularities disappear (cf. Lieberman et al. 2007; Pagel et al. 2007); and systematicity increases 
(Kirby 2000; Cornish 2006). This contributes to the appearance of design. 
Language, however, changes rather more than good design would appear to dictate. As 
Labov (2001: 6) puts it: 
 
Linguists and language teachers get some employment from the results of language divergence. 
But that seems to be about all the benefit there is to language change. It is hard to avoid the 
conclusion that language, as an instrument of communication, would work best if it did not 
change at all. 
 
To some extent this is just the way it has to be: in any cultural system, drift is inevitable. 
In addition, we should not expect the pressures acting on language to be equal in all cases. 
Various factors, like the invention of writing, or the degree to which a language is used for intra-
group versus inter-group communication, can be expected to have a significant impact (Wray 
and Grace 2007). But this leaves unanswered the question of why language should not be more 
genetically specified in the first place. It would seemingly be of enormous advantage to be able to 
communicate instantly with conspecifics without the need for interpreters. Yet, while a certain 
amount of the structure of language may be hardwired, so much of language is culturally 
transmitted that dialects only a few miles apart can diverge sufficiently in a relatively short time 
to cause serious communication difficulties. There are several factors involved here. One is the 
time available: there may simply not have been enough for greater hardwiring to have evolved 
(for a proposed “speed limit” in biological evolution, see Worden 1995). Moreover, it should not 
be assumed that, given enough time, such hardwiring would occur: as Tooby and Cosmides 
(1990: 21) point out, the “evolutionary process can be said to store information necessary for 
development in both the environment and the genes.” Indeed, the speed of cultural evolution 
relative to biological evolution means that language can rapidly adapt to a changing environment: 
something that is of great benefit to its speakers (cf. Worden: 148). It is also not clear how much 
benefit there would be to an individual whose language was much more genetically specified. 
There has recently been evidence that combinations of certain alleles may bias a population 
towards speaking, or not speaking, a tonal language (Dediu and Ladd 2007). However, this is a 
case of genes being selected for reasons almost certainly unrelated to language; the linguistic bias 
(if that is indeed what explains the correlation) is an accidental by-product. It is, moreover, only a 
small bias, whose effects are felt only after many generations. Importantly, any cognitively 
normal human infant can acquire any human language, be it tonal or non-tonal. It is hard to see 
why a stronger genetic bias, strong enough to noticeably influence the speech patterns of a 
particular individual, would be selected for, unless linked to some other beneficial phenotypic 
trait. Or what of an English-biased mutant born into an English-speaking community? The only 
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obvious benefit would be an ability to acquire the language faster. Yet this benefit would have to 
be great enough for the allele to spread through the population before the speech patterns of 
that population changed to the point that it was no longer beneficial.   
There is something else involved. Variation and change are useful to us. Any speaker of a 
language knows that not everyone pronounces and uses words in quite the same way; any 
speaker also knows that such variation has great social significance. Labov claims that an 
unchanging language would be a better “instrument of communication”, but all utterances 
communicate more than the sum meaning of their words and syntax. We all belong to various 
social groups, based on origin, profession, class and so on; and when we speak, we transmit 
information about our membership of such groups. This would be impossible without variation, 
the result of change. It is only because Britons and Americans tend to speak differently that the 
concept of an “American accent” is meaningful.1 Significantly, this kind of indexical2 
information is a good deal more reliable than the propositional kind: any English speaker can 
say, “I was born and raised in Australia.” Only a minority can say it in such a way that an 




It is hardly disputed that human beings exploit the variation inherent in language and employ it 
as a marker; but to what end? There is good reason to suppose that this ability to signal one’s 
membership of a group (however that may be defined), and to recognise others’ membership, 
has been vital in allowing the foundation and maintenance of communities based on cooperative 
exchange.3  Reciprocal altruism relies on the ability to detect and deal with “freeriders”, or 
defectors, who exploit the cooperative behaviour of others. Punishment and reputation play a 
crucial role in minimising the effect of such behaviour on the part of other community members 
(Axelrod 1984/1990: 150-4; Boyd et al. 2003). Even here, language plays an important role, as a 
means of reporting who did what to whom (Dunbar 1996). Reputation and gossip, however, are 
of little use in dealing with freeriders from outside the community, who may not stick around 
long enough to face the consequences (Enquist and Leimar 1993). An obvious tactic on the part 
of the community members in this case is to act altruistically only towards other members of the 
group. As one’s group increases in size, however, distinguishing between insiders and outsiders 
becomes very difficult. Some kind of shared marker is a prerequisite for the establishment of a 
large cooperative network. 
 The ideal marker must be costly to obtain and hard to imitate; otherwise it is unreliable. 
However, it must also be sufficiently flexible to cope with inevitable changes in the structure of 
communities, and sufficiently salient to function usefully as a marker. Genetically encoded 
markers may fulfil the first two criteria well, but they are highly inflexible. Cultural markers like 
clothing and tattoos are more flexible, but easier to imitate. By comparison, the patterns of an 
individual’s speech are extremely well suited to this purpose4: they are salient, flexible and close 
to inalienable. They are acquired young and are hard to change in adulthood. Indeed, the only 
reliable means of acquiring them is through prolonged exposure. Moreover, people are capable 
of multiple competencies: at least if we are exposed to them early enough, we can all acquire 
more than one set of speech patterns and switch between them according to context.  
                                                
1 Of course, the term “American accent” actually stands for a multitude of accents, based on narrower geographical 
definitions, social divisions and so on. 
2 I use the term not in the Piercian sense, contrasted with iconicity and symbolicity, but in the sociolinguistic sense, 
in which a particular linguistic feature indexes something with social meaning. 
3 One might speculate that it played a more important role, earlier in our evolutionary history, in identifying kin.  
4 This is not to say that the other things mentioned are never used as markers of group identity in the context 
described. They all almost certainly are, along with other things. The point is that language does the job especially 
well. 
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 Several claims are being made here: 
 
• To distinguish between insiders and outsiders to their group, human beings exploit 
variation in cultural (and biological) systems. 
• We have evolved to be highly adept at spotting and interpreting the cues provided by 
such variation. 
• This helps us to maintain social networks based on cooperative exchange. 
• This has an effect on the evolution of cultural systems (and, potentially, biological traits). 
• Language is especially well suited to this purpose; it is, indeed, the cultural system best 
suited to it. 
 
In cases where there is pressure to distinguish between insider and outsider, we should 
therefore expect human beings to be adept at using linguistic cues to make such distinctions; we 
should further expect this to have a linguistic effect, specifically divergence into different dialects 
(as well, potentially, as the apparently superfluous retention of irregularities and “difficult” 
features that might distinguish non-natives from natives; cf. Wray and Grace 2007).  
It is important to note what claims are not being made: first, although this may be a 
trigger for linguistic change, and potentially an important one, it should not be assumed to be the 
only one; other factors – like analogy, phonetic reduction, misanalysis, and so on – are clearly 
involved. The degree to which human beings actually innovate linguistically for the sake of 
creating a marker (as opposed to selecting a particular variant that already exists) is an empirical 
question that cannot be answered a priori. Second, the use of language in this way cannot be used 
to explain the existence of a critical or sensitive period for language acquisition. It should not be 




The indexical role of variation has long been recognised by linguists. Labov’s (1963) Martha’s 
Vineyard study (which can reasonably be said to be a foundational paper in the discipline of 
sociolinguistics) showed how speakers’ choice of a phonetic variant correlated well with their 
attitude towards outsiders. Related themes can be found in later sociolinguistic work. The 
concepts of prestige and covert prestige (see e.g. Trudgill 1972), where speakers aim to associate 
themselves linguistically with a particular socially defined group, are clearly relevant. More 
recently, Evans (2004) showed how gender and integration into the local community were 
significant predictors of the extent to which migrants to Ypsilanti, Michigan acquired a feature of 
the local accent. The role of gender is interesting and echoes Labov’s three generalisations about 
gender and language variation (see Labov 1990, 2001), which make women the leaders of 
linguistic change.  One might speculate that this reflects a tendency towards female exogamy, 
voluntary or otherwise, in early human societies (Hagen 2008 notes that women of reproductive 
age are disproportionately lacking among the remains of the dead at the site of an ancient 
massacre), making it more important for women to be able to integrate well with new 
communities in adulthood. But this is clearly not the only plausible explanation.  
 Sociolinguistic studies of existing speech communities are clearly very valuable to our 
understanding of linguistic variation and change. However, and particularly with regard to 
research into the evolution of language, they are also limited by the kind of communities that 
actually exist and are available for investigation. For ethical and practical reasons, researchers are 
restricted in their ability to manipulate speech communities to measure the effects of particular 
variables. If language change is at issue, the investigator is faced with severe practical problems.  
As a proxy, data can be analysed by more than one contemporary generation of the same family 
or community, but this relies on the assumption that a speaker’s patterns do not change over 
their lifetime. Studies like Harrington (2006), however, show that they do.  Aside from these 
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practical considerations, it is very hard to isolate the pressures and causal factors implicated in a 
particular change.  No natural speech community is homogeneous: the linguistic input is not the 
same for all speakers, and this makes it very hard to compare the influence of different variables.  
 These problems have led to the use of computational simulations, which allow far greater 
manipulation of variables by the investigator. For example, Nettle and Dunbar (1997) simulate a 
population of 100 agents who exchange gifts that are of higher value to the recipient than to the 
giver, constituting a Prisoners’ Dilemma game. Some of the agents are POLYGLOTS, who only 
give to organisms with a similar dialect to them, but will change their dialect to match that of 
another agent who gives them a gift. If allowed to cluster together, and given certain other 
parameters, 5 POLYGLOTS are able to invade a population of CHEATS (who accept gifts, but 
give none in return). Nettle (1999) describes a different set of simulations that model a 
population living on a spatial grid of 7 x 7 positions; each position on the grid is inhabited by a 
group of 20 individuals, which progress through 5 life stages before being replaced. By 
introducing imperfect learning, migration, social selection, and functional selection, he shows 
that social selection of linguistic variants “hugely increases both the amount of diversity which 
evolves and its stability” (54). Livingstone (2002) and Livingstone and Fyfe (1999) have 
challenged this view, with simulations that produce high levels of linguistic diversity without 
adaptive benefits. This is an important point: to say that social selection plays an important role 
in language diversity is not the same as saying it is a necessary condition for divergence; isolation 
and drift may well be sufficient conditions.  
Livingstone (2002: 115) argues that simulation is valuable as it “allows the development 
of models which can incorporate different aspects of society [and] of language and language 
learning” in a way that “is not possible … in real life”. But such in silico approaches have their 
own downside. While they give the researcher far greater control, they offer, as Nettle (1999: 37-
8) points out, only highly simplified models of the real world. They show us what computational 
agents do given certain assumptions, but we can not be sure that real human beings would do 
quite the same thing. With this in mind, there are perhaps two kinds of middle-ground approach 
that can complement both the methods described: the placing of simplified (usually robotic) 
agents in a real environment (e.g. Quinn 2001), and the placing of real human agents in a more 
or less artificial environment (e.g. Cornish 2006). The first approach has most advantage over 
fully computational simulations in cases where such behaviour as movement, vision, and the 
traversing of obstacles is involved. This paper describes a preliminary experiment of the second 
sort: it places human subjects in a simulated environment with an artificial language and an 
artificially imposed social structure.  
 
Overview 
In this experiment, participants played an online team-game that involved accumulating points 
by exchanging resources. Players negotiated for these resources in pairs on an instant-messenger 
style program using a made-up “alien language”; however, they did not know until after they had 
exchanged a particular item whether they had been negotiating with a team-mate or an 
opponent.  
 All participants began the game with exactly the same alien language (having been 
exposed to identical training data for the same amount of time). The experiment therefore 
simulated a situation in which a community had split into two parts, which were competing for 
resources5, yet still occupied a very close geographical area and were far from isolated one from 
the other: apart from two practice rounds (in which accumulated points were not counted), 
players interacted an equal amount of time with both teams.  
  
                                                
5 The exchange of “resources” in the game should be interpreted as representing a broad range of activities in the 
real world, such as exchange of skills, or of knowledge, or indeed any form of cooperation towards a shared goal. 
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The experiment aimed to investigate the following: 
 
• Success at recognition.  
• Effect on the alien language. 
• Strategies employed. 
 
In line with the hypothesis discussed above, there are several predictions to be made. First, 
players should be able to use linguistic cues to distinguish fellow team-members from members 
of the opposing team. It is crucial to note that the teams were not in any way distinguished 
linguistically at the start of the game (except inasmuch as they differed in their native languages 
or dialects, which they were not permitted to use). Any linguistic cues had to arise through 
innovation, whether intentional or accidental. Therefore, a second prediction is that the alien 
language should split into “dialects” or “accents” by which teams, or at least individuals, can be 
distinguished. Third, if the ability to recognise insider from outsider based on linguistic cues is 
adaptive, it can be predicted that the teams who do best at distinguishing between their team and 
the opposing team should achieve higher scores. 
 
Participants 
Twenty participants were selected from among students who responded to an advertisement on 
a student employment website. The experiment was described as a linguistics experiment that 
“involves playing a game with three other participants using an alien language”.6 To avoid 
difficulties in understanding instructions, applicants were selected according to level of English: 
all but six were native speakers. Participants came from a wide variety of academic backgrounds, 
and none had studied more than a semester of linguistics. Ages ranged from 18 to 42. The 
experiment was run five times over a two-week period, and each run involved four participants, 
split into teams of two. Participants were assigned to runs according to availability and assigned 
to teams at random.7 They were not told who their team-mate was until after the game had 
finished. Everyone was paid £8 for participating and a £10 bonus was shared between members 
of the winning team in each run. 
 
Alien language 
Participants were not permitted to use English or any other real language during the experiment; 
numerals were also prohibited. Instead, they were given an “alien language” to learn, which 
consisted of nineteen randomly generated words, all of which had a CV syllable structure and 
were between two and three syllables long (e.g. ralu, tejizo). The training data consisted of a sheet 
of paper giving the nineteen made-up words with the following English glosses: hello, goodbye, 
please, thanks, yes, no/not, and, I, you, have, want/need, give, meat, grain, water, fruit, fish, 
much/a lot of, question word. Participants were asked to study this in silence for ten minutes, and 
were allowed to make notes on the sheet. They were not allowed to confer, and could not even 
see each other. For the last five minutes of the training session, they were also given access to a 
set of twelve online pictures showing cartoons of people using the language. There was a very 
small amount of variation in word order introduced here (the word glossed as “not”, for 
example, might appear before the verb in one cartoon and after it in another). This was not, 
however, pointed out explicitly, and it is important to note that all participants in each game were 
given identical training data and shown identical pictures.  
 The language was regenerated for each run of the experiment and the length of words 
varied (in three of the runs, ten words had three syllables and nine, two; this was reversed in the 
                                                
6 The choice of the term “alien language” was based on Cornish (2006), who found it helped stimulate interest in 
participating in her project. 
7 There was one exception. In one case, two participants on the same run knew each other; they were put on 
separate teams. 
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other two runs). Words that closely resembled English words or proper names were filtered out, 
along with homonyms or close homonyms. 
 
Procedure 
Participants were seated in adjacent closed cubicles, each containing a PC. Having read the 
instructions and spent ten minutes with the language training data, they played two practice 
rounds in which they communicated only with their team-mate (and were made aware of this 
fact); for the practice rounds, they were allowed to refer to their wordlists and had thirty seconds 
longer than in later rounds to converse with their partners. 
 After the practice rounds, participants were allowed one minute to relax and have a last 
look at their wordlists, which were then removed. They then played 14 rounds of the game 
(though were not told how many they would play). For half the rounds, players were paired with 
their team-mates; for the other half, with the opposing team. The order was randomised, but no 
player was ever paired with the same team for more than three rounds in a row. Participants 
were unaware of this and knew only that they would be paired with their team-mates for the first 
two rounds. In fact, this was the case for the first three rounds.8 
 The game proceeded as follows. Each player began with five resources (meat, grain, 
water, fruit and fish) in different quantities (which added up to 7 for each player). The 
distribution was the same in each game, and players were randomly assigned player numbers and 
teams (this was unrelated to the particular cubicle a participant chose to sit in). Throughout the 
entire game, each player could see their own resources (and only their own) displayed on the left 
of the screen. In each round, a player was paired with another player, who might or might not be 
a team-mate. Each round consisted of three timed stages: Negotiation, Exchange and Feedback. 
In the Negotiation Stage, players could (by typing messages) chat and negotiate for resources 
using the alien language. In the Exchange Stage, players could choose (by clicking on + and – 
signs) to give away some or all of their resources to the person they had been chatting to, and 
were also asked to answer on a scale of 1 to 4 (where 1 means “Definitely not” and 4 means 
“definitely”) the question, “Were you talking to someone on your own team?” In the Feedback 
Stage, they were reminded what they had given, told what they had received, and told whether or 
not they had been talking to a team-mate. Then a new round began, and so on until the last 
round had finished. At this point, players were told the overall scores for each team. The team 
with the best combined score was the winner. 
 Points were accumulated by exchanging resources. Crucially, any resource was worth 
twice as much to a receiver than to the giver. For example, if Player 1 gave 3 points of meat to 
Player 2, Player 2 would gain 6 points of meat (this is based on Nettle and Dunbar’s (1997) 
simulation). As final scores were calculated by team, and not by player, it was therefore beneficial 
to give resources to one’s team-mate and to receive resources from any other player. It was 
detrimental to one’s success to give resources to the opposing team. To help stimulate 
negotiation, players were also encouraged to keep their team’s resources balanced: as a penalty, 
the difference between a team’s highest and lowest scoring resources was deducted from its total 
score at the end of the game.  
 In each round, the negotiation stage lasted 180 seconds, the exchange stage 30 seconds, 
and the feedback stage 20 seconds. In the practice rounds, the negotiation stage was 30 seconds 




                                                
8 This was intended to frustrate participants’ expectations about the third round, where we might expect a bias 
towards assuming they would not be paired with their team-mates again. Of course, a similar bias was to be 





According to post-experiment questionnaires, participants enjoyed taking part. Some guessed 
that the game was at least partly about identifying people based on language, although others 
thought it had been more concerned with how people learn language. Estimations of personal 
success ranged from “not very well” to “excellent”. Two participants claimed to have been able 
to guess their team-mate’s gender, but had no explanation of how, beyond “a gut feeling”. One 
game was unfortunately cut short by a power failure in the middle of the ninth round. In Tables 
1 to 3, the teams and players affected are marked with an asterisk. Results will be given both 
including and excluding data from this game. 
 
Table 1: Correct judgements in Stage 2 for all players 
 










1a 8 66.67 1 (20%) 7 (100%) 
1b 11 91.67 4 (80%) 7 (100%) 
2a 10 83.33 3 (60%) 7 (100%) 
2b 9 75 2 (40%) 7 (100%) 
3a* 5 83.33 1 (50%) 4 (66.67%) 
3b* 6 100 2 (100%) 4 (66.67%) 
4a* 3 50 1 (50%) 2 (33.33%) 
4b* 5 83.33 2 (100%) 3 (50%) 
5a 8 66.67 3 (60%) 5 (71.42%) 
5b 10 83.33 4 (80%) 6 (85.71%) 
6a 6 50 4 (80%) 2 (28.57%) 
6b 10 83.33 3 (60%) 7 (100%) 
7a 9 75 3 (60%) 6 (85.71%) 
7b 9 75 3 (60%) 6 (85.71%) 
8a 10 83.33 4 (80%) 6 (85.71%) 
8b 8 66.67 2 (40%) 6 (85.71%) 
9a 10 83.33 3 (60%) 7 (100%) 
9b 11 91.67 4 (80%) 7 (100%) 
10a 8 66.67 3 (60%) 5 (71.43%) 
10b 10 83.33 3 (60%) 7 (100%) 
Total 166 77 55 111 
 
 
Success at identification. Table 1 shows the number of correct judgements made by each 
player in the second (Exchange) stage of each round. This is based on responses to the question, 
“Were you talking to someone on your own team?” A reply of 1 or 2 is taken to mean “no” and 
3 or 4 to mean “yes”. Results from the first two rounds, in which players knew they were talking 
to their team-mates, are ignored for this purpose. Where participants neglected to respond to 
this question (as happened on seven occasions), their guess is inferred on the basis of trading 
behaviour, which was fairly transparent. 
 Overall, eighteen of the twenty players were correct in their judgement on at least 67% of 
rounds (the remaining two players were correct 50% of the time); or fifteen out of sixteen 
players if the second (asterisked) game is excluded. The mean for all players was 77% and the 
mode 83%; these are the same if the second game is excluded. In total, 216 judgements were 
made over all the games, of which 166 were correct and 50 incorrect. In line with predictions, 
this is significantly better than chance: χ2(1) = 62.296, p < .001 (excluding the second game: 
χ2(1) = 54.188, p < .001, based on 147 correct judgements and 45 incorrect).  
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 As described above, players were paired with their team-mates in half of the rounds; 
however, in the first two rounds, they were made aware of this fact, and the judgements from 
these rounds are excluded from the analysis.  Therefore 88 of the 216 judgements were from 
rounds in which players were paired with their team-mates. Of these, 55 were correct and 33 
incorrect. This is significant at p < .05 (χ2(1) = 5.5; χ2(1) = 4.05 excluding the second game). For 
those rounds in which players were paired with members of the opposing team, 111 guesses 
were correct and 17 incorrect, which is highly significant: χ2(1) = 69.031, p < .001 (excluding the 
second game: χ2(1) = 81.385, p < .001). This would appear to suggest that participants were 
erring on the side of caution, and were biased towards assuming they were paired with their 
opponent. This may reflect an inherent conservatism, but is most probably the result of knowing 
who their partner was in the first two rounds (see above). This would have led to a bias in the 
third round and (when they turned out, against expectation, to be paired with their team-mates) 
again in the fourth round. In fact, only two guesses in the fourth round were incorrect, and of 
the 33 failures to identify team-mates, 14 occurred in the third round. Although these biases 
should cancel each other out to an extent, his is a problem that needs to be solved in future 
experiments. 
 
Table 2: Definite judgements in Stage 2 for all players. 
 
Player Game No. of 
definite 
guesses 





1a 1 6 4 (67%) 47 35 
1b 1 5 5 (100%) 47 35 
2a 1 6 6 (100%) 46 33 
2b 1 4 3  (75%) 46 33 
3a* 2 2 1 (50%) 61 52 
3b* 2 3 3 (100%) 61 52 
4a* 2 0 0  17 13 
4b* 2 4 4 (100%) 17 13 
5a 3 3 2 (67%) 55 41 
5b 3 7 7 (100%) 55 41 
6a 3 5 2 (40%) 44 28 
6b 3 0 0 44 28 
7a 4 5 5 (100%) 67 54 
7b 4 2 2 (100%) 67 54 
8a 4 7 7 (100%) 82 52 
8b 4 9 7 (78%) 82 52 
9a 5 9 8 (89%) 463 432 
9b 5 10 9 (90%) 463 432 
10a 5 7 6 (86%) 35 28 
10b 5 1 1 (100%) 35 28 




Table 3: Combined correct judgements for teams and team scores. 
 







1 1 79.17 47 35 
2 1 79.17 46 33 
3 2 91.67 61 52 
4 2 66.67 17 13 
5 3 75 55 41 
6 3 66.67 44 28 
7 4 75 67 54 
8 4 75 82 52 
9 5 87.50 463 432 
10 5 75 35 28 
 
Table 2 shows the number of definite judgements per player (defined as a guess of 1 or 4), and 
the number of these that were correct. As might be expected, definite guesses were incorrect 
overall in a minority (15%) of cases. In each game, the highest score before penalty was achieved 
by the team with the greater number of definite guesses. The winning team in each game was 
also the one with the higher combined percentage of correct judgements (see Table 3). The 
scores themselves, however, cannot be easily predicted from this recognition rate. The different 
strategies employed need to be taken into account. 
 
Strategies. It is worth reiterating at this point the limits imposed by the alien language. Players 
were not allowed to use any real language during the game; the nineteen words they were given 
to use simply did not allow the explicit discussion of strategy between team-mates. In spite of 
this, strategies did emerge, and some teams and players used them to great effect.   
The ideal player of this game would have a reliable way of recognising if they were paired 
with their team-mate and, if so, making it clear who they were. If they were paired with an 
opponent, they would pretend convincingly to be part of their opponent’s team. They would also 
keep their resources balanced throughout in order to avoid a penalty at the end of the game. This 
last task is complicated by the fact that the penalty is based on the combined score; the ideal 
player must therefore either rely on their team-mate to do the same, or keep track of their team-
mate’s resources sufficiently to compensate for imbalance. As team-mates’ resources are hard to 
keep track of, and team-mates themselves not necessarily reliable, one or two teams hit upon the 
simpler tactic of just giving away as much as possible in rounds where they were knew they were 
paired together. This was the strategy employed by the most successful team, but it is an 
extremely risky one, and depends on there being a very reliable means of identifying one’s own 
team-mate. Should that fail, a player might give away all their resources to the other team. 
To identify themselves, players employed roughly five identifiable linguistic strategies: 
 
• “Secret handshake”: indicate affiliation through greeting. 
• Mimicry: imitate the other person. 
• “Accent spotting”: identify idiosyncratic features of your team-mate’s (and others’) use of 
language. 
• Salient innovation: use the language in a noticeably different way. 
• Expressive innovation: modify the language to increase expressivity. 
 
Such strategies can be, and were, combined. It is also not always possible to draw a clear 
distinction between them: any expressive innovation is likely to be salient, for instance. Strategies 
 11 
may also conflict: accent spotting becomes less effective if one’s team-mate begins imitating the 
spotter. There are other difficulties in the case of strategies like mimicry: many participants said 
that they had used this strategy, but in a given case of two players’ using the language in a similar 
way, it is not always clear if this should be interpreted as intentional mimicry (or on whose part). 
Owing to these difficulties, this section will not attempt a statistical comparison of the overall 
effect of strategy on score. Instead, it will focus on the behaviour of the most successful team: 
Team 9 (see Table 3).  
 The members of this team used all of the above-identified linguistic strategies to some 
extent, and used the reliability this gave them to exchange with each other as much as possible 
when they were paired together. Most noticeably, they hit upon a simple innovation that was 
both expressive and highly salient: they repeated the names of their resources to indicate 
quantity; for example, if “ralu” meant “water”, “ralu ralu ralu” would mean “three points of 
water”. As this became impractical as quantities increased, they repeated them in abbreviated 
form, using only the first letter of the resource name (so rrrrrrrrrr meant “ten points of water”).9 
This not only allowed the efficient transmission of information; it also allowed reliable team-
mate recognition. Impressively, the team also managed to keep this innovation secret from the 
other team by using a “secret handshake”. Instead of “sekudi”, glossed as “hello”, members of 
this team greeted with “jori noloku”, glossed as “I have”. In early rounds, this seems to have 
been used literally; the players simply dispensed with a greeting and got down to the business of 
listing resources. When it became clear that the other team still began each interaction with 
“sekudi”, this stylistic difference became conventionalised. That “jori noloku” did indeed take on 
the status of a greeting is shown by the fact that it came to be repeated by both players before 
they actually said what resources they had. Members of Team 9 even began employing the 
further strategy of waiting at the start of each round for the other player to begin the interaction. 
If the other person greeted with “sekudi”, they would reply with the same. In one case this 
backfired, as a member of Team 9 began with “sekudi” despite being paired with their team-
mate. Nothing was exchanged in this round. Perversely, this indicates how powerful and reliable 
the strategy had become. As can be seen from Table 3, Team 9 won by a margin of 403 points. It 
is also notable that they made the greatest number of definite guesses of any team (see Table 2). 
 
Linguistic divergence. As described above, all players learnt an identical artificial language at 
the start of the game, and were not permitted to use any real language or numerals during the 
game. No participant broke this rule. There was, however, an enormous amount of innovation: 
although the language began with only 19 unique words, far more unique forms were used in the 
games themselves. In the third game, 120 unique forms were used (127, if forms used in the 
practice rounds are counted). Even in the game cut short by a power cut, 56 unique forms were 
used. Most of this seems to be the result of error, either of memory or in typing. For example, a 
word like “dikono” might be also appear as “dinoko” or “dikno”. These can be considered as 
analogous to production errors in speech; many occur only once or twice in a given game.  
However, there is also evidence of propagation: whatever the source of linguistic innovation, it 
can be adopted by other language users and eventually become established in a particular dialect. 
It may happen, for example, that all players in a game use both “dikono” and “dinoko” at some 
point, but that one player uses the second more often, while the other players prefer the first. It 
may also happen that two teams may be distinguished by such a choice: one team may come to 
use “dinoko” more often, while the other continues to favour “dikono”. In this case, we could 
speak of something like dialectal difference. A real-life analogy would be the use of /aks/ in 
place of /ask/ among certain communities of English speakers. Many if not most of these 
speakers also use /ask/ on certain occasions, but they are distinguished by the relative frequency 
                                                
9 Two other teams employed repetition in this way. One was Team 3, in the game that was cut short. Had the game 
continued, it seems likely they would have been the second most successful team overall. The other was Team 8, 
who only hit upon the strategy late in the game. 
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of the two variants in their language (by contrast, probably most English speakers utter /aks/ 
only as a rare production error). In fact, such patterns occurred in the case of several word-forms 
in the games. In itself, however, isolated cases like this do not tell us much. The question is 
whether the game set-up has led to a divergence of the alien language into two distinct forms; in 
other words, does the independent variable Team have an effect on the use of particular variants 
by players? Are players more like their team-mates than their opponents? 
As a test, all the individual word-forms used in each game (not including the game that 
was cut short) were extracted and a frequency count derived for each player in the game. For 
example, Player 1 might have used “dikono” 25 times, “dinoko” 18 times and “dikno” 0 times, 
while the corresponding counts for Player 2 might have been 20, 23 and 7. All the word-forms 
were then divided into sets, 19 for each game (the second game was excluded). Thus “dikono”, 
“dinoko” and “dikno” would all form one set, while “bivo”, “bivvo” and “biivo” would form 
another. In a very few cases, where it was not at all certain which set a form should belong to, it 
was excluded from the analysis. Also excluded were any sets containing only one item. Where 
players repeated abbreviated forms of words, these were treated as one variant (so, for example, 
rrrrr and rrrrrrrr were counted as tokens of the same variant). The final tally was 54 sets. For 
each of these sets, the relative frequencies of variants were worked out for each player (so in a 
set of 4 items, the distribution for one player might be  .25 .25 .5 and 0).  The mean Euclidean 
distance was then measured between each pair of players. Each variant set was then scored: if all 
four players were closer to their team-mates than to their opponents, the set was given a score of 
1; if members of only one team were closer to each other than to their opponents, the set was 
given a score of 0.5.10 The result was a combined score of 19 for all sets. The raw frequency 
counts were shuffled randomly for each item and the data rescored; this was repeated 10,000 




To summarise: the results from this game provide evidence that adult human beings are well able 
to correctly interpret patterns of linguistic variation and use the information gained to protect 
resources from freeriders, even after a very short time, little exposure to the language, and no 
means of explicitly discussing strategy. Moreover, such behaviour seems to be sufficient to cause 
an initially homogeneous language to diverge according to the structure of the community that 
speaks it.  
 Of course, this remains only a preliminary run of an experimental paradigm. This paper 
hopes above all to show that linguistic behaviour of the kind discussed here can be investigated 
in the laboratory, and that this complements fully computational and mathematical models and 
studies of actual speech communities.  As a preliminary run, it is necessarily small-scale, and has 
certain shortcomings that result from this. First, to clearly establish that the behaviour in the 
game was the result of the particular pressure to distinguish between team-mate and opponent, a 
control is needed in which participants play the same game, but where there is no such pressure. 
Second, the number of players is small; participants have only to recognise one team-mate. It 
would be very interesting to see if even a slight increase in team size would have a significant 
impact. The issue of how players are paired in the first rounds also needs addressing. To give 
some grounding to the idea that players belong to a team, it seems reasonable, and a better 
approximation to reality, that they should be explicitly paired with their team-mates at the 
beginning of the game. As noted above, however, this creates an inevitable bias in the following 
round; pairing them unexpectedly with their team-mate in this round may go some way towards 
cancelling out this bias, but it is not entirely satisfactory. The best solution may be to make 
                                                
10 This is somewhat conservative scoring. Nothing was awarded where one member of a team was closer to their 
team-mate, but that team-mate was closer to an opponent. 
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participants aware of their partners only in the practice rounds. Alternatively, a more radical 
change would be to have the teams emerge from the interactions. 
 It should be clear that the “alien language” used in the experiment was highly simplified 
in comparison with real human languages; moreover, it was written rather than spoken.  It is 
therefore worth noting that much of the linguistic behaviour seen in the game has real-life 
analogues. Reduplication (the repetition of a word or part of a word) is used in various 
languages, usually to convey plurality or intensity (as in English “very very good”). Croft (2000: 
75-6) also notes that communities with specific shared interests often save superfluous effort 
(and emphasise their group’s exclusiveness) by abbreviating commonly used terms, as when wine 
connoisseurs refer to Cabernet Sauvignon as “Cab Sav” and Chardonnay as “Chard”. The 
“secret handshake” strategy, moreover, recalls Cruttenden (1986: 169): 
 
There are certain areas which are particularly susceptible to the idiosyncratic use of tones: 
Greetings, farewells and social formulas are one such area: the conventional way of intoning the 
equivalent of Good morning will vary from language to language; moreover, variation within one 
language in such areas will be sensitive to very subtle social conventions. 
 
A final point worth mentioning is the issue of innovation, the “actuation riddle” posed 
by Weinreich et al. (1968): where does change come from? This experiment is not designed to 
answer this question. However, it is notable that there is practically no evidence of innovation 
for the sake of innovation to be found in the data. There is no reason to suppose, for example, 
that the vast majority of linguistic variation was not the result of error, even if such error-based 
forms were propagated. Team 9’s use of “I have” as a greeting was innovative, but was merely an 
extension of its literal meaning: the secret-handshake use arose out of an accidental difference 
between the teams’ style.  The repetition and abbreviation of resource names was a salient 
change to the language, but it fulfilled an expressive function. At no point, in other words, is 
there evidence that players changed anything about the language purely for the sake of being 
different. The linguistic cues that allowed players to identify each other were parasitic on more 
functional linguistic behaviour. In this context, it is worth going back to Team 9’s behaviour. As 
their resources increased in quantity, they seem to have paid less and less attention to keeping 
their resources balanced, and concentrated on simply exchanging as much as possible when they 
were paired together. Actually listing how many of each resource they had thus became 
redundant. In other words, not only did “jori noloku” become conventionalised as a greeting; 
any information exchanged between the players became only a means of identifying each other; 
the parasitic function of the language had become its primary function. This is particularly clear 
in the case of Team 9, but there is no reason to suppose it was not true of other teams. It would 
also appear to be the case for much human communication: the actual content of the message is 
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Computational simulations have provided evidence that the use of linguistic
cues as group markers plays an important role in the development of lin-
guistic diversity (Nettle & Dunbar, 1997; Nettle, 1999). Other simulations,
however, have contradicted these findings (Livingstone & Fyfe, 1999; Liv-
ingstone, 2002). Similar disagreements exist in sociolinguistics (e.g. Labov,
1963, 2001; Trudgill, 2004, 2008a; Baxter et al., 2009). This paper describes
an experimental study in which participants played an anonymous economic
game using an instant-messenger-style program and an artificial ‘alien lan-
guage’. The competitiveness of the game and the frequency with which play-
ers interacted were manipulated. Given frequent enough interaction with
team-mates, players were able to use linguistic cues to identify themselves.
In the most competitive condition, this led to divergence in the language,
which did not occur in other conditions. This suggests that both frequency
of interaction and a pressure to use language to mark identity play a signif-
icant role in encouraging linguistic divergence over short periods, but that
neither is sufficient on its own.
Keywords: Cooperation, Cultural evolution, Experimental, Historical lin-
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DRAFT—PLEASE DO NOT CITE WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE
AUTHOR
This is an experimental study of language divergence. Participants played
a team-game in which they used an instant-messenger-style program to ne-
gotiate anonymously for resources in an artificial ‘alien language’. Frequency
of interaction was manipulated, as was the competitive nature of the game.
Given sufficiently frequent interaction and a pressure to use language as a
source of social markers, the ‘alien language’ diverged significantly. Neither
factor was sufficient on its own. The first section of the paper discusses the
theoretical background; the second section discusses previous computational,
sociolinguistic, and experimental studies of the role of identity marking and
frequency of interaction in language change; and the remaining sections de-
scribe the experiment and discuss its implications.
1 Why we need markers of identity
In evolutionary biology, cooperative behaviour is behaviour that benefits an-
other individual, and whose evolution is dependent on this benefit; several
mechanisms have been identified by which this can become an evolutionary
stable strategy (see West, Griffin, & Gardner, 2007, for a useful summary).
However, many of these mechanisms rely on individuals staying around long
enough to face the consequences of cheating (Axelrod, 1984/1990, 169–91)
and, among mobile social organisms like human beings, individuals can move
relatively easily from community to community, exploiting each in turn (En-
quist & Leimar, 1993). A solution to the problem of distinguishing between
members and non-members of one’s community is to employ some kind of
marker. The ideal marker must be relatively costly to obtain or imitate (cf.
Irons, 2001; Sosis, 2003; Ruffle & Sosis, 2007), and suitably salient, yet flex-
ible enough to cope with changing group dynamics. Any trait that varies
across human populations can serve as a marker of this sort, but among all
possible candidates, linguistic variation seems an especially good source (cf.
Nettle & Dunbar, 1997, p. 98). An accent or dialect is a salient trait that
is flexible both across generations and within a single lifetime (Harrington,
2006). Yet, despite this flexibility, learning new speech patterns takes a con-
siderable time, and considerable exposure to the target; this appears, more-
over, to be generally easier for children than for adults, for reasons that re-
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main controversial (see e.g. Penfield & Roberts, 1959; Lenneberg, 1967; New-
port, Bavelier, & Neville, 2001; Abrahamsson & Hyltenstam, 2008). There
is no reason to suppose that linguistic traits are the only human traits to be
used in this way, but linguistic markers are likely to be especially reliable,
and there is evidence that even young children attach especial importance to
them (Kinzler, Dupoux, & Spelke, 2007; Kinzler, Shutts, DeJesus, & Spelke,
in press).
2 Selection in language change
If linguistic variation is exploited as a source of identity markers, this ex-
ploitation can be expected to influence the evolution of a language, since
it introduces a selective pressure, usually called social selection (whereby
variants are selected according to their association with something of social
relevance to the speaker. See e.g. Nettle, 1999; Croft, 2000). We might
expect this to lead to a high level of socially structured variation—whereby
individuals converge linguistically with other members of their group, but
groups diverge linguistically from each other—faster than would be expected
by drift alone (Dunbar, 2003, p. 230). Indeed, a study of phylogenetic trees of
language families by Atkinson et al. (2008) found evidence for ‘punctuational
bursts of evolution . . . during the emergence of new and rival groups.’
This idea is familiar to sociolinguists, and Labov’s (1963) description of
a socially mediated sound change in Martha’s Vineyard is a classic example
(see also Blake & Josey, 2003; Pope, Meyerhoff, & Ladd, 2007). Such studies
of real-world communities are complemented by computational models. Sim-
ulations by Nettle and Dunbar (1997) and Nettle (1999) appear to confirm
that the existence of variability in language, coupled with a bias towards co-
operating with those who speak in a similar way, leads to a population that
cannot be invaded by ‘cheats’, and a high level of (geographically structured)
linguistic diversity. Nevertheless, other simulations have cast doubt on the
importance of social selection in explaining linguistic diversity; in studies by
Livingstone and Fyfe (1999) and Livingstone (2002), a high level of geograph-
ically structured linguistic diversity emerges owing to variation in frequency
of interaction, and no social selection.
This scepticism about the role of social selection is even echoed in the
work of Labov, who argues that frequency of interaction is likely to be more
important (Labov, 2001, p. 506). Similar views are expressed in Trudgill
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(2004) and Trudgill (2008a), and have been hotly debated (Bauer, 2008;
Coupland, 2008; Holmes & Kerswill, 2008; Mufwene, 2008; Schneider, 2008;
Tuten, 2008; Trudgill, 2008b; Baxter et al., 2009). In psycholinguistics,
Pickering and Garrod’s mechanistic interactive alignment model of dialogue
predicts that speakers will converge as a function of the amount they interact
(Fay, Garrod, & Carletta, 2000; Pickering & Garrod, 2004). This does not
seem to leave much space for more complex social factors.
Part of the difficulty in resolving this question is that the two factors of so-
cial selection and frequency interact considerably, and teasing them apart in
the real world is difficult. Simulations in silico provide a solution to some of
the practical difficulties but, as we have seen, give conflicting results, partly
to be explained by the necessary simplicity of the agents that interact in
them. A middle ground—a kind of simulation in vivo—is found in studies
that put real human agents in a controlled artificial environment (e.g. Galan-
tucci, 2005; Kirby, Cornish, & Smith, 2008; Scott-Phillips, Kirby, & Ritchie,
in press). In a small-scale study of this sort described in Roberts (2008),
participants were divided into two teams and played a game that involved
typing messages anonymously on an instant messenger program using a sim-
ple artificial ‘alien language’ and exchanging resources with other players.
The aim of the game was to share resources with team-mates, but to avoid
giving them to opponents. The results suggested that the pressure to identify
oneself to one’s team-mate caused the alien language to diverge into team
‘dialects’. However, the study did not investigate the role of frequency of
interaction in bringing this about. The purpose of this paper is to present a
larger-scale experimental study, based on Roberts (2008), that incorporates
this factor.
3 Description of experiment
3.1 Overview
An experiment was carried out with 80 participants; it had a 2 × 2 (between-
subjects) design, so there were four conditions of 20 participants each. Five
games were played in each condition, with four players in each game. A game
consisted of a series of timed rounds in each of which every player was paired
(anonymously) with one of the other players, their ‘partner’ for that round.
The round involved negotiating anonymously, by typing messages in a simple
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artificial ‘alien language’ (the use of real languages was forbidden) on an
instant-messenger-style program, to exchange resources with their partner.
After this negotiation stage, players could choose to give resources away to
their partner; any resource given was worth double to the receiver, which
allowed teams to accumulate points.
In a typical round, players would greet each other, then state what re-
sources they wanted and were prepared to give away, and ask what their
partner wanted in return (e.g. ‘I need lots of meat. Do you have meat? I
give you fruit.’). Depending on this exchange, and the player’s estimate of
the benefits of doing so (see below), each player might then go on to give
away a certain amount of their resources to their partner. After this they
would be told the results of the exchange.
The first independent variable was competitiveness:
• Competitive: the four players were divided into two teams. The object
of the game was to beat the opposing team by as great a margin as
possible. There was a prize for the team in the condition that beat its
opponents by the greatest margin.
• Cooperative:1 all four players were considered part of the same team.
The object of the game was to get as high a score as possible. There
was a prize for the team in the condition that achieved the highest
score.
Every game of the cooperative condition was matched with a game in the
competitive condition; for each pair, the words of the alien language and the
order in which players were paired up was kept the same.
The second independent variable was frequency of interaction:
• Low-frequency: 15 rounds set up so that each player interacted an equal
amount of time with every other player. In the competitive condition,
this meant being paired only a third of the time (5 rounds) with their
own team, and two thirds of the time (i.e. 10 rounds) with the opposing
team.
• High-frequency: 16 rounds set up so that each player interacted half
the time (i.e. 8 rounds) with one other player (always their team-mate
in the competitive condition), and a quarter of the time (4 rounds)
with each of the remaining two players. While there was thus a bias in
4
terms of individual players, it meant that players interacted an equal
amount of time with each team in the competitive condition.
Figure 1 is a diagram of the experimental design.
Figure 1: Diagram of experimental design (No. of participants given in brack-
ets)
In the cooperative conditions, it will be noticed that the players’ task
was relatively straightforward: players had only to give as much as possible
to their team-mates (i.e. all the other players in the game), while paying
attention to what players asked for, so as to keep resources balanced. In the
competitive conditions, the task was somewhat more complex. In addition
to giving as much as possible to their team-mate (while keeping resources
balanced), the ideal player would avoid ever giving resources away to their
opponents, while always appearing to be the team-mate of whoever they were
partnered with for a given round. This meant finding some way of identifying
one’s team-mate, and the only channel by which this could be achieved was
the negotiation stage of the round. As will be seen in Section 3.5, however,
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the ‘alien language’ players had to communicate with severely limited their
opportunity for explicit strategising; instead, players had to rely mainly on
cues in the linguistic form of their messages, rather than the content.
With this in mind, two predictions were made for competitive condition:
1. That players would be able to identify their team-mates using only
linguistic cues.
2. That the alien language, identical for all players at the beginning of
the game, would diverge into dialects.
It was further predicted that these effects would be greater in the high-
frequency condition, where team-mates were in greater contact.
3.2 Participants
Eighty participants were selected from among students who responded to
an advertisement on a student employment website. The advertisement re-
quired that students should not apply if they suffer seriously from dyslexia
or RSI, have studied linguistics, or have done an experiment for the same
experimenter in the past. Participants were aged between 18 and 30, were a
mixture of undergraduates and postgraduates from a variety of disciplines,
and came from a variety of linguistic backgrounds. They were assigned to
sessions according to their availability and assigned to teams at random.2
Every participant was paid £8 for participating. As a motivator, members
of the most successful teams were awarded £10 each.
3.3 Game structure
Each player sat in a separate cubicle with a desktop computer. After they
had all read through the instructions for the game, they were each presented
with a sheet of paper with a list of twenty English words and glosses in an
‘alien language’ (see Section 3.5). They were given ten minutes to learn this,
using any method that did not involve saying the words aloud. They were
specifically told that they could write on the paper, and were given pens for
this purpose. After five minutes had elapsed, they were directed on the screen
to a set of cartoons with examples of the language being used.3 Every player
learnt exactly the same alien words, and saw exactly the same cartoons.
After training, participants played three practice rounds, in which they could
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refer to their word-lists. Players were paired with a different partner in each
practice round. In the competitive condition, the first of these was their
team-mate, and players were told as much. In the cooperative condition,
they were told that each partner would be different. After the practice rounds
were over, the word-lists were removed and the players played the full game,
using the alien language from memory. Players were paired in the first three
rounds of the full game as they had been in the practice rounds, and players
in the competitive condition were again told that their first partner would
be their team-mate. Players were told nothing else about who they would be
paired with in each round, or how many rounds they would play. After the
first three rounds, the order of pairings was random, though no two players
were paired for more than two rounds in a row. A typical round was described
in Section 3.1.
(a) CHAT Stage (in which players negotiate to ex-
change resources)
(b) EXCHANGE Stage (in which players exchange re-
sources)
Figure 2: Examples of CHAT and EXCHANGE stages (Competitive condi-
tion)
For the duration of a round, each player was paired with one of the other
players; except in the first round, they were given no information about who
this was until the end of the round. Each round consisted of three stages. The
first stage (chat; see Figure 2(a)) lasted for 160 seconds (120 in the practice
rounds, which were otherwise identical to those in the full game), which
pilots showed to constitute a considerable time pressure, considering that
players could not use their native languages. Only during this stage could
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players communicate with each other, which they did by typing messages;
no particular order of turns was imposed. The second stage (exchange;
see Figure 2(b)) lasted 30 seconds. Only during this stage could players
give away resources to their partner; there was no limit on gift size. In the
competitive condition, they were also asked in this stage to judge if they had
been talking to a member of their own team. In the third stage (feedback;
see Figure 3(a)), which lasted 15 seconds, players were reminded how much
of each resource they had given away, and told what they had received from
the other player; in the competitive condition, they were also told whether
or not the other player had been a member of their team. After that, a new
round started, and so on until the end of the game, when the final score for
both teams (or, in the cooperative game, the score for the whole group) was
revealed (see Figure 3(b)).
(a) FEEDBACK stage (in which players receive feed-
back on exchange and interlocutor’s identity)
(b) Final screen (shows combined team scores at end
of game)
Figure 3: Examples of FEEDBACK stage and final screen (Competitive
condition)
3.4 Resources and scoring
Players began the game with 28 points each, distributed among the following
resources: meat, grain, water, fruit and fish. Each player would begin with 0
points in one resource, 3 points in two, 7 points in one, and 15 points in an-
other. No two players had identical distributions, but the 0 resource always
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corresponded to 15 in the player’s team-mate’s set. No resource was worth
inherently more than another (10 points of meat, for example, was worth as
much as 10 points of water). Throughout the game, players could see how
much of each resource they had, but not how much their team, or any other
player, had. The only way these quantities could change was by giving re-
sources away to, or receiving them from, another player. Any resource given
away was worth double to the receiver (cf. Nettle & Dunbar, 1997); giving
away resources to one’s team-mate therefore allowed the team to accumulate
points. The team’s score for each resource was simply the sum of its mem-
bers’ scores. For the purposes of winning the game, it was the teams’ scores,
not the scores of their individual members, that mattered; there was thus a
direct benefit to cooperating with members of one’s own team. However, at
the end of the game, teams were penalised for having unbalanced resources:
the difference between the highest scoring resource and the lowest scoring
resource was deducted from the total score (see Figure 3(b)). This was to
discourage players from simply giving away all their resources, and to encour-
age them instead to use the alien language to negotiate a beneficial exchange.
The only reason not to give away as much as possible to one’s team-mate—
apart from uncertainty as to their identity in the competitive condition—was
the possibility of dangerously unbalancing the team’s resources. In the event,
most players proved to be rather conservative, and the most successful teams
were those who gave away large quantities of resources, but who established
reliable markers to make this less risky (see Sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2). Players
did not see their team’s score, or any score but their own, until the end of
the game.
3.5 Alien language
Players were not allowed to use English, any other real language, or numerals
in the experiment. Instead they were given an ‘alien language’ to learn, which
consisted of twenty randomly generated words of either two or three CV
syllables. This severely limited the potential for explicit strategising. The
alien words were generated anew for each pair of games (that is, the same
language was used for one game in the cooperative condition, and one in the
competitive condition—although games in the high-frequency condition were
not matched in this way with games in the low-frequency condition). The
following is an example set, with English glosses:
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hello/goodbye – suto need – ganita
please – gowene give – ziga
thanks – wumovo meat – nimu
yes – dejizi grain – jemulo
no/not – falo corn – kovuha
and – tuga water – yane
I – takola fruit – golo
you – bofa fish – nesewi
have – hilapi much/a lot of – firo
want – hiyi question word – yukini
So that players would remain focused on the game and the screen in front
of them, and so that memory lapses (along with typing mistakes) would pro-
vide a source for ‘natural’ variation in the language, analogous to production
errors and slips of the tongue in real language, players were not able to re-
fer to a word-list during the game itself and had to use the alien language
from memory. Early pilots had suggested that participants felt somewhat
overwhelmed by the prospect of having to ‘get the alien language right’, so
participants were also told not to ‘worry at all about making mistakes in the
language. The important thing is to make yourself understood without using
English (or any other real language).’ This was also intended to encourage
players to communicate as naturally as possible, and not to treat the task as
a memory test.
4 Results
As in Roberts (2008), there were two main dependent variables:
1. Players’ success in distinguishing between team-mates and opponents.
2. The degree to which the alien language diverged into two ‘dialects’.
Only in one condition, the high-frequency competitive condition, were
players able to identify their team-mates; and only in this condition did the
alien language diverge into dialects.
Tables 1 and 2 summarise the raw results for every team in the compet-
itive conditions. Section 4.1 analyses players’ success at recognising their
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team-mates; Section 4.2 analyses the level to which the alien language di-
verged; Section 4.3 discusses the relationship of these measures with players’
success in the game; Section 4.4 discusses the strategies players used.
Scorea Convergence % Correct Mean Strategies
levelb recognitionsc giftd employede
Game 1
Team a 110 (126) 0.89 61.5 (12) 2.3 (4.1) DR, II
Team b 102 (102) 0.86 64.3 (14) 1.8 (2.7) DR, II
Game 2
Team a 114 (163) 0.87 57.7 (12) 2.4 (4.0) DR
Team b 114 (131) 0.86 78.6 (14) 3.7 (6.2) DR, M, II
Game 3
Team a 205 (467) 0.88 62.5 (10) 13.3 (23.2) DR, M
Team b 236 (544) 0.93 50 (10) 16.7 (32.7) DR, II
Game 4
Team a 129 (224) 0.83 75 (10) 7.3 (9.1) DR
Team b 78 (245) 0.82 56 (11) 4.6 (3.7) DR
Game 5
Team a 131 (189) 0.89 74.1 (13) 5.2 (6.1) DR, II
Team b 110 (207) 0.86 65.4 (12) 4.2 (4.3) DR, M
Table 1: Summary of data for competitive low-frequency condition. Notes: a)
score before penalty given in brackets; b) 1 - mean distance between team-mates
(higher figure means greater convergence); see Section 4.2. c) excludes first round
and rounds where players made no response; number of responses made given in
brackets. d) based on all rounds; mean gift to team-mates only given in brackets.
e) see section 4.4.1.
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Scorea Convergence % Correct Mean Strategies
levelb recognitionsc giftd employede
Game 6
Team a 588 (659) 0.86 92.6 (12) 20.8 (38.1) DR, M, II , SH
Team b 195 (251) 0.92 72.4 (14) 4.2 (6.8) DR, M
Game 7
Team a 59 (89) 0.92 60 (15) 2.1 (2.5) DR, II
Team b 141 (149) 0.89 68.97 (14) 1.8 (3.1) DR, II
Game 8
Team a 146 (162) 0.87 65.5 (14) 3.9 (6.1) DR, M, II
Team b 122 (161) 0.86 83.3 (15) 2.7 (4.4) DR, M, II
Game 9
Team a 142 (176) 0.93 62.96 (12) 4.3 (6.1) DR
Team b 1057 (1248) 0.86 100 (10) 36.8 (71.6) DR, II, SH
Game 10
Team a 78 (91) 0.88 62.1 (14) 1.2 (1.7) DR
Team b 95 (95) 0.86 73.3 (15) 1.1 (1.6) DR, II
Table 2: Summary of data for competitive high-frequency condition. Notes:
a) score before penalty given in brackets; b) 1 - mean distance between team-mates
(higher figure means greater convergence); see Section 4.2. c) excludes first round
and rounds where players made no response; number of responses made given in
brackets. d) based on all rounds; mean gift to team-mates only given in brackets.
e) see section 4.4.1.
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4.1 Recognising team-mates
In the second stage of each round in the competitive condition, players were
asked: ‘Were you talking to someone on your own team?’ and answered on a
scale of 1 to 4, where 1 meant ‘Definitely not’ and 4 meant ‘Definitely’. The
third column of Tables 1 and 2 shows the percentage of correct recognitions
for each team, where an answer of 1 or 2 is taken to mean ‘no’, and an answer
of 3 or 4 is taken to mean ‘yes’.4 As can be seen, players were more often
right than wrong. All 258 judgements for the low-frequency condition were
submitted to a binomial sign test. The result is significant (S = 91 incor-
rect; p < .001), but less impressive than it seems. Players in this condition
interacted more with the opposing team than their own. Had they guessed 1
or 2 every time, they would actually have done better (S = 80 incorrect out
of 280; p < .001).
It is possible, however, that these explicit judgements hide more impres-
sive implicit judgements. To test whether players treated all assumed oppo-
nents the same, gifts were compared (as a proportion of the player’s resources
at the time of donation) for those rounds where they voted ‘no’: if players
were talking to team-mates, did they give them more than they gave their
opponents, despite explicitly guessing ‘opponent’ in both cases? In fact, a
Wilcoxon T test (where N1 = 32 and N2 = 121) showed that gifts to team-
mates were significantly larger in these rounds than gifts to opponents (T
= 2504, p < .05); furthermore, gifts to team-mates in these rounds did not
differ significantly from gifts to team-mates where players guessed ‘yes’ (T
= 913.5, N1 = 32 and N2 = 61; p > .05). This suggests that, while play-
ers learnt that they were more likely to be paired with an opponent than a
team-mate, and made their explicit judgements on this basis, they were still
in many cases able to identify their team-mates, if only on a subconscious
level.
In the high-frequency condition, players were paired equally often with
opponents as with team-mates, and they did significantly better than chance
at noticing which was the case (S = 75 incorrect out of 285; p < .001). In
this condition, there was no significant difference between gifts to opponents
and team-mates on those rounds where players thought they were paired
with opponents (T = 3620.5, N1 = 49 and N2 = 127; p > .05).
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4.2 Linguistic divergence
To measure the degree to which players converged and diverged linguisti-
cally, every individual word used in each game was extracted along with
a frequency count for each player (i.e. how many times each player used a
given form) and sorted into ‘variable sets’, according to which players could
be compared. For example, one player might use only the form ‘nimu’ to
refer to meat, while another player might use ‘nimu’ sometimes and (the
innovative form) ‘nimo’ the rest of the time. These—along with any other
forms used to mean ‘meat’ in a given game—would constitute a variable
set. The innovative forms appear mainly to have risen accidentally, through
typing mistakes or memory lapses, although several players claimed to have
intentionally introduced small innovations (see Section 4.4.1). On the basis
of these sets, pairs of players could be compared according to which vari-
ant they favoured. This is analogous to variation in real language, where
speakers vary in the phonetic forms they use (e.g. the word ‘meat’ might be
pronounced variously as [mit], [miP], [mIit], [m@IP] etc.). Most variation was
analogous to this kind of phonetic variation, and the introduction of entirely
new forms—that had no obvious connection with the original form—was ex-
tremely rare: there were only two clear cases across all conditions (noti for
kebi ‘not’; and penah, and variations on it, for leba ‘fish’).5
For each condition, all the forms used were assigned to variable sets as
described and the raw frequency scores converted to proportions. The mean
Euclidean distance between each pair of players was then calculated. Ta-
ble 3 shows a simple example, taken from one game, of a small variable set
consisting of two variants. The number on the left of each cell is the raw
frequency and the number in brackets is the proportion. The form lale was
given to participants in the word list at the start of the game, and glossed as
‘you’. The variant lele most likely arose as an error, but was the only form
Player 2 used throughout the game. Player 4, as it happened, was similarly
consistent in her use of the other form. Table 4 shows the mean distance (in
proportions) between every pair of players for this example set; the smallest
distances are marked in bold.
The second column of Tables 1 and 2 shows the mean level of convergence
for every team (calculated as 1 minus the mean distance between team-mates
across variable sets; a score of 1 would indicate complete convergence). Only
in Game 9 was there a significant difference (p = 0.035, based on a Monte
Carlo test) between the convergence level of the two teams. For the majority
14
of games, therefore, both teams were converged to a similar level. It is
important to note, however, that this is not a measure of between-team
divergence: if all four players in a game used the language in exactly the same
way, both teams would show the same level of convergence; on the other hand,
two teams could show the same level of convergence, yet diverge significantly
from each other. To test whether teams had diverged in any condition,
the variable sets were scored: if, for a given variable set in the competitive
condition, every player was closer to their team-mate than to either of their
opponents (which is the case in the example set), the set was awarded a score
of 1 (meaning that the teams had diverged with regard to this variable); if this
was true of both members of only one team, the set was scored 0.5; otherwise,
it was scored 0 (meaning no between-team divergence). The scores for all
variable sets were summed in each condition. P values were calculated using
the Monte Carlo method (the data was shuffled and rescored 10,000 times).
Precisely the same method was employed for the cooperative conditions,
except that ‘team-mate’ here meant the player corresponding to a team-mate
in the competitive condition, namely those who happened to be paired in the
first round. In the high-frequency condition, this meant a player’s team-mate
was the player they were paired with most often. If social selection did not
play a significant role in stimulating divergence, and frequency of interaction
were sufficient on its own, we should thus not expect a significant difference
between the competitive and cooperative high-frequency conditions, as the
frequency of interaction was the same in the two conditions.
Team 1 Team 2
Player 1 Player 2 Player 3 Player 4
lale 2 (.2) 0 (0) 12 (.857) 43 (1)
lele 8 (.8) 18 (1) 2 (.143) 0 (0)
Table 3: Example variable set
The first two rows of Table 5 show the resulting p values: there was
significant divergence in only one condition. The competitive and cooperative
conditions were also compared directly by performing a Monte Carlo test on
the scores for each variable set. The results of this are shown in the third
row of Table 5: there was a significant difference between conditions only in
the high-frequency condition, suggesting that both a pressure to distinguish
between team-mates and opponents and sufficiently frequent interaction with
the former can cause divergence in the short term.
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Team 1 Team 2
Player 1 Player 2 Player 3 Player 4
Player 1 0 .2 .657 .5
Player 2 .2 0 .857 .5
Player 3 .657 .857 0 .143
Player 4 .5 .5 .143 0
Table 4: Mean distances between players in example set
high-frequency low-frequency
Competitive p = .0014** p = .566
Cooperative p = .937 p = .275
Conditions compared p = .027* p = .275
Table 5: Significance values for linguistic divergence per condition
4.3 Comparison with score
In four out of five competitive games in the high-frequency condition, the
team that made the greatest number of correct judgements also won the
game; and in the one game where this was not the case, the score before
penalty was extremely close (161 to 162). This suggests, as expected, that
there is a fitness advantage to being able to identify members of one’s own
community, which agrees with the finding in Roberts (2008).
The low-frequency condition was very different; the team that made the
most correct guesses in this condition had the lower score before penalty
in every case. This suggests (as is supported by players’ own evaluations in
feedback questionnaires) that players were not doing well at recognising their
team-mates, at least on a conscious level (see Section 4.1). As noted above,
players would be correct in their judgements two thirds of the time simply
by guessing 1 or 2 every round.
In neither condition was there a significant correlation between level of
convergence and score (low-frequency condition: r(8) = .49, p > .05; high-
frequency condition: r(8) = -.38, p > .05) and, as noted in Section 4.2,
there was a significant difference between levels of within-team convergence
in only one game—Game 9—where the most closely converged team was in
fact the losing team. While this appears to contradict expectations, it is not
as strange as it may appear. For team-mates to be able to identify each other,
an especially high level of convergence is in fact unnecessary; one suitably
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salient variant or shared code is sufficient for recognition; and, as can be seen
from Table 2, the winning team in Game 9 had a particularly powerful code:
a ‘secret handshake’ (see Section 4.4.1). The overall levels of within-team
convergence and between-team divergence are better treated as by-products
of adaptive strategies rather than as strategies themselves. The next section
discusses the strategies that players actually used.
4.4 Strategy
4.4.1 Identification strategies
The strategies available to players to identify, and be identified as, team-
mates can be summarised as follows:6
• Dialect recognition (DR): try to remember how different players use
the language and identify them based on this. For example, a player
in Game 8 noticed (and mentioned in feedback) that another player
always spelt dobo as dovo.
• Intentional innovation (II): make changes to the language that are likely
to be recognisable. For example, a player in Game 10 (team b) exag-
gerated the form of the greeting (suto) by repeating the final vowel
(e.g. sutooo, sutooooooo etc.).
• Mimicry (M): try to sound as much like the person you’re talking to as
possible. For example, the team-mate of the ‘sutooo’ player in Game
10 also used the form ‘sutooo’ on two occasions.
• ‘Secret handshake’ (SH): say something at the beginning of the in-
teraction that identifies you to your team-mate (and ideally not your
opponent), and requires a specific response from them (see below for
an example).
The strategies are referred to in abbreviated form in the last column of
Tables 1 and 2. Inclusion in that column is based on players’ own reporting
in feedback questionnaires of the strategies they employed and, where this
can be clearly seen, evidence in the data.
As the tables show, the rarest, but apparently most successful, strategy
was ‘secret handshake’, which occurred in Games 6 and 9. The more sophis-
ticated of the two handshakes evolved to have three parts: one player gave
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the word for ‘hello’: vobu; the other responded by repeating it twice: vobu
vobu; and the first responded again with vobu vobu!!!. Both handshakes were
reliable enough to allow members of this team to exchange large amounts of
resources with little fear of being tricked by the opposing team, and both
teams won their games. Considering the power of this strategy, it is notable
that it was used so rarely. The strategy is costly, however: given the rather
tight time constraints in the game, devising and attempting to establish a
shared system of this kind is very difficult, particularly when there is uncer-
tainty about the identity of one’s interlocutor. There are no proper examples
of it in the low-frequency condition, where the low frequency of interaction
between team-mates made it especially difficult to establish. One player in
Game 3 seems to have attempted to establish such a system by repeating the
word for hello three times at the start of each round (‘suve suve suve’), but
her team-mate failed to catch on, and she gave up the endeavour. It is worth
noting, however, that this player was also the least conservative player in the
condition (she gave away a mean of 16.9 points per round; see Section 4.4.2),
and the only player in the condition to give her opponents less than half
what she gave her team-mate. Her team won the game and was the highest
scoring team in the condition.
4.4.2 Giving behaviour
The fourth column of Tables 1 and 2 shows the mean amount of resources
given away per round by each team, and the mean amount given to team-
mates (whether or not players guessed who they were paired with). The
most successful teams were the most generous. In both conditions, however,
most players were rather conservative in their gift-giving. Even in the first
round, when players were told explicitly that they would be paired with their
team-mates, only one player gave away everything, and only one other gave
away more than half their resources. It is worth bearing in mind that there
are very few real-life situations where giving away all your resources is a good
idea. The importance of keeping resources balanced to avoid a penalty also
encouraged caution.
Two teams stand out in both conditions as being the least conservative;
these are the only teams with a mean gift of over 10. There is a difference
between the two conditions, however. In the low-frequency condition, the
non-conservative players began giving away large amounts of resources in the
last five rounds of the game—a behaviour that appears to have originated
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with one player in the eleventh round and spread to the others. Players
also did not discriminate successfully between team-mates and opponents in
their generosity. In the high-frequency condition, on the other hand, non-
conservatives were more consistently generous: all gave away more than 20%
of their resources on at least four rounds apart from the first (where all
gave over 30%). They were also more discriminating. It is not surprising
that generosity only occurs as a consistent behaviour in those teams that
developed ‘secret handshakes’; not only does the secret handshake provide a
more secure environment for generous giving, it is itself costly to establish,
and thus a non-conservative behaviour.
4.4.3 Relation between strategy and linguistic divergence
The ‘secret handshakes’ discussed above have parallels in real-life linguistic
behaviour. Cruttenden (1986/1997, 169) notes, for example, that greetings
and other social formulas are ‘particularly susceptible to the idiosyncratic
use of tones’. Occurring early and almost obligatorily in social interactions,
yet carrying little semantic load, they are a convenient focus for variation
and a useful linguistic marker, and this can lead to divergence in greeting
behaviour between groups of speakers (see also Manzini, Sadrieh, & Vriend,
2009 for experimental evidence for the role of gestures like smiles, winks and
handshakes in enhancing coordination by eliciting trust). While they are
an impressive strategy, however, they are a special case. The main focus
of this paper is on the large-scale, though subtler, divergence discussed in
Section 4.2.
This divergence was mainly the result of the other linguistic strategies,
but an important point should be noted: not all these strategies can neces-
sarily be expected to lead to linguistic divergence or convergence (they did
not in the other conditions, at any rate to a significant level) and, when they
do, this is not necessarily the conscious aim of the individuals involved; diver-
gence is better understood as a large-scale by-product, or ‘epiphenomenon’
(cf. Keller, 1994), of smaller-scale strategies on the part of individuals. An
important strategy in this respect is mimicry, as this is the means by which
variant forms are adopted. ‘Intentional innovation’ also plays a role, as, like
accidental and unconscious innovation, it increases the number of new vari-
ants available for propagation between team-mates. Finally ‘dialect recogni-
tion’, the most commonly used strategy, encourages team-mates to converge,
since convergence reduces the amount of information that needs to be mem-
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orised about one’s team-mates’ linguistic behaviour. This can be expected
to become more and more important as group size increases, to the point
where keeping track of variation on the individual level becomes impossible
(cf. Dunbar, 1993).
4.4.4 Summary
The most successful strategy was a combination of generous giving and the
intentional creation of complex salient markers. Both are potentially costly
behaviours, but the latter helped create an environment in which the former
was less risky. Two points should be borne in mind, however. First, most
players engaged very little in either of these behaviours. The majority relied
instead on recognising less salient patterns of variation, some innovation,
mimicry, and a conservative exchange of resources. It is this behaviour, not
the more sophisticated ‘secret handshake’ strategies that led to the divergence
described in Section 4.2. Secondly, these strategies were very successful only
where frequency of contact between fellow group members was sufficiently
high. Where it was low, the establishment of complex shared codes seems to
have been too difficult.
5 Discussion
There is disagreement in the literature regarding the relative roles of social
selection and frequency of interaction in stimulating linguistic divergence. In
this experiment, players were able to identify their team-mates reliably only
when they communicated with them 50% of the time, but this frequency of
interaction only led to linguistic divergence where there was pressure to use
the language to mark identity. Neither of these factors was sufficient on its
own. This is not to say that neither factor can ever be sufficient; it is at
least plausible that much longer games would have seen divergence in other
conditions. The results show that a combination of frequent interaction and
pressure to distinguish in-group from out-group encourages a language to
diverge over a very short period of time.
These results replicate the results of Roberts (2008), and support the
findings of Nettle and Dunbar (1997) and Nettle (1999): a pressure for so-
cial selection increases the amount of divergence between groups in spite of
inter-group contact; in addition, the level of isolation in the high-frequency
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condition was not sufficient to produce significant divergence in the absence
of social selection. As Dunbar (2003, p. 230) accepts, however, there is no
reason to reject drift as an explanation for language diversity over long time
periods. In this respect, these results do not contradict the findings of Liv-
ingstone and Fyfe (1999) and Livingstone (2002).
The study has certain limitations. As each game requires four partici-
pants, the number of games is relatively small in each condition; the games
were also relatively short. An obvious future direction would be to run larger-
scale and longer games. There was also little scope in the experiment for
investigating the role of such factors as changing team dynamics, or greater
communicative pressures to encourage meaning-based change (cf. Smith,
2007), which can all be expected to play a role in real-life language change.
It would be interesting in the future to incorporate these factors. Finally, in
contrast with the computational simulations described in Section 2, which all
involved multiple generations of agents, this study involved only one genera-
tion of speakers—although the output of the previous generation is simulated
by the word-lists and cartoons in the training rounds. It would be interesting
to incorporate inter-generational change into the game by using the output
of one set of players to create the word-lists for the next set (cf. Kirby et al.,
2008). It is nonetheless striking that divergence can be observed in the lab-
oratory in only one generation (and—given that the game consists of fewer
than twenty rounds of a few minutes each—over a very short time period).
To think solely in terms of divergence would be misleading. This is how
we normally perceive the phenomenon in question—we consider, for instance,
that Proto-Romance diverged into the modern Romance languages—but con-
vergence is of just as much importance. Indeed, divergence occurred in all
conditions of the game: just as no two speakers of Italian can be expected
to have identical idiolects, no two players in the game used the alien lan-
guage in exactly the same way. The between-team divergence measured in
the game, however, depends not only on the distance between teams, but
also on the distance between team-mates. It is important to be clear about
the direction of the relationship: within-team convergence does not necessar-
ily mean between-team divergence, but the latter does imply the former. In
other words, if team-mates sound like each other, this does not mean they
don’t sound like their opponents; to be able to say that one team does not
sound like the other, on the other hand, we need to also be able to say that
members of one team have something in common.
Divergence occurs in two ways: through innovation in a subset of speak-
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ers, and as a by-product of convergence (where not all speakers converge).
Innovation can result from both error and intention; both occurred in the ex-
periment. Convergence occurs when speakers imitate each other’s patterns
of usage. Where players claimed to have done this intentionally in the game,
this has been referred to as mimicry; but there is a substantial literature
showing that this behaviour consistently occurs on an unconscious level in
dialogue (e.g. Giles, Coupland, & Coupland, 1991; Shepard, Giles, & Poire,
2001), while the interactive alignment model predicts convergence as a func-
tion of the amount of interaction (Pickering & Garrod, 2004). Indeed, it is
almost always reasonable to accommodate to one’s interlocutor. Rationally,
this is less necessary in the ‘cooperative’ condition of the game, where there’s
only one side to be on. However, the interactive alignment model predicts
that speakers will accommodate in this condition too, and this is a reasonable
expectation: alignment aids communicative success. Moreover, if alignment
is advantageous in the way suggested, then it is likely operate on a ‘rule-of-
thumb’ level (cf. Goodie, Ortmann, Davies, Bullock, & Werner, 1999). Yet
the results in Section 4.2 show a difference in levels of convergence between
the competitive and cooperative games. The divergence in the competitive
condition cannot therefore be explained purely on the basis of frequency of
interaction. That is not to say that the results contradict the view that fre-
quency of interaction alone may lead to linguistic divergence. They strongly
suggest, however, that a pressure to select linguistic variants on the basis of
their social significance plays an important role in speeding up this process.
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1It will be noted that even games in the ‘cooperative’ condition were competitive with
respect to other groups of players in the same condition. The conditions are named with
regard to within-game competition.
2There was one exception, where two participants in the same session turned out un-
expectedly to know each other; they were put (unknown to them) on separate teams.
3They were not given this from the beginning of the training session, as early pilots
had suggested that it distracted too much from the word-lists.
4The responses from the first round, where players know they are talking to their team-
mate, were ignored, as were rounds where players neglected to respond. It will also be
recalled (see Section 3.3) that games in the high-frequency condition were one round longer
than in the low-frequency condition.
5No distinction was made between different kinds of variant (e.g. on the basis of edit
distance), and all the variation measured was on the individual-word level. Word order or
punctuation, for example, was not taken into account; these sources of variation remain
open to future investigation.
6A few players also claimed to have attempted to keep track of their team-mates’
resources (based on what they offered and asked for) so as to identify them on this basis.
Since they reported very little success at this, it will be ignored in the following analysis.
It should also be noted that it is hard to identify cases of intentional mimicry in the data;
this may therefore be underreported.
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